

THE JAINA RELIGION

and

LITERATURE

VOLUME I: PART I

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Price Re. 0-10-0

Published by
MOTILAL BANARSI DASS
Booksellers & Publishers,
Sudhintha Street,
LAHORE

**TO
HIS HOLINESS
VIJAYAVALLABHA SŪRIJI**

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P R E F A C E

We are not, indeed, wholly without manuals in English dealing with the subject treated in this work. But, there is still, I think, room for a work like the present one, which may be found useful by the general English reader and student as it tries to furnish in a moderate compass a thorough exposition of the important *Jaina* tenets and terminology along with *Jaina* ritual and literature. My aim in writing this work is that Jainism as expounded by the *Tirthankaras* especially by Lord *Pārśva* and Lord *Mahavīra* may be correctly understood and justly evaluated.

In preparing this work, I have tried to consult as many sources as were available to me out of those mentioned at the end, and I take this opportunity of thanking the authors concerned. I have cited, where needed, authorities without quoting them *in extenso*. I am thankful to Mr S P Badami B A, LL B, a retired Small Causes Court Judge for the valuable suggestions he made while going through the press copy at the suggestion of Jainācārya Vījya-

vallabha Sūriji I am deeply indebted to this venerable Sūriji, for, it was at his instance that I undertook this work. A scheme was suggested by him as he wanted to have a book prepared for the students of "Shri Atmanand Jain College" (Ambalā City) which provides for the imparting of religious and moral instructions on a broad theistic basis. I hope that the readers who may get benefitted by this work will join me in expressing gratitude towards him.

When the complete press copy was ready by July, 1943, this work was divided into two parts the first dealing with 'Jaina Dharma' and the second with 'Jaina Literature'. But, owing to the abnormal times the progress of printing has been delayed. So the original plan of issuing both the parts as one volume is now modified, and Volume I containing chapters I to XIII of Part I is being published. Volume II will consist of the remaining chapters of part I and part II complete. Further, analysis, bibliography of Jainism, and list of abbreviations, which were meant to be given on the completion of the work, are included in this Volume.

I have twice gone through the pagination

proofs of this work. But even then some mistakes have remained unnoticed. These are attended to in the errata.

In the end, I crave indulgence of the learned readers for any omissions or commissions and request them to weigh the worth of this work after taking into account my various commitments and especially the unfavourable circumstances during which I had to carry on this work.

M. T. B. College,
SURAT
27th November, 1944

Hiralal R. Kapadia

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List of Abbreviations

A J P = Anekantajayapatākā

A T L = Adhyatmatattvāloka

A V = After the nirvana of Lord Mahavira

D K J P = The Doctrine of Karman in the Jaina
Philosophy

D P M = Digest of Padmānanda Mahakāvya

E J = An Epitome of Jainism

H C L J = A History of the Canonical Literature
of the Jainas

H I L = A History of Indian Literature

H J = The Heart of Jainism

H K L = A History of Kanarese Literature

J B O R S = Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research
Society

J C = Jaina Culture

J K C = Jainism and Karnataka Culture

J U B = Journal of the University of Bombay

Lat = Laterally

Mh B = Mahabharata

M L T = Mahavira His Life and Teachings

O J = Outlines of Jainism

P = Palya

ERRATA

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
11	20	Under	By
20	8	momentous	o
22	last but one	Yasoda	Anodya
59	9	bondange	bondage
65	20	on	in
68	9	twenty two	twenty five
73	.	struk /	struck,
83	27	destruction	/
87	5	to form a body	

THE JAINA RELIGION AND LITERATURE

PART I

THE JAINA DHARMA

CHAPTER I

Dharma

Every mundane being hankers after happiness and abhors misery, and that is why it is anxious to know and follow a path which can lead to the desired goal. This path is manifold, for, every prophet has chalked out a line suitable at least to his followers and the age in which he flourished. Each of these lines goes by the name of *dharma*¹. It enjoins noble and ennobling principles such as 'live and let live', and 'be honest, chaste and content'. These are the corner-

1 This can be roughly translated as 'religion'. The word 'religion' is differently defined. Romain Rolland's definition of religion as given in his *Life of Rama Krishna* is "the search for truth at all costs with single minded sincerity prepared for any sacrifice, faith in an end to human effort higher than the life of existing society, and even higher than the life of humanity as a whole."

(Quoted from *Jawaharlal Nehru an autobiography* p. 380)

"Religion is the act of bringing one's own life up to an accepted standard of excellence morally and spiritually." So says Herbert Warren in *Jainism* (p. 3)

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68	9	twenty two	twenty five
73	.	struk	struck
83	27	destruction	separation
87	5	to form a body	to acquire a capacity to form a body
96	3	This soul	For such a movement this soul
110	14	<i>utalika</i>	<i>utkalika</i>
131	2	subordinate	subordinated
145	4	mean	means
156	10	<i>gan:</i>	<i>gun:</i>
186	8	a piece of wood	a bamboo bark
190	21	<i>asatmkheya</i>	<i>asankheya</i>

THE JAINA RELIGION AND LITERATURE

PART I

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CHAPTER I

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stones of ethics¹ But *dharma* does not mean only ethics It deals with metaphysics theology and ritualism as well It examines the problem of evil and the origin of the universe It defines the attributes of God if it postulates or proves His existence It explains the relationship between man and God² and between man and the universe as well Further it propounds the devotional³ and ecstatic⁴ aspects of ritualism Its main function is to point out a practical path which if properly followed can make any and every living being eventually attain perfect evolution and freedom from miseries and worries for ever In other words all the rules for ordering life are so enjoined that they give a practical aid in attaining the perfection of the self

Different prophets have propounded different tenets in this connection But some of the preachers and interpreters of these tenets failed to realise and evaluate

1 It deals with the problem of man's conduct in society

2 This is only a part of theology for it also teaches what our I or ego is

3 This aspect is like the devotion of wife to husband or of child to father The devotee feels near to and in the presence of the great rich brilliant burning ideal which has presented itself to him as an ever inspiring ever vivifying infinity of purity and joy Vide *Outlines of Jainism* (p xx v)

4 In this aspect it is the husband or father conscious of his power of his reception of the devotion of wife or child The ecstasy feels itself to be the light —*Ibid* p xxiv

them in a correct way. This became a means of misguiding the masses regarding their destinies and duties. It has given rise to various beliefs, meaningless superstitions and undesirable ceremonials¹, and has at times created an atmosphere where the utility of *dharma* is not only challenged but its holy name is even jeered at.

Dharma connotes more than what is expressed by religion. It is one and not many, for it is truth and truth is universal and never sectarian, and that is why it neither comes in conflict with true science, nor runs counter to the laws of human understanding. It is open to all and needs no blind faith to support it for it thoroughly stands the test of reason. Not only does it protect man from degradation and difficulty but it immensely helps him in facing them and attaining unadulterated and perpetual bliss. It acts as a unifying force and not as a dividing factor, and thus it forms a nucleus of universal brotherhood.

Whatever the allegations of the antagonists of *dharma* may be, they fail to belittle its importance. These allegations at best expose pseudo religions and thus rather serve *dharma* than harm it—much less dethrone it or demolish it.

All religions from the most primitive to the most fully evolved admit a superhuman being or power. Its nature is however variously defined by different

1 This leads to downright hypocrisy and drives away sincerity the soul of all religiosity.

persons even in the same country. These differences combined with those pertaining to the practical expression of dependence on a superhuman being or power have led to the rise of a number of religions.

Religions differ from one another according to the scope they give to sentimental, intellectual and practical elements which are the main constituents of *dharma*¹. In some religions God is recognised as the centre from which they proceed and to which they return again. They are thus theocentric religions. Some are anthropocentric for man is the centre of these religions. Herein man is either considered as superior to gods or at least competent enough to reach the superiority by his intellectual powers or that God is looked upon as a further development of the man up to the utmost perfection attainable in this world.

That religion which can do the greatest good to

1 Dr Otakar Perold observes in *The place and Importance of Jainism in the Comparative Science of Religions* (p. 15)

In most of the religions the practical element which appears in the shape of rites and ceremonies overgrows the whole religion in such a way that the other elements become only subordinate addition the sentimental element being still a favourite. The cultivation of the intellectual element is the special feature of the Aryan religions. But only in Jainism all these elements are well balanced whilst in the old Brahmanism and in Buddhism the cultivation of the intellectual element is often exaggerated.

the greatest number of living beings—which can secure absolute and eternal happiness for the living beings by the shortest and simplest process is considered excellent. Several religionists assert that their religion alone is the best. The *Jainas*¹, too, sail in the same boat. The object of this work is mainly² to demonstrate as to how far their claim is justifiable. We therefore propose in the following pages to examine the *Jaina* view about the problem of evil, the method suggested for reducing miseries to nothing by their spiritual leaders and the consequent attainment of the *summum bonum* Jainism promises. But before we do so we may note that according to the *Jaina* tradition, philosophical and religious principles of Jainism have been propounded by their *Jinas* i.e. *Tirthankaras*—the persons who have crossed the ocean of mundane existence and reached the shore of eternal serenity, after they had attained omniscience by their own effort and not through any divine or supernatural agency³. These principles have been

1 'Jaina' means a follower of *Jina* the victor of passions who is also known as a *Tirthankara*.

2 Incidentally this will serve as a means for studying Jainism to a student of comparative religions—the student who wishes to broaden, strengthen and universalize the basis of reason. It will at the same time serve to eradicate the misconceptions about Jainism—the misconceptions based upon half knowledge or prejudice or error.

3 This implies that Jainism is not a revelation.

recapitulated in the *Jaina* scriptures and rational argumentation to support and check them has been indulged in wherever possible and desirable. For Jainism now definitely admitted as one of the most ancient monastic organisations of India arrives at some of its view points about the universe in a way which is not within the reach of the limited comprehension of any and every average man

CHAPTER II

Antiquity and Spread of Jainism

Truth and untruth are both coeval : to say they have been existing and will exist side by side in the world. According to the *Jainas* their religion as propounded by their omniscient *Tirthankaras* is nothing but truth and hence they are inclined to believe that there was never an age when Jainism did not exist at least in some part of the world and that there will never come an age when it will be completely wiped out from the surface of our globe.

Leaving aside this view we can assert without any reserve that it is neither an off shoot of Buddhism propounded by Lord Buddha as some of the oriental and occidental scholars once believed¹ nor is it a branch of the *Vaidika* religion so often named as Brahmanism² and popularly designated as Hinduism.

1 Just as H T Colebrooke and others looked upon Buddhism as an off shoot of Jainism so H H Wilson A Weber and others looked upon Jainism as an off shoot of Buddhism. But it was Dr H Jacob who in 189 A D ably proved that Jainism and Buddhism had each a separate and independent existence.

2 From the original stock of the Indian Religion Jainism and Buddhism branched off as separate religions many years after the time of the great reformers Mahāvira and Gautama.

According to the late 'Punjab kesari' Vijayananda Sūri alias Ātmāramaji Mahārāja (1837 A D — 1897 A D) some of the *Jaina Tīrthankaras* are alluded to in *Yajurveda* (IX 25') *Taittirīya Aranyaka* (I 1² IV, 5 17' V, 4') etc. It appears that there are references to *Jaina* saints and their doctrines in *Mahābhārata*. For instance *ḷṣapanaka* is mentioned in *Ādi parvan* (III 126)³ *bhāia yajña* in *Śanti parvan* (CCCLXVI) and *saptabhangī*⁶ in *Śanti parvan* (CCXXVIII V 6)

Buddha and even when eventually Brahmanism Jainism and Buddhism stood out as rival religions in the country they influenced each other much more profoundly than their followers care to admit. Owing to their common origin they possess mainly the same religious traditions including the Pantheons — Dr A B Dhruva's Notes (p 5) to his edition of *Syadvāda māñjari*.

1 2 Here is mentioned Aristanemi the 22nd *Tīrtha kara* of the present *atascarpi* 11

The word Aristanemi occurs at least in the *Śāntipatha* of the *Munḍaka Prāṇa* and *Manḍukya Upaniṣad* of the *Atharvaveda*. There it is an epithet of Tarkṣya : e Aruna the herald of the sun. In *Aṣṭadhyayi* (VI 2 100) there is a reference to an *Ariṣṭīritapura*. Vide Prahlād C Divanji's article 'Origin of the Bhagavata and Jaina Religions' published in the *Annals of B O R I* (Silver Jubilee Volume p 122)

3 4 Herein there is a reference to *Arhat* which means a *Tīrthanakara*

5 The word *śramana* similarly occurs in *Ramayana* (I 14 22) and it is interpreted by the commentators as a *Digambara Jaina*

its exposition see Chapter xi

Badarayanasūtra (II, 33) refers to *syādiada*¹ That is how it has been interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya and others *Bhagavata purāṇa* (skandha v, adhyāyas 3-6) supplies us with the biography of Lord Ṛṣabha², and so does *Skanda purāṇa*³ This *Tīrthanāra* is mentioned in *Brahmaṇḍa purāṇa Śiṣya-purāṇa* and *Nāga purāṇa* as well *Vīdo Tattvanirṇayaprasada* (pp 506-523)⁴ Some of the Mathura inscriptions too refer to Lord Ṛṣabha.

From this it may be safely inferred that Lord Mahāvīra (599 B C—527 B C)⁵ was not the founder of Jainism. He was not the first to conceive the cardinal principles of Jainism but he rather gave a different shape to the religion propounded by his predecessor

1 For its elucidation see Chapter XII

2 He is mentioned by Dharmakīrti in *Viśvajñānu* (chap III p 126 l 18) and in its commentary by Dharmottara (p 128, l 19)

3 In M Bh (xii 1, 125-130) Lord Ṛṣabha is designated as *Brahmarṣi* and as one of the Sāṅkhyācāryas who preceded Kapila

4 A few extracts from this are given by Mr M J Mehta in his introduction (p iv) to *Adhyatmatattvaloka*

5 According to *Parameśvarāraṇa* (viii 339) Lord Mahāvīra attained salvation 155 years before the accession of Candragupta which is usually assigned a date 323 or 321 B C. Thus there is a difference of opinion about the date of this salvation amongst the Jains as well as amongst the modern scholars. In the case of Jesus Christ it was noticed after a number of years that his birth-date was really about four years earlier than the commencement of his era.

Lord Parsva (877 B C—777 B C) who lived about 250 years prior to him. This is what several scholars mean while tracing the origin of the five *mahāvratas*¹ in *cāturyāma dhārma*² of Lord Parsva.

It may be added that modern historical research has proved beyond doubt on the basis of literary evidences³ that Lord Parsva and Lord Mahavira (the elder contemporary of Lord Buddha) are not mythical figures. For instance *Viahapannatti*⁴ (I 9 s 77) deals with a discourse between Kālāsyaśisikaputra (P Kālasavesīyaputta) a follower of Lord Parsva and disciples of Lord Mahavira as regards various topics. An *agama* named *Uttarajjhayana*⁵ (XXIII) records a conversation between Indrabhūti the first *Gaṇadhara* (immediate and principal disciple—apostle) of Lord Mahavira and Keśin a follower of Lord Parsva. *Āyāra*⁶ (II s 401) says that the parents of Lord Mahavira were worshippers of Lord Parsva. *Sūyagaḍa*⁷ (II 7) notes a discussion between Indrabhūti and Uḍaka a follower of Lord Parsva.

The inscriptional evidence of the 3rd century B C supports this view for in the seventh pillar edicts

1 See Chapter XIV

2 See Chapter XIV

3 These are (i) based upon the *Jaina* canon or direct and (ii) based upon the *Buddha* canon or indirect (collateral).

4-5 Each one of these is a *Jaina* scripture. For details chapters XXV I and XXV II respectively.

Th s is a *Jaina* scripture. For details see ch XXVI.

usually ascribed to Emperor Asoka¹ there is mention of *nigantḥas* (knot less or unfettered) who seem to be no other than the followers of Lord Mahavira and the Hathigumpha inscription of Emperor Kharavela appears to honour this very sect.

Lord Ariṣṭanemi was a cousin of Lord Kṛṣṇa according to *Jaina* works². These two great personages along with Pradumna, son of Kṛṣṇa by Rukmini are dealt with, at great length in the *Jaina* and *Bhagavata* works. So it is rather difficult to believe that Lord Ariṣṭanemi is merely a mythical personage and not one who actually had a physical existence especially when the *Jaina* mythological works contain a considerable wealth of several details regarding the *Yadavas* whereas the *Bhagavata* works only such as were found by their interpreters useful for developing their themes³.

That there were more than one *Tirthankaras* who

1 It was his grand son Samprati under whom the Śvetāmbara mission was sent to the South India. The earliest lithic reference to the Śvetāmbaras in South India is found in an inscription of Kadamba Magesavarman (vide 'Indian Antiquary' (ii) p. 88). Another is in *Epigraphia Carnatica* (ii Śrīvan: Belgola 254). In the former the Śvetāmbaras are called Śveta patha and in the latter Sitāmbara. Vide *Jainism and Karnataka Culture* (p. 130) by Prof. S. R. Sharma.

2 See *Triṣaṣṭhalakṣṇapuruṣacaritra* (parvan viii) and ch. iv.

3 Cf. Prahlād C. Divanji's article 'Probable dates of two Pre-historic Tirthankaras' (p. 26) published in 'Śrī Mahāvira Jaina Vidyāśāstra Rajata Mahotsava Grantha'.

preceded Lord Mahavira has been deduced by Mr Kamta Prasad Jain in his Appendix to *Lord Arishtanemi* from the following data mentioned by him —

Emperor Khāravēla names Ṛṣabha as Agrajina in his inscription of 160 B C See J B O R S (vol III p 447)

In *Maharagga* (I 22 13) there is a mention of a *Jaina* temple of Lord Suparsva (the 7th *Tirthankara*) situated at Rājagraha in the time of Lord Buddha. It further informs us that Upaka a recluse of the *Ājīvika* sect was a worshipper of Lord Ananta who could be no other than the 14th *Tirthankara* of the *Jainas* especially when the *Ājīvikas* were very much connected with and accepted most of their tenets from the *Jainas* themselves. See *Āriya Pariyesana sutta* quoted in *The Indian Historical Quarterly* (vol III p 247)

A Hindu traveller notes that King Śrenika alias Bimbisara caused to be built shrines of 24 *Jaina Tirthankaras*. Vide *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (January 1824)

Nāgendra Nath Vasu in his intro (p 6) to *Harnamśa purāṇa* vouchsafes the historicity of Lord Nemi. In this *Harnamśa purāṇa* (p 488) Lord Nemi is referred to as a cousin of Lord Kṛṣṇa.

Since Lord Kṛṣṇa is regarded as a historical person there is no reason why the same privilege should be denied to Lord Nemi.

The mention of one Nemí is found in the *Yajurveda* (IX, 25) Though there is nothing to show that he is a *Jaina*, some of the *Jainas* and some of the orthodox Brāhmanā Panditas believe him to be so.

In *Prabhāsa purana* Lord Nemí is referred to as a *Jina* who obtained salvation on the mount Raivata. He is no other than the 22nd *Tirthankara* of the *Jainas*.

[Now a word about the spread of Jainism. If it is assumed that Jainism dates at least from Lord Pārśva, it can be said that its first home was near Benares which was the seat of *Vaidika* cult, but, in course of time it migrated westwards and northwards,] with the remarkable consequences that to day there are few *Jainas* among the indigenous inhabitants of Bengal including Bihar and Orissa where the caves of Udaya giri and Khandagiri near Cuttack bear witness to its popularity in the early centuries of the Christian era. Besides, to the north in Mathura, Delhi, Jaipur and Ajmer, it is still fairly represented. There is a great influence of Jainism on the mercantile communities of Gujarat and Marwar, and there are several cultivators in the Karnāṭaka district of Belgam who are *Jainas*.

1 As regards the influence of Jainism on the province of Karnāṭaka the reader is referred to J K C. Therein on p 170 we have

"Whatever may be the antiquity of Jainism in the South no one can deny that there is enough conclusive evidence to the

Inscriptions show that Jainism was already very powerful in Orissa¹ in the second century and in Mathura in the northwest in the first century B C. Under Emperor Aśoka Jainism is said to have been introduced into Kashmīr.

Jainism found its way into Mysore² and the Tamil country at a very early date (298 or 296 B C). A twelve year famine is supposed to be the reason for this early transplanting of the faith to such a distance. It flourished exceedingly in the south till the middle of the seventh century when a *Jaina* King Kuma³ became converted to Śaivism and if we may trust the sculptures at Tiruvatur in Arcot⁴, slew with the most horrible severity thousands of his former co religionists who refused to follow his example. Even if the account of the persecution is exaggerated there is no doubt that after this time the prosperity of Jainism in

effect that at least from the beginning of the Christian era down to the epoch making conversion of Viṣṇuvardhana Hoysala by Rāmānuja in the 12th century A D Jainism was the most powerful religion in Kārnātaka.

1. Huen Tsang (629-644 A D) says that Kalinga (Orissa) is the chief centre of Jainism. So it follows that this religion had its hold on Orissa for a long time.

2. This is spoken of as the cradle of Jainism in the South in its childhood. See J K C (pp. XIII and 39).

3. See *Early History of India* (3rd edn p. 455) by Vincent Smith.

4. There is still a sisterhood of nuns in South Arcot who shave and wear white cloth. These might be *Digambaras*. So says F. Thurston in his *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* (Vol. II) J K C (p. 163).

the south steadily declined. This decline from about 1000 A. D. was due to a series of causes (i) the influence of Śaṅkaracārya (ii) the fall of Ganga kingdom of Talkad (1004 A. D.) (iii) the hostility of Chola kings towards the Jainas (iv) conversion of Ballalraja to Vaiṣṇavism (v) the revival of Vaiṣṇavism under Basava about 1160 A. D. (vi) the teaching of Madhvacārya (vii) the rising of the Brahmanical kingdom of Vijayanagar and (viii) a wave of Vaiṣṇava enthusiasm inspired by Caitanya in the 16th century. See *History of Kanarese Literature* (p. 21).

The centre of Jainism was gradually changing from Bihar to Gujarat. Some argue that this can be deduced from the fact that the great council of 454 A. D. was summoned not in the historic land of Magadha but in the western country.

The zenith of Jain prosperity lasted from this council of Valabhi down to the 13th century. Vastupāla and Tejapāla had a hand in establishing the glories of Jainism.

Jainism had once spread in Ceylon for, the chronicles of Ceylon bear testimony to this. Vide *Mahāvīra His life and Teachings* (p. 51).

As stated in *Parisiṣṭaparvan* (pp. 69 and 282) Jainism was the state religion of certain kingdoms¹

¹ Several kings of the Gaṅga and Rāstrakūṭa dynasties patronized Jainism. Even the Calukyas of the South and those of the Pāṇḍya dynasty allowed Jainism to flourish. The Pallava kings (4th to 10th centuries) too did the same. The kings of Hoysala up to 1141 A. D. or so were Jainas. For details see J. H. C. and *Medieval Jainism* by B. A. Saleore.

inasmuch as it was adopted and encouraged by certain kings. The history of North India and that of the South, too, can never be complete unless a due notice is taken of Jainism which brought about immense and important changes in the laity and the royalty thereof.

Some of the firmans' in Persian available to-day show how powerful the Śvetāmbara community was during that period and how much influence of persuasive nature it could exercise over the rulers of those days from whom they secured grants of places of pilgrimage throughout the length and breadth of India.

Jainism has never recovered its temporal power since the days of the Mahomedan conquest, it is no longer in any sense a court-religion, nevertheless the influence that it wields in India to-day is enormous. The wealth and position of the *Jainas* have helped them in getting a number of edicts issued by the rulers of Native States whereby, they have prohibited slaying of animals on *Jaina* sacred days.

The spread and importance of Jainism can be inferred from the various *Jaina* temples built at great cost in different parts of India. In the eleventh century there were temples in the United Provinces. In the Punjab, Sind, Rajputana and Central Provinces (12th to 14th centuries) there were *Jaina* temples in olden days.

Some of them are given in the Appendix of E J.

msa, (12) Vāsūpūjya, (13) Vimāla, (14) Ananta, (15) Dharma, (16) Śānti, (17) Kunthu, (18) Ara, (19) Malli, - (20) Munisuvrata, (21) Nami, (22) Nemi, (23) Pārśva and (24) Mahāvira.

There are other names, too, for some of these *Tīrthankaras*. For instance, the 1st *Tīrthankara* is named as Vṛṣabha, the 9th as Puṣpadanta, the 22nd as Ariṣṭanemi, and the 24th as Vardhamana, Jñāta-putra, Vaiśālīka, Śanmati, Devārya, Mahativira¹ etc²

Jainism divides time into infinite *kālacakras* or wheels of time which rotate ceaselessly downwards and upwards. Each *kālacakra* which may be looked upon as an aeon, is divided into two cycles known as *avasarpinī* and *utsarpinī*. The former which is as it were the falling of the wheel is a descending cycle from the stand-point of material and spiritual progress whereas the latter, which is as it were the rising of

1. Cf the following line occurring in *Dharmajayanaṁamālā* (v 116) "Sanmatir Mahativiro Mahaviro'ntyakāśyapah"

2. For various names of Lord Mahāvira see *Vīratthava*. At times he is named in the *Jaina* canonical works as *samapa*, *muni*, *māhāna*, *Videhajacca*, *Videhadinna* *Nāya* and *Kasava* too. He was known to the *Bauddhas* as *Nigantha Nātaputta*, a combination of two epithets religious and secular. The name 'Nātaputta' has a parallel in *Śakyaputta* (Buddha). He is so called as he was a scion of the *Śākya* clan. The *Bauddha* texts and commentaries however do not definitely explain the *Nātaputta*. Vide M L T (p. 5).

the wheel an ascending one¹ Each of these cycles which are equal in time is divided into six *aras* (spokes) of unequal length with their distinguishing characteristics fixed for ever

The names of the six *aras* of the *avasarpini* period are —

- (i) *Susamā-suṣama* the *ara* of extreme happiness
- (ii) *Suṣama* the *ara* of happiness
- (iii) *Suṣama duḥsama* the *ara* wherein happiness preponderates misery
- (iv) *Duḥsamā suṣama* the *ara* wherein misery exceeds happiness
- (v) *Duḥsama* the *ara* of misery It is the *ara* we are living in 2468² years have elapsed by this time
- (vi) *Duḥsamā duḥsamā*, the *ara* of extreme misery

The six *aras* of the *utsarpini* cycle have the same names but in the reverse order¹ Thus its first *ara* is named as *Duḥsama-duḥsamā* and the last as *Suṣama suṣama*

It is during the 3rd and the 4th *aras* of the *avasarpini* and *utsarpini* cycles that 24 *Tirthankaras*

1 Herein strength prosperity height of the body piety knowledge gravity and courage are on the increase Cf *Piṇḍanta's Mahapurana* (II p 25) For details see *The Heart of Jainism* (pp 272 276)

2 This date is based upon the traditional date of the nirvana of Lord Mahāvīra which is 527 B C

flourish in each of the five Bharata *ḷṣetras* and in each of the five Airāvata *ḷṣetras* as well.¹ We are here concerned with those 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* who flourished during this *Hundāvasarpīṇī* in our own country. They are none else but those whose names have been noted on pp 17-18. As regards their lives, we shall note only some momentous points, and shall begin with Lord Mahāvīra

Lord Mahāvīra—The Kṣatriya Ling Siddhārtha (P. Siddhattha)² of Kāśyapa *gotra* (lineage) had one brother named Supārśva, one daughter named Sudarśanā³ and two sons named Nandivardhana and Mahāvīra (the last being the youngest) and a Kṣatriyāni wife named Triśalā. She belonged to the Vaśiṣṭha *gotra* and was known as Videhadattā and Priyakāriṇī as well. She was a sister of Cetaka⁴ of Videha whose order was obeyed by all the Licchavis and


1. Each of the 5 Mahāvīdeha *ḷṣetras* has 32 *viḷayas*, and, in at least four of these *viḷayas* a *Tīrthaṅkara* is always to be had.

2. He is also named as Śreyāmsa (P. Sijjamsa) and Yaśasvin (P. Jasamsi). Vide *Paḷṣasatapaṅkappa* (s 107).

3. Lord Mahāvīra had an elder sister named Sudarśanā (vide *Āyāra* II, 15, 3).

4. His other relations may be represented as under.—

Mallas One night she saw 14 wonderful dreams¹ which were interpreted as foretelling the birth of an illustrious son In course of time, in 599 B C, on the 13th day of the bright half of Caitra (March April) she gave birth to Lord Mahāvira in Kundagrama, a suburb of Vaisali He is hence known as Vaisalika (P Vesaliya) The parents of Lord Mahāvira named him as Vardhamana for, since his descent in the womb of Trisala wealth fame and merit of the family had immensely increased² Gods named him as Mahāvira in virtue of his fortitude and hardihood in



C I S B E (vol xli intro p xv)

1 According to the *Digambaras* (lit sky clad) there were 16 dreams The *Sthānakavāsins* differ from the idolatrous *Svetāmbaras* (lit clad in white) regarding the nature of some of the dreams For details see II J (pp 23 25)

2 See *Payasaraṇākappa* (s 104 105)

patiently putting up with all sorts of hardship of privation for his strict adherence to the rules of asceticism and penance and no less for his complete indifference to pleasure and pain¹

Lord Mahavira is also known as Jnātaputra (P Nayaputta) as the name of his clan was Jnata (P Nāya)² He was seven cubits tall and was married³ to Yaśodā who gave birth to a daughter named Priyadarsana⁴ alias Anodyā When he was 28 years old his parents died He then wanted to renounce the world but owing to the pressure of his elder brother Nandivardhana he waited for a couple of years at the end of which period he bade good bye to the life of a house holder and began to lead the life of an ideal ascetic During this period Gośala an early antinomian became his disciple but after six years

1 Ibid s 106

2 Rāhula Saṅkṛtyāyana in his *Buddhacarya* says

Jnatṛ jāti is a branch of the Licchaviyas Even to-day there lives a jāti named Jathariya a branch of the Bhūmihars near modern Va salī The word Jathariya is a deformation of jnatṛ and the district Rattī the chief residential quarters of the Jathariyas is associated with jnatṛ natti latti ratti Further the gotra of these Jathariyas is Kaśyapa the same as that of Lord Mahāvira

3 Accord ng to the *Digambaras* he remained unmarried

4 She was married to Jamālī son of Lord Mahavira's sister Sudarśanā This Yaśoda gave birth to a daughter named as Śesavati alias Yaśavati See p 21

he separated himself from Lord Mahavira. After 12 years of severe penance¹ the latter attained omniscience on the bank of the river Rjupāluka and became a *Tirthankara*. He preached sermons for full 30 years. At the age of 72 in 527 B C², he attained at Pavā salvation³ leaving behind him two *Ganadhara*s Indra-bhūti⁴ and Sudharman⁵ and a lot of other disciples and their disciples and a vast number of lay adherents male and female as well.⁶

The *Bauddha* canon refers to Rājagṛha Nālanda Vaiśālī (P Vesālī), Pāvā and Śrāvastī (P Savatthī) as places where the activities of Lord Mahavira and his immediate followers were concentrated. Vide M L T (p 7) ⁷

Lord Pārśva—Lord Parsva was born in

1 It is for this reason that he has been spoken of as 'Dirgha tapasvin' in the *Bauddha* works

2 The day was the new moon day of Kārtika i.e. that of Āśvina according to Gujarat. It is the Divalī holiday

3 According to the *Parishetaparakam* (viii 333) this took place 155 years ahead of the coronation of Candragupta. On this basis Prof H Jacobi takes this date to be 476 or 477 B C

4 See H J (pp 61-63)

5 See H J (pp 63-64)

6 He had 21 000 *Sadhas* 36 000 *Sadhvis* 1 59 000 *Srāvikas* and 3 18 000 *Śrāvikas*

7 In H J (p 28) we have —

'If we contrast the stories told of Mahāvira with those told for instance of Krishna by Hindus we shall see at once that the thoughts of these early followers of Jainism moved on a higher cleaner plane and this purity of thought is one of the glories of Jainism to-day'

877 B C in Benares in the Ikṣvāku family. His father Aśvasena was the king of Benares. His mother's name was Vāmā. He was nine cubits tall. Once he defeated the Yavana king of Kalinga, and he eventually married Prabhāvatī, daughter of Prasenajit of Ayodhyā. At the age of 30¹ he renounced the world, and within a short period he became omniscient and *Tirthaṅkara*. He had 8 *Ganadhara*s. He attained salvation in 777 B C on the Sammetasikhara mount situated in Bihar, when he was 100 years old². He had propounded four *yāmas* instead of the five *mahāvratas*. These vows differ only in number, otherwise, in their application and significance, they are equal³.

Lord Nemi—Lord Nemi, the 22nd *Tirthaṅkara* had a cousin in Lord Kṛṣṇa, for, Samudravijaya, the father of the former and Vasudeva, the father of the latter were sons of Andhakavṛṣṇi, who had eight more sons. Each of these 10 persons is known as *Daśārha*. Lord Nemi, son of Samudravijaya by, Śivā was born in Śauripura. He was betrothed to Rājimatī, daughter of Ugrasena and sister of Kamsa.⁴ But he did not marry her; for, when he had come very near the

1. See Bhāva-deva's *Pārśvanāthacaritra* (vi, 103).

2. For details see M. Bloomfield's *The Life and Stories of the Jain Savior Parśvanāth* which gives us a summary of Bhāva-deva Suri's *Pārśvanāthacaritra* composed in Vikrama Samvat 1412.

3. See Chapter xiv.

4. For all these relations see *A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jains* (p. 151).

marriage pandal, he heard piteous cries of a number of birds and beasts collected together for the marriage feast to be shortly given. He shuddered at this very idea of his father-in-law and turned back. At the end of a year he took *dikṣa* : he renounced the world and soon attained omniscience. He founded a *tīrtha* as is expected of every *Tīrthanāhara*. Rājimatī who had in the meanwhile renounced the world was appointed the head of nuns. Lord Nemi had a brother in Rathanemi. Both of them attained salvation, the former on mount Girnar. The Kurus and the Pāṇavas flourished during the life-time of Lord Nemi.

Lord Ṛṣabha—Instead of dealing with the lives of the remaining 21 *Tīrthanāharas* in this reverse order, I shall commence with that of the first. In the third *ara* of the *avasarpinī*, when there remained about 84 lacs of *pūras*¹, Lord Ṛṣabha who was in his previous birth a god in Sarvārthasiddhi (a celestial world), was conceived by Marudevā, the wife of Nābhi, the 7th *kulākara*². This epoch³ as well as his birth were celebrated by gods with eclat, and equally so were his marriage³ and coronation⁴. So far as the present *avasarpinī* is

1 *Pūra* means (8400000)² years

2 For the description of 7 *kulākaras*, the patriarchs see pp. 29-30

3 According to the custom of those days he was married to Sumāṅgalā his own twin sister and Supandā whose brother (born as a twin) had died in childhood

4 This event took place when 20 lacs of *pūras* after his birth had elapsed

concerned he was the first to teach 72 *kalās* (arts), 5 *śilpas*, 18 *lipis* (scripts) and to fix various measurements and to establish various customs and judicial procedure etc. Further, he was the very first *Tirthankara* to deliver holy sermons. The sight of his *sama vasarana* affected his mother so much that she attained omniscience soon followed by salvation. He too reached final emancipation in due course¹.

He had 100 sons. Amongst them Bharata was the eldest, and Bāhubalin² the strongest. The former was the first *Cakravartin*. He composed four *Vedas* but they got perverted and distorted later on during the interval between the *tirthas* of the 9th and the 10th *Tirthankaras* when the continuity of the *dvāda śāngis* preached and propounded by the previous *Tirthankaras* came to a full stop for the first time and when same became the case with Jainism³. Bharata

1 For details about his life see my 'digest' of *Padmā nanda Mahākavya*.

2 He is named as Gommata by the *Digambaras*. At Śravana Belgola or 'the white pond of the śramanas' (J K O p 154) there is his nude colossal image 57½ feet high carved in 983 A D. For an illustration see J K O. There are two similar images of this same saint in the Tuluva country one at Kārkala 41ft high dating from 1432 A D and the other at Yemur 35ft executed in 1604 A D. They are said to be the largest free standing statues in Asia (Vincent Smith's *History of Fine Arts in India*). See H K L (p 19).

3 Such an undesirable state of affairs occurred in India during the interval between the *tirthas* of every two *Tirthankaras*.

had a son named Marīci who took *dīkṣā*; 'but being unable to abide by the rigorous rules of discipline governing the life of an ascetic, he chose a mean' between this life and that of a house-holder and became the first *Tridaṇḍin*. It was he who after billions of years was born as the first *Vāsudeva* named *Triprṣṭha*, subsequently as a *Cakravartin* *Priyāmītra* by name in the *Mahāvīdehas*, and later on, born as Lord *Mahāvīra*.

Lord Ajita—As regards Lord *Ajita*, the 2nd *Tirthaṅkara*, it may be noted that his brother *Sagara* was the second *Cakravartin*. Further, during his life-time, there flourished one *Tirthaṅkara* in each of the other 4 *Bharata kṣetras*, in each of the 5 *Airāvata kṣetras* and in each of the 32 *viṣayas* of each of the 5 *Mahāvīdeha kṣetras*. Thus, in all, there were 170 (1+4+5+160) *Tirthaṅkaras* in *Jambūdvīpa* at one and the same time. Such a unique occasion of having a maximum number of *Tirthaṅkaras* has not

beginning with the 9th and ending with the 16th. Thus, in all there have been 7 extinctions of *drādaśāṅgīs* (and Jainism as well). Fortunately, however, the *drādaśāṅgī* preached by Lord *Sānti* has practically survived in spirit up to the present day.

1. Some believe that this is the origin of the *Sāṅkhya* system of Philosophy. E J (p. xix) suggests that in the time of Lord *Rṣabha*, the *Sāṅkhya* and *Śaiva* schools were extant. The schools of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya* flourished during the period of Lord *Śītalā* and those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Bauddha* came to prominence during the time of Lord *Pārśva* and *Mahāvīra*.

since arisen during the life time of any other *Tirthankara* who flourished here in this *avasarpini*

Tirthankaras III-XV—In the lives of the 3rd to the 15th *Tirthankaras* nothing of importance is worth noting

Tirthankaras XVI-XVIII—Of the 16th, the 17th and the 18th each *Tirthankara* was a *Calravartin* as well. Even though each of them was destined to attain salvation in that very birth, none of them continued to rule the big empire but followed the golden path of taking *dikṣa*—the path leading to final beatitude, if properly followed

Lord Mallī—Lord Mallī was a daughter of king Kumbha by Prabhāvatī. The *Digambaras*, however, take him to be a son. She solved her father's difficulty when six kings wanted to marry her. She remained unmarried throughout her life.

In the interval between the 20th and 21st *Tirthankaras* there flourished Rama¹, *Lakṣmaṇa, Sītā, Ravana and others the well known characters noted in Valmiki's *Rāmāyaṇa* and Viṃśatī's *Paumacariya*.

So far as the life of the 21st *Tirthankara* is concerned there is nothing special to mention.

This finishes a rough survey of the lives of the 24

1 He is not looked upon as an incarnation of Viṣṇu but is called a *Karanapurusa* i. e. a being with a special destiny in *Pampa Rāmāyaṇa*. See H. K. L. (p. 35)

*Tirthankaras*¹ So, before I may end this chapter, I shall take a brief note of the 7 *kulakaras*

It was in the third *ara* of this *avasarpini* that the first *kulakara* Vimalavahana by name was born. During his time the ten *kalpavrkṣas*² gradually ceased to yield the desired fruits and couples (*yugmins*) began to claim certain *kalpavrkṣas* as their own property. As they could not agree amongst themselves, they unanimously appointed Vimalavahana as their lord to safeguard their interest. He distributed the *kalpavrkṣas* amongst them and promulgated a policy known as *hakara nīti* which consisted in saying 'oh, you have done a wrong thing'. His grand son Yasasvin, the third *kulakara* (Caksusmat, his father being the second) had to promulgate *makara nīti* as the former was becoming ineffective. The *hakara nīti* was utilized for minor offences whereas the *makara*

1 It may be noted that each of these *Tirthankaras* has a separate *lañchana* (cognizance). For cognizance, colour, names of attendant spirits (*Yakṣas* and *Yakṣinīs*) birth place etc see Dr Burgess's Appendix to Bühler's *Indian Sects of the Jainas* (pp 66 ff) and H J (pp 312-313). For short sketches of the lives of the 24 *Tirthankaras* see *The Jaina Iconography* (pp 49-90).

2 They were desire fulfilling trees. "One tree gave them sweet fruits another bore leaves that formed pots and pans the leaves of a third murmured sweet music, a fourth gave bright light even at night, a fifth shed radiance like little lamps the flowers of a sixth were exquisite in form and scent the seventh bore food which was perfect both to sight and taste the leaves of the eighth served as jewellery the ninth was like a many storied palace to live in, and the bark of the tenth provided beautiful clothes." Vide H J (p 273).

niti for grave ones Prasenajit the fifth *kulakara* the grand son of this Yaśasvin and the son of Abhicandra the fourth *kulakara* was obliged to promulgate a third policy viz *dhikkāra' niti*. He was the grand father of Nabhi the father of Lord Ṛṣabha Nābhi was the seventh *kulakara* and his father Marudeva the son of Prasenajit the sixth one¹

According to the *Digambaras* there were 14 *kulakaras* and not 7 Out of them the 7th the 8th the 9th the 10th the 12th and the 14th² have the same names as the 1st the 2nd the 3rd the 4th the 6th and the 7th of the *Śvetāmbaras*

It may be mentioned *en passant* that these *kulakaras* are not included amongst 63 *Śalakapuruṣas*³ or *Karana puruṣas* by either of these main sects of the *Jainas*. The *Digambaras* mention them along with 9 Nāradas⁴ 11 Rudras⁵ 24 *Kāmadevas*⁶ 24 fathers of the 24 *Tirthankaras* and 24 mothers of the 24 *Tirthankaras*

1 For further data is about these seven *kulakaras* see D P (pp 63 64)

2 For the names of the rest see O J (p 128)

3 They include 24 *Tirthankaras* 12 *Cakravartins* 9 *Vāsu devas* alias *Narayanās* 9 *Pratīvasudevas* alias *Pratīnarayanās* and 9 *Baladevas* or *Isaladharas*. In the *Jaina Antiquary* (vol v li nos 1 2) an article entitled *Narayanās Pratīnārayanās and Baladharas* and written by Dr Harisatya Bhattāccharya has been published in two instalments and it is still to be completed

4 6 For their names see O J (p 127)

CHAPTER IV

The Jaina Church

Constitution—The *Jaina* church has for its votaries both the clergy and the laity. The former includes monks as well as nuns, and the latter house holders—males as well as females of any and every caste, colour and country. Any human being who has an unflinching faith¹ in the words of a *Tirthankara*, is a *Jaina*, even when by chance, such an individual may have become a prey to the worst types of all the seven vices². This

1 This right faith along with right knowledge and right conduct forms a collection of three jewels (*ratna traya*) which when set together adorn a glorious diadem for man aspiring and exerting for salvation. These three jewels of the *Jainas* may be compared with the *Bauddha* ones—Buddha, the Law and the Order, with the *Muslim* triad—Happiness (*kher*) Mercy (*mera*) and Prayer (*bandagi*), with the *Zoroastrian* trio—Holy Mind, Holy speech and Holy Deeds, and with the *Christian* jewels—Faith, Hope and Love.

2 They are (i) gambling (ii) flesh-eating, (iii) drinking wine, (iv) prostitution (v) hunting, (vi) stealing and (vii) adultery. See *Sūktamuktavali* (p. 812) where it is said

‘सूतं च मांसं च मुरा च वेश्या पापद्विचौर्ये परदारसेवा ।

एतानि सप्त व्यसनानि लोके घोरातिघोरं नरकं नयन्ति ॥”

Since hunting is here specifically mentioned, shooting fish etc. are to be taken as implied.

may appear strange, but this is perfectly logical, for, the right type of faith is not always necessarily side by side translated into action. A note of warning may be sounded here. The faith in Jainism should be *bona fide* and should not be used as a cloak for the vicious life to be led. There must be a thorough repentance of having become a slave of a vice or vices and of continuing to lead such a wretched and undesirable life, which is the outcome of sheer helplessness to withstand evil temptations. Such an individual is to be pitied, rather than condemned. One who even partially leads a life consistent with one's firm faith in Jainism is, of course, on a higher plane than this individual, and one who leads an ideal life, is by all means on the top most rung of the spiritual ladder of liberation. Thus it will be seen that there is a big number of stages gradations pertaining to a pious life based upon the right type of faith. Those whose vows are of a minor character¹ are called *Śravakas*, if males and *Śravikas*, if females. Similarly, those whose vows are major and of a more exacting nature² are named as *Sādhus* and *Sādhvis* according to their sex. It may be here noted that Lord Mahavira admitted nuns in the monastic order from the very beginning, and thus he differs from Lord Buddha, who, later on,

1 They are known as *anuvratins*

2 They are known as *mahāvratins*

admitted females as *Bauddha* nuns and that too after great reluctance¹

It is the duty of the *Srautakas* and *Śrautikas* to offer to *Sadhus* and *Sadhvis* articles of food that are allowed by the scriptures when they approach them for alms. Further they should see that these have not to go without the accessories² which are necessary for leading the life of an ascetic. Moreover they are to render help even to their co religionists who are in trouble and who have not renounced the world.

The clergy though superior to the laity cannot on that account look down upon the latter. If a monk or a nun has unnecessarily offended the laity—even a *Śrautika* he or she should request her for being pardoned for the offence committed³. Besides if a monk even of a very high position makes any wrong statement in a religious discourse with a *Śrautika* or a *Śrāutika* he must beg pardon and correct his mistake⁴.

It is not the number of individuals that constitutes a *sangha* (church) but it is their quality. Even only

1 See *The Life of Buddha As Legend and History* (pp 103—103) by E. J. Thomas

2 They are usually an alms bowl a board a bed cloth ng a mat etc

3 Vide *Samanasutta*

4 Cf. the episode of Indrabhuti who begged pardon of a *Śrautika* Ānanda by name

one monk one nun one *Śrautaka* and one *Śravika* each of intrinsic worth, make up a *sangha* whereas a number of them, if bogus, is only a collection of bones¹ The importance and the position of this *sangha* can be inferred from the fact that even a *Tirthankara*, though omniscient and an incarnate of sterling character, bows to the *sangha*² Besides, the *sangha* of real worth has a power to excommunicate even a monk of a very high calibre, in case he is guilty /

From this it will be seen that in the *Jaina* church laymen and laywomen are not mere spectators but they hold an important and indispensable place there in, and thus they form an integral part of the *Jaina* organization Moreover, they are not puppets of the clergy, on the contrary they can challenge their orders, if unjustifiable This is perhaps the reason³ why the *Jaina* church has survived in the land of its birth whereas the *Bauddha* one (where as said, the laity are looked down as a nonentity and are only passive supporters of their church) proved incompetent to maintain itself under the fierce assault on its monastic settlements made by the Moslems of the 12th and the 13th centuries

Grades—In the ecclesiastical world, there are

1 See Ratnaśekhara Suri's *Sambodhasattari* (v 37)

2 Cf the salutation '*namo tithassa*'

3 See Dr Hoernle's Presidential address of 1898 A D referred to in H J (intro p xii)

monks of various orders *Acarya* (preceptor) tops their list, and *Upadhyaya* (sub preceptor) is next to him in rank. The rest are known as *Sadhus*. *Acarya* is a person of erudition and noble character and is a past master in administration concerning the group of the *Sadhus* of whom he is the head. He is to be respected as much as a *Tirthankara*, for he too, like the latter is one of the *Parameshthins*¹, and his word is practically a law. He explains the meanings of the scriptures taught by a sub preceptor. On that account he is expected to know many languages and to have gone on foot to a number of cities and villages to have a first rate information about the customs and manners prevalent therein.²

Schisms—It is in a way true that even what is stated in unequivocal terms or even what is written in an unambiguous language is at times open to a wrong interpretation. For some may take it at its face value some may try to read between the lines and some may endeavour to understand the spirit underlying it. This being so, it is no wonder, if in olden days marked differences of opinion prevailed regarding the interpretation of certain portions of the

1 See Ch. XIV

2 About his qualifications see *Kappaniya* (v 241 244) and *Parayanasūradhara* (para 64) and its com (pp 122a-132b)

Jaina scriptures. When it was found that there was not the least possibility for any compromise regarding these differences, and that the views expressed by one party were an open challenge and a defiance to the traditional view held by the other party, the former party was denounced as *mūhvara* (schismatic) by the latter.

Amongst the *Śvetāmbara* works such as *Thāna* (VII, s 587) and the *nijjuttī* (v. 779), *bhāsa* (v. 229) and *mūlabhāsa* on *Āvassaya* and *Visesāvassayabhāsa* (v 2300) are noted seven schisms, whereas in Hemacandra Sūri's *com* (p 935) on *Visesā* (v 2305) are noted eight schisms.

The names of the *dharmācāryas* associated with the seven schisms, the views they dogmatically asserted, and the dates and the places where they were first declared are as under.—

Name	View	Date	Place
1. Jamālī	Bahurata ¹	543 B. C.	Śrāvastī
2. Tisyagupta	Javapradeśaka ²	541 B. C.	Ṛṣabhapura
3. Āśādha Ācārya	Avyaktaka ³	313 B. C. (Vira Samvat 214)	Śvetāmbrī
4. Āśvamitra Ācārya	Sāmucchēdika ⁴	307 B. C. (Vira Samvat 220)	Mithilā
5. Ganga Ācārya	Dvaikriya ⁵	299 B. C. (Vira Samvat 228)	Ullukātira
6. Śaḍulūka ⁶	Trairūśika ⁷	17 A. D. (Vira Samvat 544)	Antaraṇḍikā
7. Goṣṭhāmabala	Abaddhika ⁸	57 A. D. (Vira Samvat 584)	Daśapura

1-8 For these foot-notes see p. 38

To these seven schisms may be added the eighth known as *Botika dr̥ṣṭi*. The founder of this *dr̥ṣṭi* was Śivabhuti alias Sahasramalla. He insisted upon

1 According to this view a thing does not originate during the time of its origination but it takes a longer period. In short it does not accept a statement which says that what is being done is done—a statement made by taking into account *samaya* the ultimate unit of time the countless number of which passes whilst one is winking an eye tearing a rotten piece of cloth or snapping a finger.

2 According to this view there is a soul only in its last *pradeśa* and not in any other out of its *āsankhyeya pradeśas*.

3 The propounders of this view doubt the asceticism of all monks as pseudo saints cannot be easily detected and distinguished from the real ones.

4 Every object perishes in all respects after it is produced. This is what this view means.

5 According to this view one can experience two acts—be attentive to two topics in one and the same *samaya*.

6 He is also named as Rohagupta and is looked upon as the founder of the *Vaiśeṣika* system by the *Jaina* tradition.

7 This view propounds that over and above animate and inanimate objects there are no *jīvas* also e.g. a tail of a lizard just cut off.

8 According to this view *karman* is connected with the mundane soul in a way a skin of a serpent with the serpent. That is to say it does not permeate all the *pradeśas* of the soul concerned and it can be eradicated like a slough.

practising *jina-kalpa*¹, though he, was dissuaded by Ācārya Āryakṛsna from doing so². He began to go about stark naked. His sister Uttara once came to him, and she, too, undressed herself. A *ganika* on seeing her naked, covered her body with a piece of cloth, though Uttarā did not like it. Thereupon Uttara informed Śivabhūti about this. He persuaded her not to give up the cloth, for, he said that firstly it was given by a deity and secondly a naked woman presented a very ugly and indecent sight. In course of

1 This is one of the two types of the life to be led by the Jaina monks the other being *sthavira kalpa*. Even during the life time of Lord Mahāvira and thereafter till the salvation of Jambusvāmin, either of these types of life was resorted to, by monks according to their mental and physical attainments. Further there was neither any rivalry nor ill feeling between the monks who practised *sthavira kalpa* and those who practised *jina kalpa*. As this cycle is *atāsarpiṇī*, the mental strength and the physical constitution of human beings go on deteriorating. Such being the case, in course of time it became impossible for Jaina monks to practise *jina kalpa*, as the qualifications for its acceptance not only meant nudity but mastery over nine *Purīas*, observance of severe austerity, complete indifference to body, a great deal of stamina to put up with even the most trying hardships and harassments and capacity of leading a solitary life. See the com. on *Paṭayanāsārūddhāra* (v 499).

2 For the pertinent discussion see *Vīśeṣā* (v 2553 2605).

time Śivabhuṭi gave *dikṣa* to Kodinna¹ (Sk Kaundinya) and Kottavīra² and this resulted in the establishment of a sect known as *Digambara*

From this it follows that the *Śvetambaras* believe that the main reason why the *Jaina* church got split up into two sects³ known as the *Śvetambaras* and the *Digambaras* is the undue insistence on the part of the latter to expect nakedness from all types of monks and that too under all circumstances

Some of the modern scholars think that even during the life time of Lord Mahāvīra the *Jaina* church was divided into two groups one advocating and imitating the rigid life led by Lord Mahāvīra who remained completely unclad and the other leaning towards the line chalked out by Lord Parśva. This difference in the outlook became wider and wider and it at last culminated in the schism.

There are other scholars who believe that this culmination was brought about by a famine of 12 years which affected Bihar and which obliged some of the *Sādhus* to go to the southern India. These *Sādhus*

1 2 Each of these names sounds like a *Kaṇnada* (Canarese) one and may remind one of Kaundakunda (Kundakunda)

3 For parallels we may note that the *Bauddhas* are mainly divided into *Hīnayānas* and *Mahāyānas* the *Vaidika* *Hindus* into *Śvāmārgins* and *Viṣṇumārgins* the *Muslims* into *Śīyas* and *Sunnīs* the *Zoroastrians* into *Kādamās* and *Sāhensāhīs* and the *Christians* into *Catholics* and *Protestants*

on their return found that their brother—monks were not as rigid as themselves in the observance of vows etc

Whatever may be the right view the *Śvetāmbaras* believe that the *Digambara* sect arose in 83 A D whereas the *Digambaras* hold that the *Śvetāmbara* sect arose in 80 A D There are 84 items wherein these two sects differ from each other So says Yaso vijaya Gaṇi in his Hindi work entitled as *Dikpata Coryāsi bola*¹ If we take a broad view of this situation we may say that both the sects have almost all the philosophical doctrines in common² but they differ in ritual The *Digambaras* maintain that (i) the omniscient 'do not take food' (ii) monks cannot have any clothing as that too means attachment (iii) women cannot attain salvation³ in that very existence because of their sex⁴ (iv) there can be no place for nuns in the *Jaina* monastic order and (v) the

1 This is published in *Prakaranaratnakara* (Vol I pp 566 574) compiled by Bhimasimha Manaka

2 As regards the minor differences about the various kinds of knowledge see *Nandi* (App IV) published as No 2 in Candana Jainagama Granthamālā

3-4 These two views are challenged and criticised by Gunaratna Suri in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* a com on *Saddarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Suri See pp 53b-54b and pp 79b 81a respectively

5 Some of the *Digambara* works such as *Telokkasara* however entertain an opposite view

Śvetāmbara canon is a patch work and not genuine¹ This is not the place to examine these views so I proceed to take a note of sub sects²

Sub sects—According to *Tārārahasyadīpikā* (p 45a) the *Digambaras* are divided into four *sanghas* viz (i) Kāsthā sangha (ii) Mūla sangha (iii) Māthura sangha and (iv) Gopya sangha³ The first three do not admit that (i) women can attain salvation, (ii) the omniscient take food and (iii) clothing is not a barrier in attaining liberation whereas the last holds a contrary opinion in the case of the 1st two respects Further a brush (*picchika*) utilized by the Kāsthā sangha is made up of the hair of a *camar*; while those used by the Mūla sangha and Gopya sangha are made up of feathers of a peacock The Māthura sangha has no brush from the very beginning The Gopya sangha is equated by some with the Yāpaniya sangha Of these I shall note some details about the last

1 See pp 68 69 of H O L J where this view is discussed See also J K C (p 128)

2 Of the various classes of the Christians viz Roman Catholic Presbyterian Puritan Episcopal Evangelical etc There are good many sects amongst the Muslims too

3 *An Epitome of Jainism* mentions on p 654 Draviḍa sangha as the fifth and it notes three sub-sects of Mūla sangha Further it refers to *ganās* and *gacchas* of the Nandī sangha a sub sect of Mūla sangha On pp 653 654 it mentions five sub-sects of the *Digambaras* viz (i) Bisapanthī (ii) Terāpanthī (iii) Samāyapanthī (iv) Gumānapanthī and (v) Totapanthī J K C (pp 151 156) mentions several *sanghas* *ganās* and *gacchas*

The Yapaniya Sect—The followers of Jainism are mainly divided into two sects the *Śvetambaras* and the *Digambaras*. But there is a third sect known as *Yapaniya* too. Devasena Suri (a *Digambara*) in his *Damsanasara* (v 29) says that this sect (*sangha*) arose in the city of Kalyana in *Vikrama Samvat* 205. Hari bhadra Suri in his *Lalitavistara*¹ respectfully refers to this school as *Yapaniyatantra*. Some of the kings of the dynasties such as Kadamba, Rastrakuta etc. have honoured the heads of this school by giving them ground etc. This school was extant at least upto the 15th century of *Vikrama* era for in an inscription dated *Śaka Samvat* 1316 there is mention of Dharma kirti and Nagacandra of this school. There is a temple *Dodda-basti* in Belgaum. Herein there is an inscription from which we learn that this temple was built by Parisayya in *Śaka* 935.

According to *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* (p 45a) etc., a *Sādhu* of the *Yāpaniya sangha* remains naked, keeps a brush of feathers of a peacock, eats food from his palm adores naked idols and blesses the followers with *dharmalabha*. This *sangha* believes in (i) the emancipation of women in that very existence (ii) the taking of food by the omniscient, (iii) the liberation of the non Jainas and (iv) the *Śvetambara* canon.

1 Here (p 57) a quotation is given from *Yapaniyatantra*

Śākaṭāyana¹ alias Pālyakīrti (the author of a grammar and *Amoghavṛtti* on it) and Aparajita Sūri (the commentator of *Dasaveyaliya* and the author of *Vijayodaya*) are looked upon as *Yapanīyas* owing to certain references in their works which do not tally with the doctrines of the orthodox *Dīgambaras*. Śivārya, the author of *Arāhanā*, too, is bracketed with them on the ground that *gāthas* 665 and 666 go against the *Dīgambaras*. Strange to say, in *Vijahāṇa* (ch 40) it is said that the dead body of a *Śaḍhu* should be guarded by remaining awake at night and it should be deposited the next day in a suitable place—a rite which may remind one of the disposal of the dead by the *Zoroastrians*. *Gāthas* 428 and 1544 support the view that Śivārya probably belongs to the *Yapanīya* school. Svayambhu the author of *Paumacariya* and *Harivamśapurana* and Viśeṣavadin the author of *Viśeṣabhyūdaya* are also perhaps *Yapanīyas*. So says Pandit Nathuram Premi in his Hindi work, *Jaina Sahitya aur Itihasa*.

It is believed that it was the Muslim influence on India that created a non idolatrous mentality amongst some of the Āryas. The *Śvetambaras* got split up into idolatrous (*mūrtipūjaka*) and non idolatrous sub sects

1 He is referred to by Malayagiri Suri in his com (p 23) on *Nandi* as the head of the *Yapanīya Yatis* (ascetics)

in 1474¹. A D The founder of the latter sect was Lonkāsaha², a scribe He became disgusted with the *Jaina* monks of those days in 1452 A D, and he openly established the non idolatrous group in 1474 A. D, on his getting a pupil in Lākhami. This new group raised its voice against the performance of essential functions of the *Jainas*, such as *pauṣadha*³, *pratikramana*⁴, *pratyākhyana*⁵ etc, and donation that was somehow tinged with *himsa* (violence)⁶ The members⁷ of this group were designated by the idolatrous *Śvetāmbaras* as Lumpakas, Veśadharas and Utthapakas, while they called themselves as *Dhūṇḍhiyās* They are also

1 O J (p xxxix) however, gives a different date and distinguishes between the *Lunkās* and the *Sthānakavāsins* The pertinent passage is as under —

' Later divisions gave rise to various other sects, such as that of Lunkas (1452 A D), which denounces idols and that of the still somewhat numerous *Sthānaka vāsins*, or Dhunthias (1653 A D), holding the same view "

2 Some Pirojkan, a favourite of a Patahsah was demolishing *Jaina* temples and *pauṣadhasālas* in these days This seems to have given impetus to Lonkāsaha to preach non idolatry

3 5 See Ch XXIII

6 Lāvanyasamaya has mentioned and criticized the views of Lonkāsaha in his Gujarātī work *Siddhāntacopā* composed in 1497 A D Kamalasamyama too, has done so in his *Siddhāntasāroddhāra samyaktvollāsa śippayāla* in Gujarātī

7 They take delight in pointing out the similarity of dates between their rise and that of the birth and work of Martin Luther (1463 A D —1546 A D) in Europe

known as Lonkas and Sthānakavāsins. Later on in 1760 A D, Bhikkhanji and his twelve associates founded a new sub sect known as 'Terapanthi'. It holds novel ideas about *ahimsa* (non violence) unacceptable to the rest of the Śvetāmbaras the Sthānakavāsins included. It is also a non idolatrous sect.

Hierarchs and Gacchas—It was during the life time of Lord Mahāvira that nine *ganas* (schools) were formed out of the disciples of his 11 *Gaṇadharas* all of whom were Brāhmanas. Immediately after his salvation Indrabhūti the first *Gaṇadhara* attained omniscience. So Sudharman the fifth *Gaṇadhara* became the head of the Jain church for Indrabhūti handed over his pupils to him as was done by the *Gaṇadharas* 2 to 4 and 6 to 11—the nine *Gaṇadharas* who did not survive Lord Mahāvira¹. Sudharman was born in 607 B C the very year in which Indrabhūti was born. When the former attained omniscience in 699 B C his pupil Jambusvamin² a Vaisya succeeded³ to the headship.

1 See The Jaina System of Education (pp 204 205) published in J U B (Vol VIII pt IV Jan 1940)

2 His life is narrated in H J (pp 68 69)

3 The choice of a successor is not necessarily based upon the seniority of a disciple in age or the monkish order but the competency is the main factor which the *guru* the head takes into account and accordingly selects a disciple out of affiliated ones and installs him as his successor during his own life-time usually with some ceremonies

He, too, became omniscient in 515 B C¹ So Prabha-
vasvamin, his disciple, a Ksatriya, assumed the
headship. On his death in 452 B C Śāyāma-
bhava (P Sejjambhava), the author of *Dasaveyaliya*,
a Brahmana became the head, and he enjoyed that
position till 429 B C He was succeeded by Yaśo-
bhādra Suri who remained for 50 years as the head of
the church i e upto 379 B C He had two pupils
Sambhutivijaya and Bhadrabāhusvamin² Each of
these was a Brahmana, and each was appointed by
Yasobhadra Suri as his *uttaradhikarin* Thus the number
of *paṭṭadhara*s which was one till then got increased
to two³ Though there were two *paṭṭadhara*s, Sam-
bhutivijaya acted as the spiritual head for eight years
At the end of this period Bhadrabāhusvamin succeeded
him, though he was not his disciple but a brother
disciple. He remained as the head of the church for
fourteen years i e upto 357 B C⁴

Sthūlabhadra,—He was a pupil of Sambhutivijaya
and had been taught 14 *Puṇyas* by Bhadrabāhusvamin
who, however did not teach him the meanings of

1 None thereafter has attained omniscience in India and none will do so in this *avasarpinī*

2 He was the last saint to know all the 14 *Puṇyas* along with their meanings According to the *Digambaras* he had given *dīkṣā* to King Candragupta

3 Vide *Kīrtanārāṇī* VI (p 49)

4 As stated in *Parīkṣapariyaṇ* he died in 170 A V

Purāṇas 11 to 14 He had seven sisters all of whom had renounced the world His parents were Śakadala and Lacchaladevi The former was a minister of King Nanda IX Sthūlabhadra was the head of the church for 49 years : e upto 308 B C He died in 215 A V or 219 A V at the age of 99 He was succeeded by his pupil Ārya Mahagiri He was the head of the church for 30 years : e upto 278 B C He had a brother-disciple in Ārya Subastin who succeeded him and remained as the head of the church for 46 years (16 years after Mahagiri) : e upto 262 B C He is said to have converted King Samprati grand son of Asoka (271 B C — 231 B C) to Jainism This king tried his level best to spread Jainism even in foreign lands and he erected several temples The headship of the church passed on in this way from one *Acarya* to another¹ Amongst these *Acaryas*, the name of Vajrasvamin deserves to be specially mentioned for he was the last to know the first ten *Purāṇas* and one to have taken *dīkṣa* at a very early age He is also known as Vairasvamin His parents Dhanagiri and Sunanda had joined the monastic order The Vajra *sakha* of the Jain church owes its origin to this Vajrasvamin

Siddhasena Divakara² Mallavadin and Haribhadra

1 Subastin Susthila and Indradinna are some of them See H J (pp 75-77)

2 For his life and works see *Saṃvatsara Tarka* (intro pp 1-103)

Sūri¹ are well known saints who have enriched the *Jaina* literature. Śilaguna Suri² deserves mention as he is looked upon as the restorer of the Cavadā dynasty. Bappabhatta Suri was an influential Sūri. He made King Amra a staunch supporter of Jainism. This Suri lived from 743 A D to 838 A D. Passing over other leaders of less importance we come to Śilanka Suri who was alive in 876 A D. He perhaps wrote commentaries on the 9 *Angas* but only two are available. See H C L J (p 196)

Uddyotana Suri had 84 pupils each of whom was appointed the head of the saints under him in 937 A D or so. This gave rise to the formation of 84 *gacchas*³. Most of them have become extinct⁴ and some new ones have come into existence. Amongst them Tapa⁵, Kharatara and Ancala⁶ may be here mentioned.

1 For his life see my intro (pp xvii-xxix) to *Anekanṭa jayapataka* (vol I) and, also the intro to Vol II (in press)

2 For a sketch of his life see H J (pp 82-83)

3 For a chronological list of the heads of various *gacchas* see E J (pp xlvii-lxvii)

4 The name of Tharapadra may be mentioned as an instance

5 This name is derived from the title Tapā given to Jagacandra Suri in Vikrama Śaśvat 1285 by the ruler of Mevar for his austere penance

6 This is also known as Vidhi pakṣa and it originated in 1157 A D

Abhayadeva Suri the commentator of *Angas III-XI* was born in 1015 A D He became a Suri in 1031 A D and died in 1078 A D Hemacandra Suri¹ the well known polygrapher had a very wide influence with Siddharaja and Kumarapala He lived from 1088 A D to 1172 A D

Just like *gacchas* there are *kulas* too e g Nirvṛti *kula* Candra *kula* Nāgila *kula* and Praśnavahana *kula* Similarly there are *sakhas* too e g Ksema *kīrti sakha* Nagari *sakha*² etc

While concluding this chapter I may note that in Theravāli a section of *Pajjosatānakappa* we come across a list of *gaṇas* (schools) their *śākhās* (branches) and *Ganadharas* (heads of schools) This list tallies with the items noted in the inscriptions of the second century A D Vide Buhler's *Epigraphia Indica* I 371 ff 393 ff Further *Nandī* (v 23 43) mentions 27 saints³ who were the leading personalities in olden days

c

1 For his life and works see *Kavyan Uśasana* (vol II intro pp cclx ii—cccxxx)

2 Umāsvāti belonged to the Uccanagari *śakha* See the colophon (v 5) of his *bl asya* on *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*

3 For their names see H C L J [p 160]

CHAPTER V

Dravyas and Tattvas

The six dravyas—*Dravya* (substance) is defined in Jainism as one which has *satta* (existence)¹ This *sattā* connotes three attributes (i) *utpada* coming into existence (origination) (ii) *vyaya*, going out of existence (destruction) and (iii) *dhrauvya* continuous sameness of existence (permanence)² Any and every thing that exists, undergoes modifications (*pariyayas*) like origination and destruction, but its inherent nature essential character persists even when modifications take place For, all reality according to Jainism is *substance cum mode*³.

Every substance which signifies the substantive basis of an object or a thing, is the substratum of attributes (*gunas*) which inhere in it The relation between a substance and its attributes is not of a

1 That existence is a quality of a substance is proved in *The Science of Thought* (p 10)

2 Cf TS (V, 29) In *Pancatthikaya* (v 9) by Kunda kundācarya *dravya* is defined as one which is never distinct from *satta* and which runs—passes into such and such natures and modifications

3 See Prof A B Dhruva's Notes (p 31) to his edition of *Syādvādamāñjarī*

temporary character but of a permanent nature. The two are not separable except by pure mental abstraction, for, a substance is after all a sum total of all its attributes, and hence it is known as *gunin*, too.

Attributes should not be confounded with accidents which are passing phases, forms or modes of existence of a substance. For example yellowness, malleability etc., being the permanent qualities¹ of gold are attributes whereas a gold chain, a gold bracelet etc., are its accidents as they are passing phases. Thus it will be seen that an accident is a changing impermanent state of existence of a thing, whereas an attribute is inseparable from it, and is an inalienable property of it for all times, though subject to differences of degrees of manifestation under extraneous conditions e.g. the attributes of gold are liable to be affected by the admixture of alloy, in proportion to its quantity.

Every substance is knowable² i.e. to say it is capable of being an object of knowledge on the part of some one or other and so are its attributes and accidents³. From this exposition it must have been realized that a substance has existence, knowability etc., as its attributes.

1 Eight qualities of gold are mentioned in *Dasaveyaliya nujjuli* (v. 351)

2 For this statement a proof is advanced in S. Th. (p. 7)

3 This differentiates Jainism from Kant's Philosophy

All the substances¹ can be divided into two classes *jīva* (soul)² and *ajīva* (non-soul). The latter has five sub-classes: (i) *dharma*, (ii) *adharma*, (iii) *ākāśa*, (iv) *puṣṭāla*, and (v) *lāla*. Of these *dharma* and *adharma* are not merit and demerit as some³ may be inclined to believe by taking their etymological meanings 'virtue' and 'vice' into consideration. But, according to the *Jaina* metaphysics they are substances which respectively act as a medium of motion and that of rest (stationariness). *Dharma* is the indispensable accompanying cause⁴ of the motion of moving bodies animate and inanimate as well⁵, as water is for the swimming of a fish. In itself it produces no local change. *Adharma* is similarly the indispensable accompanying cause of the stationariness—inertia of living beings and objects that are at rest, as a shadow of a

1. In E J (p. 23) 'substance' is defined as "the underlying entity (*द्रव्य*) which itself, remaining essentially the same in and through all its modes of being, gives support and connection to all its qualities, modalities and the like".

2. Every soul is constitutionally free and potentially divine.

3. See *The Doctrine of Karma in Jain Philosophy* (p. 2, fn. 1).

4. It is an indifferent or passive (*udāhina*) cause and not active or solicitous (*preraka*) cause.

5. In O J (p. 13) *dharma* is translated as 'principle of motion' and in *Jainism* (p. 12) as 'an ether, the fulcrum of motion'.

tree is for an exhausted traveller inclined to take rest¹ Each of these two substances is one in number and co eval each is co terminous with *lokakāśa* and each consists of *asankhyeya pradeśas* (units of space)

Akasa means space It is contained in nothing Its function is to afford space or room to other substances It consists of *ananta* (infinite) *pradesas* It is divided into *lokakāśa* and *alokakāśa* In the former one there are the remaining five *dravyas* for it is the receptacle of all bodies animate and inanimate whereas in the latter there is nothing but space *Lokakāśa* is co terminous with *dharma* and *adharma* as well and it consists of *asankhyeya pradeśas* *Alokakāśa* has infinite *pradesas*

Pudgala means matter It has touch taste odour and colour whereas the remaining substances are void of touch etc Our body mind senses objects enjoyed by the senses *karman*² sound light darkness shadow etc, come under the category of *pudgala* *Pudgala* exists only in *lokakāśa* It may be either subtle or gross and that too in a varying degree Its ultimate indivisible unit is *paramanu*³ This also possesses

1 In *Jānism* (p 12) *adharma* is described as another ether the fulcrum of rest in the sense of not moving

2 For its explanation see chapter XIII

3 This is far far subtle than even an electron of modern chemistry—the electron about which Sir Oliver Lodge says

If an electron is represented by a sphere an inch in dia

touch, taste, odour and colour, and it can get combined with one or many more *paramanus* and form an aggregate known as *skandha*. A *paramanu* has only one *pradeśa* whereas a *skandha* more than one, and the biggest *skandha*, infinite

Kāla means time. According to the *Śvetambaras* it is a function of space, and hence they call it an *aupacarika dravya*—a quasi substance, but the *Digambaras* take it to be a real one. This *kāla* is the cause or the circumstance of the modifications of *jīvas*, *pudgalas* etc.¹ It is not a *pudgala* and so it is without touch, taste etc. It is the necessary element in our dealings with other substances²

The division of time into *kalacakras* along with their main sub divisions *utsarpinī* and *avasarpinī* has

meter, the diameter of an atom of matter on the same scale is a mile and a half' (quoted in the intro p L of A T L)

For, the latter is not an ultimate unit in the *Jaina* sense. This *paramānu* so long as it forms a part and parcel of the object of which it is a *paramānu* goes by the name of *pradeśa*. Thus *pradeśa* and *paramānu* are equal in magnitude. In the case of the soul *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* we cannot have *paramanus*, for, their *pradeśas* can never get separated from them.

1 In O J (p 15) we have 'That which is the cause or circumstance of the modification of the soul and other *dravyas* is time'

2 *Dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* are each examined with respect to their *dravya*, *keśetra*, *kāla*, *bhāva* and *guna* in H J (p 108)

been already noted on pp 18 19 For practical purposes time is divided as under —

Asankhyāta samayas = 1 *avalikā*

Saṅkhyāta āvalikās = 1 *ucchvāsa* or 1 *nīhśivasa*

1 *ucchvāsa* + 1 *nīhśivasa* = 1 *prapa*

7 *prapas* = 1 *stoka*

7 *stokas* = 1 *lāṭa*

77 *lāṭas* = 1 *muhurta* (48 minutes)

30 *muhūrtas* = 1 *ahoratra* (day and night)

15 *ahorātras* = 1 *pakṣa* (fortnight)

2 *pakṣas* = 1 *masa* (month)

2 *masas* = 1 *ṛtu* (season)

3 *ṛtus* = 1 *ayana*

2 *ayanas* = 1 *samvatsara* (year)

The period of eighty four lacs of years is known as *Pūrtāṅga* and that of 84 lacs of *Pūrtāṅgas* as *Pūrtā Pūrtā Truṣitāṅga Truṣita* etc, upto *Śīrṣaprahelikā* are each 84 lacs times the preceding one That is to say *Truṣitāṅga* is equal to 84 lacs of *Pūrtas* = (84 lacs)¹ years and *Śīrṣaprahelikā* is (84 lacs)⁸⁴ years or according to *Jaisakaraṇḍaga* (84 lacs)⁸⁴ years An immensely big number of years that far exceeds even *Śīrṣaprahelikā* is named as *badara addha palyopama* It is the time taken to empty a circular well called *Palya* which is one *yojana*¹ in diameter and one

1 This is associated with *utsedha ṅgula* and not *pramaṇaṅgula* or *atmaṅgula*

vojana in depth as well, which is very very closely packed up with hair of the *yugalīlas* of the Uttara Kuru ksetra¹ grown during the first seven days of their birth, and from which one *keśagra* is taken out at the end of every 100 years. If, instead of removing only a *keśagra*, only the smallest sub piece of the hair² is removed, the period then required is said to be *sūkṣma addha palyopama*. Ten *koṣakoṣis*³ of such *sūkṣma addhā palyopamas* make up one *sūkṣma addha saḡaropama*, and such ten *koṣakoṣis* of *saḡaropamas* make up half the *kalacakra*.

Astikāyas—As already noted there are five substances according to the Śvetambaras, and that each of them has a multitude of *pradeśas*. So each is called *astikāya* (*asti* meaning *pradeśa* and *kāya*, a multitude)⁴.

1 See Appendix I

2. The hair is firstly to be divided into as many small pieces as one can see, and then each of them is to be conceived as divided into as many small sub pieces as possible

3 A *koṣākoṣi* means a crore multiplied by itself. It equals 10^{14} .

4 This is the usual interpretation occurring in the Śvetāmbara works but strange to say, from *Anuogaddaracūṇṇ* (p 29) we learn that *asti* means 'permanence and *kāya* 'origin and destruction'. Thus the word *astikāya* stands for a substance

In O J (p 16) the word *astikāya* is translated as 'magnitude'. Further, there it is said that the five substances 'are called *astikāyas* because they have *sattā* and are therefore *asti* and

According to the *Digambaras*, *kala* is not a figurative substance but even then it has only one *pradesa*. Such being the case, according to them, too, the number of *astikayas* is five. Since *jiva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *akasa* and *pudgala* are each an *astikaya*, they are spoken of as *jīvastikaya*, *dharmastikaya*, *adharmaastikaya*, *akastikaya* and *pudgalastikaya* respectively. Usually only the names *dharmastikaya* and *adharmaastikaya* are current.

According to Jainism no world process is possible in the absence of any one or more of the six substances. For, space is essential for localization, time for continuity, *dharma* and *adharma* for motion and rest, *pudgala* for supplying the material of bodies, and souls for life, knowledge and enjoyment. Further, the functioning of substances is due to their own nature and not the outcome of any one's order or decree.

The Nine Tattvas¹

Jiva (soul) or cogitative substance, *ajiva* {
or non cogitative substance *punya*² (merit)
(demerit or sin), *asrava* (influx), *samvara*³
nirjara (dissipation), *bandha* ()

because they have many *pradesas* and are
Darvasangaha (v. 20)

1 This is translated in H. J. (p. 94) as
of fundamental truths"

2-3 In the Intro (p. xxvii) to A. T.
tively rendered as 'virtue' and 'vice'.

(emancipation) are known as nine *tattvas* in Jainism. The word *tattva* is variously rendered into English (i) essential principle¹, (ii) predicament², (iii) category³ and (iv) principle⁴.

According to T S (I, 4) there are only seven *tattvas*, for, *punya* and *papa* can be either looked upon as *astava* or *bandha* according to the stand point we take. Both are means of bondage therefore they are one and are certainly by themselves the cause of bondage.

Jina—As already stated it is one homogeneous irresolvable substance not composed of separable factors⁵. Hence it is not subject to division, disintegration or destruction. Its qualities such as knowledge⁶, consciousness⁷ etc., are of a permanent charac

1 See *What is Jainism* (p 5)

2 See the intro (p xxxvii) of A T L

3 See the Eng trans of T S (p 3) and H J (p 94)

4 See O J (p 37)

5 That every soul is indivisible is proved in S Th (pp 22 24)

6 That knowledge is the nature of the soul is proved in S Th (p 11). Here on p 25 it is said that knowledge is never acquired from without but only actualized from within. On p 15 we have "Knowledge consists in the modifications or aspects of its own substance (consciousness)". On p 21 we have "When there is no modification of the state of consciousness, there is no perception".

7 The question as to whether consciousness as a quality is indivisible or it is composed of units is discussed in S Th (pp 12 13). That consciousness has no existence independent of the

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The Nine Tattvas¹

Jīva (soul) or cogitative substance, *ajīva* (non soul) or non cogitative substance, *punya*² (merit), *pāpa*³ (demerit or sin), *asrava* (influx), *samlara* (stoppage), *nirjara* (dissipation), *bandha* (bondage) and *mokṣa*

because they have many *pradeśas* and are therefore *kāya*." Vide *Daṃṭasāṅgaha* (v 20)

1 This is translated in H J (p 94) as 'the nine categories of fundamental truths'

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punya and *dravya punya* The former is the disposition of the doer which makes this doer act according to the divine law and the latter is the translation of this disposition into action Disposition backed up by true knowledge and equipped with a strong will power can yield the desired fruit

There are nine ways of acquiring merit Five of them result from offering to the deserving (i) food, (ii) water (iii) clothing (iv) shelter and (v) bedding the sixth is engendered by paying due respect to them the seventh by fully appreciating their good points the eight by personal attendance upon them and the ninth by salutation The reward of merit can be reaped in 42 ways They are described in H J (pp 113—116)

Pāpa—*Papa* is a moral disease or weakness This is also of two kinds *bhava papa* and *dravya papa* Here instead of desirable disposition we have the undesirable one *Papa* or sin is of 18 kinds (i) *himsa*¹ (ii) falsehood (iii) stealth (iv) non celibacy (v) possession (vi) anger (vii) pride (viii) deceit (ix) avarice (x) attachment (over fondness) (xi) hatred (xii) quarrel someness (xiii) false accusation (slander) (xiv) back biting (xv) like and dislike (xvi) scandal (xvii) decep

1 In a way this is the greatest sin and of all crimes

tive and untrue speech¹ and (xviii) wrong belief.² The reward for sin can be reaped in 82 ways See H J (pp. 132-139)³.

Punya and *pāpa* are each of two kinds from another view-point, too. While *punya* is being realised or enjoyed it may either lead to the acquisition of merit or demerit. In the former case it is known as *punyānubandhi-punya* and in the latter as *pāpanubandhi-punya*. Same is the case with *pāpa*. For, its realization may side by side be accompanied by the amalgamation of merit or demerit. These two cases are known as *punyānubāndhi-pāpa* and *papānubandhi-pāpa* respectively. These divisions of *punya* and *pāpa* explain the anomalies as to why an apparently innocent being suffers and why a scoundrel goes scot-free. The sufference is the result of the wicked acts previously committed, and it is not the outcome of the good conduct at present. Similarly a rogue enjoys an enviable position in virtue of the good acts previously performed by him whereas he will surely reap hereafter

1. "It is that species of untruthfulness which in ordinary conversation leads to *suggestio falsi*, and which in religion leads to hypocrisy". So says H J (p. 130).

2. These eighteen types of sin are mentioned by Śilāṅka in his com. (p. 79) on *Āyāra*.

3. In H J (p. 119) it is remarked that if one were to make a close study of the *Jaina* idea of what sin is, one will be struck with the profound knowledge of human heart reflected in Jainism.

spheres making both appear as self-same with each other

Since birth and even previously in the infinite past we are and have been acquiring (*asrava*) and amalgamating—incorporating (*bandha*) foreign, subtle and invisible matter (*pudgala*) This excites us to unnatural actions and obscures our wisdom etc

It may be noted that both *asrava* and *bandha* are mutually related to each other as cause and effect *Asrava* is not only the antecedent cause of *bandha* but the consequent one as well, of a still anterior *bandha* Equally so is the case with *bandha* On this account this should not be interpreted as a vicious circle of cause and effect for their eternal continuity is like that of the seed and the tree or that of an egg and a hen

This will suggest that Jainism does not believe in the idea that we have fallen from a state of purity For if such a fall were to be admitted there will be no guarantee that the mental and moral discipline penance and rectitude of life will lead to the *summum bonum*, and further it will be a sheer waste of time and energy to restrain our passions which may be otherwise let loose for eating drinking and merry making in an uninterrupted manner

Samvara—It means 'stoppage' It is the reverse of *asrava* It is two-fold *bhava samvara* and *dyaya-*

samvara The psychical condition which is instrumental in stopping the inflow of the foreign matter from approaching and cleaving to or digging into the mundane soul, is called '*bhava samvara*', whereas the actual stopping '*dravya samvara*'. The mundane soul can raise its head against the traps and temptations set up by the matter. It may refuse to take in any more of this mischievous matter by controlling the sense organs and refraining from undesirable activities. When the soul actually does this, there commences the practical side of the *Jaina* metaphysics.

Nirjara—*Nirjara* means dissipation or wearing out of *karmans*. This may be either natural or artificial. In the former case it is called *akama nirjara* or *savi-paka nirjara* and in the latter *sakama nirjara* or *avi-paka nirjara*. In the former case it is a natural maturing of *karmans* which leads to its dissipation and separation from the soul and in the latter case a deliberate attempt in the form of practising penance etc., is to be made. Consider the example of a mango fruit. It may ripen by itself or it may be plucked half ripe or even unripe and then ripened by artificial means. Take another example of a chain. It may wear out gradually and leave the person free or the chain may be shattered and the person becomes free.

Samvara no doubt assists the evolution of the soul, but it alone is not sufficient to work it out in full.

For, stoppage of the inflow of fresh matter unless accompanied by the dissipation of the matter already acquired and amalgamated, cannot make the mundane soul attain its natural condition

Just as in a lake water flows in from various pores and channels so the foreign matter flows into the soul through the five sense organs four passions, non observance of the five vows and twenty two activities¹ of mind, speech and body. On the pores and channels being closed, no further water can enter the lake. Similarly observance of the five types of carefulness (*samiti*)² and the three types of control (*gupti*)³, performance of the ten fold duties⁴ of a saint, entertaining twelve fold holy reflection (*bharana*)⁵, putting up with

1 For their names and description see E J (pp 532 536)

2 See Ch XIV

3 See Ch XIV

4 They are (i) forgiveness (forbearance) (ii) humility (iii) straight forwardness (sincerity), (iv) contentment (v) truth (vi) control, (vii) penance (viii) imparting knowledge etc, (ix) non attachment and (x) celibacy. All these are of the highest degree. For a detailed exposition see H J (pp 151 151)

5 Reflection or meditation is associated with each of the following (i) transitoriness of an object when its modifications are taken into account (ii) helplessness of a living being when attacked by death etc, (iii) mudaneness, (iv) loneliness (v) separateness (vi) impurity of body (vii) influx of *karmans* (viii) stoppage of *karmans* (ix) dissipation of *karmans*, (x) nature of the universe (xi) rarity of right faith and (xii) the nature of truth or right path. For details see H J (pp 156-161)

twenty two kinds of hardship (*parīṣaha*)¹ and leading a saintly life (*caritra*)² in five ways³ check the influx of *karmans*

Mokṣa—*Mokṣa* means emancipation of the soul from the snares of *karman*. It is a complete deliverance of the soul for all time and from all veils and coverings and coatings of *karman*. It results when the soul is purged of one and all the *karmans*. It leads to final beatitude and autonomy pure and simple which can never be wrenched by any body. It is the realization of the ideal self in and by itself. It endows it with infinity quartette (*ananta catuṣṭaya*) viz., infinite perception, infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite potency.

Some other features of the liberated are

(1) A soul on being liberated from the *karmans* as it were flies up to the topmost part of *loka*⁴ and

1 They are hunger, thirst, cold, heat insect bites, nudity, langour or discontent, women wandering sitting lodging, abuse, injury, begging, failure in begging, disease, contact of prickly grass etc., personal uncleanness kind treatment, conceit of knowledge, lack of knowledge and slackness in belief. For details see *Uttarayjñayana* (II) and H J (pp 148-151)

2 This is five-fold (i) equanimity, (ii) recovery of equanimity after a fall from it, (iii) pure penance, (iv) freedom from all passions except a subtle part of greed and (v) passionlessness

3 These are the 57 (5+3+10+12+22+5) weapons which a soul can employ in its fight against the influx of the alien matter.

4 The entire universe or cosmos is divided into two parts

reaches it in one *samaya*, for, it has a buoyancy but it was so far kept down by corporeal trammels. It can not go beyond this extreme limit of *loka* as there is non existence of *dharmastikaya*. Otherwise it would have been on a never ending journey. Just as a gourd when coated with dirt etc., sinks down in water but it bobs up to the surface, on that dirt etc., being washed off, so a mundane soul, when purged of the *karmika* dirt, goes up vertically straight upto the highest surface of *loka*.

(2) This upward motion is natural in the case of the soul like the flame of a fire.

(3) A liberated soul occupies two thirds of the space it used to, in its final birth. That is to say, its form and stature are one third less than those of his or her last body.

(4) It is only from the human condition or existence (*gati*) that one can be liberated and not even from the celestial one, much less from sub human and infernal ones.

(5) None in the present age¹ can achieve salvation from Bharata *ksetra*.

(6) On no account, the liberated can be re born known as *loka* and *aloka*. In the former there are all the *dravyas* and in the other only one viz *akasa*.

1 On this *atsarpani* being over *utsarpani* will begin. Therein *Tirthankaras* will flourish. *For their names etc see H J (pp 276 278)

so the following idea^s expressed in *Bhagvadgīta* (IV.7, has no place in Jainism :

"Oh Bharata (Arjuna), whenever there comes a decline faith and Irreligion uprises, then I will take birth. In every for the protection of the good, the destruction of the wicked, and the establishment of faith I become incarnate."

(7) The liberated can be grouped under fifteen heads. One of them includes those who witho renouncing the world attain salvation. For information about all the fifteen heads the reader may refer to H J (pp. 170-171).

(8) Every liberated individual maintains his, h or its separate entity through all eternity, and th this idea differs from the non-Jaina one of absorpti into *Brahman* or the Supreme.

(9) The liberated condition does not mean t extinction of the soul as the *Bauddhas* believe



ing happiness is distinctly seen; but, in the case of the *sthāvāra* beings such an activity is not seen. The fire-bodied and the air-bodied are seen to be moving. They have thus motion in common with the *trasa* beings. So, from this view-point the fire-bodied and the air-bodied, though *sthāvāra* in one sense, are called *gati-trasa*, and to distinguish them from the other *trasa* beings, the latter are called *labdhi-trasa*.

Before we proceed further, we may give instances of the living beings noted so far. The earth-bodied have earth as their body, and they include dust, sand, a stone in a quarry, a diamond or a coal in a mine, metals such as gold etc., in a mine, mercury, a coral, vermilion, talc, orpiment, realgar, collyrium, various types of clay and salt etc. The earth-bodied beings become inanimate under certain conditions e. g. when their body is struk, cut etc.

The water-bodied have as their body water. Dew,

CHAPTER VI

Exposition of the Soul

Jainism classifies living beings in various ways¹. According to one of them, they are divided into two groups (i) the liberated (*mukṭā*) and (ii) the mundane (*samsarin*). The latter are further divided into two sub groups viz., *trasa* and *sthavara*. The former are classified under four heads (a) *pañcendriyas*, (b) *catuṣendriyas*, (c) *triendriyas* and (d) *dvīendriyas*, and they are so named after the number of sense organs they possess. The latter have only one sense organ viz., that of touch, and they give rise to five varieties (i) the earth-bodied, (ii) the water-bodied, (iii) the fire-bodied, (iv) the air-bodied and (v) the vegetation.

It may be noted that those whose *trasa-nama karman*² is in operation (*udaya*) are here styled as *trasa*, whereas those whose *sthavara nama karman*³ is in operation as *sthavara*. In the case of the *trasa* beings so defined an activity of going from one place to another for becoming free from misery and of attain-

1 In H J (ch VII, pp 94-106), the living beings are grouped in 14 different ways.

2 3 Each of these is a kind of *nāma karman* one of the eight varieties of *karman*.

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The water-bodied have as their body water. Dew, snow, hail, mist, hoar-frost, fog, moisture, rain-water, *ghanodadhi*¹ etc., are the examples of the water bodied. They become inanimate under certain conditions. For instance water when properly boiled or mixed with

1 *Loka* is divided into three worlds: lower, middle and upper. The lower world has seven earths, each of which is surrounded by very strong thick water. This water is known as '*ghanodadhi*'.

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another kind of water candy sugar etc becomes inanimate

The fire bodied have fire as their body A living charcoal a flame a spark a fire brand a meteoric fire lightning conflagration a submarine fire etc are the fire bodied This may remind one of the salamander¹ of olden days which is not however a fire bodied being in the *Jaina* sense of the word

The air bodied have air as their body Wind a breeze a monsoon a whirl wind a squall a tornado a cyclone a trade wind *ghanaiḍa*² *tanaiḍa*³ etc are their examples

The maximum size of each of the encasements of the earth bodied water bodied fire bodied and air bodied is very very small—an innumerable part of a cubic finger So this is not visible We see it only in a mass Every drop of water is a mass of the water bodied The minute animalcules (in a drop of water) which are seen by means of a microscope are not the water bodied they are other living beings The water bodied have water and water alone as the matter of their body

Souls of the vegetable kingdom are two fold —(1)

1 This is a lizard like animal supposed to live in fire

2 It means thick wind It encircles *ghanodadhi* the thick water sheath of each of the seven earths noted in fn 1 of p 73

3 It means thin wind It surrounds *ghanavata*

sādhārana vanaspatikāya and (ii) *pratyekā vanaspatikāya*. The former is as it were a colony of living beings. They are hence known as *ananta kāya*¹. They have a common body known as *nigoda*², and they perform simultaneously the acts of taking food, inhalation and exhalation etc., but are otherwise separate and distinct from each other. They do not combine to form one soul by intensification or any other process or method, and death or destruction of one or more does not mean death or destruction of one and all.

In the case of the latter, there is only one soul so far as a fruit, a flower, a bark, a trunk, a root, a leaf and a seed are each concerned.

All the *ekendriyas* are both gross and subtle. The latter occupy any and every place of *lokakāśa* as they literally fill it. *Pratyekā vanaspatikāya* is only gross whereas *sādhārana vanaspatikāya* is gross and subtle as well.³

1 Onion, garlic, carrot, radish, turnip, yam etc. are some of them. Bulbuous roots, tender sprouts etc. are also *ananta kāya*.

2 This is of two types viz. *bādhara nigoda* and *sukṣma nigoda*. They are respectively associated with gross and subtle *sādhārana vanaspatikāya*.

3 Thus it will be seen that according to Jainism, not only man is endowed with soul but even plants etc. This hylozoistic theory, as Dr. H. Jacobi calls it, is quite different from the animistic belief in the existence of spirits in stones, running brooks and trees.

That all sorts of vegetation live, grow and respond to human and other forces applied to them¹ has been discussed at full length in *Āyāra*.²

The *dvīndriyas* have two sense-organs (touch and taste). They are: a worm, a shell, a leech etc.

The *trīndriyas* have three (touch, taste and smell) They are: a bug, an ant, a cochineal etc.

The *caturīndriyas* have four (touch, taste, smell and sight) They are a bee, a wasp, a fly, a mosquito, a gnat, a butter-fly etc

The *dvīndriyas*, *trīndriyas* and *caturīndriyas* are collectively known as *vikalendriyas*.

The *pañcendriyas* having all the five senses (touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing) are of four kinds: (a) celestial beings (*devas*), (b) infernal beings³ (*nārakas*), (c) human beings (*manuṣyas*) and (d) *tiryacs*. The last denote all those *pañcendriyas* which are not included

1. A practical demonstration was once given in Bombay in the University Building by the late Sir J. C. Bose

2. The *Mahābhārata* (Anuśāsanaparvan 58, 23-32) highly praises plant life and divides plants into six kinds. *vrkṣa* (trees), *latā* (creepers that cling to trees), *vallī* (creepers that spread on the ground), *gulma* (bushes), *tvakṣāra* (trees whose bark is strong while the inside is hollow, like bamboos), and *grāṇa* (grass) *Śāntiparvan* (181, 1-17) supplies us with a graphic description as to how trees have life since they feel pleasure and pain and grow when cut

3. These are all neuter without exception

in the first three kinds. They are at times translated as 'sub human'. The word *tiryac* is used also for the beings having one to four sense organs. So these are distinguished by their designation *pāncendriya tiryacs*. They are of three species (i) aquatic such as a fish, a dolphin, a crocodile, an alligator etc. (ii) terrestrial such as an elephant, a lion etc., and (iii) air animals such as a goose, a parrot etc.

All the celestial beings—gods and goddesses and all the hellish beings as well have each a *vaikriya*¹ body and a very very long life as compared with that of human beings. Their birth is spontaneous: i.e. to say they appear suddenly at the place where they are to be born. Their death is natural and not an outcome of any accident, suicide, disease or the like. In short, their life cannot be cut short by themselves or others. Leaving aside these common features of the celestial and hellish beings, the former enjoy happiness in a smaller or greater degree whereas the latter have a horribly miserable life to lead.

Celestial beings are grouped under four heads

(a) *Bhavanapati* (residential), (b) *Vyantara* (peripatetic) (c) *Jyotiṣka* (stellar) and (d) *Vaimānika* (heavenly). The first and the last have each ten grades whereas the rest eight. The ten grades are

(i) *Indra*. He is a supreme authority like a king

1 For its explanation see p. 84

He is so to say an olympic monarch

(ii) Samanika He is equal in all respects to Indra except in rank and authority He is respected like an elder

(iii) Trayastrimsa He acts like a minister or a priest

(iv) Parisadya He acts like a friend

(v) Itmaraksaka He is a body guard

(vi) Lokapala Like a policeman he is a protector of people

(vii) Anika He is a soldier or a commander in chief

(viii) Prakirnaka He can be compared with the public

(ix) Abhiyogya He is a servant

(x) Kilbisika He is like an *antyaya* an untouchable

The Vyantaras and the Jyotiskas have not the two grades viz Trayastrimsa and Lokapala out of these ten

The Bhavanapatis are the lowest species of gods and they reside in a subterranean earth They are divided into ten classes and they are like princes as each of their following ten names indicates —

(a) Asua kumara (b) Naga kumara (c) Vidyut kumara (d) Suparna kumara (e) Agni kumara (f) Vata kumara (g) Stanita kumara (h) Udadhi kumara (i) Dvipa kumara and (j) Dik kumara

The Vyantaras comprise eight classes (a) Kinnara

(b) Kimpurusa, (c) Mahoraga, (d) Gandharva, (e) Yakṣa, (f) Rakṣasa, (g) Bhūta and (h) Pisaca. Some of them serve even men.

The Jyotiṣkas are divided into five classes (i) suns, (ii) moons, (iii) planets, (iv) constellations and (v) stars.

The Vaimānikas are divided into two classes (i) Kalpopapanua and (ii) Kalpatita. The former have twelve sub classes¹, whereas the latter, two viz Graīveyakavāsin² and Anuttaravāsin³.

1 These are based upon the particular heaven (*svarga*) out of twelve they reside in. These twelve heavens are named as under —

(i) Sandharma, (ii) Iśāna, (iii) Sanatkumāra, (iv) Mahendra, (v) Brahmāloka, (vi) Lāntaka, (vii) Mahāśukra, (viii) Sahasrāra, (ix) Ānata, (x) Prānata, (xi) Āraṇa and (xii) Icyuta.

In Brahmāloka, there are gods known as Lokantikas whose duty it is to request a Tīrthānkara to establish a tīrtha by renouncing the world.

2 There are nine graīveyakas. Their names are (i) Sudarśana, (ii) Supratibaddha, (iii) Manorama, (iv) Sarvabhadrā, (v) Viśāla, (vi) Sumanas, (vii) Saumanasa, (viii) Pṛitikaṛa and (ix) Āditya. Vide *Lokaprakāśa* (vol II p 363b). They are also known as the lowest, the middle and the uppermost of the lower, middle and upper divisions.

3 In all there are five anuttaras. They are (i) Vijaya, (ii) Vajrayanta, (iii) Jyanta, (iv) Aparājita and (v) Sarvārthasiddha. The first is in the east, the second in the south, the third in the west and the fourth in the north whereas the fifth is in the centre. Vide *Lokaprakāśa* (vol II, p 366a).

He is so to say an olympic monarch

(ii) *Samānika* He is equal in all respects to Indra except in rank and authority He is respected like an elder

(iii) *Trayastrimsa* He acts like a minister or a priest

(iv) *Parīṣāḍya* He acts like a friend

(v) *Ītmahakṣaka* He is a body guard

(vi) *Lokapala* Like a policeman he is a protector of people

(vii) *Anika* He is a soldier or a commander in chief

(viii) *Prakīrnaka* He can be compared with the public

(ix) *Ābhīyogya* He is a servant

(x) *Kūlbīsika* He is like an *antyaja* an untouchable

The *Vyāntaras* and the *Jyotiṣkas* have not the two grades viz *Trayastrimsa* and *Lokapala* out of these ten

The *Bhavanapatis* are the lowest species of gods and they reside in a subterranean earth They are divided into ten classes and they are like princes as each of their following ten names indicates —

(a) *Asura kumara* (b) *Naga kumara* (c) *Vidyut kumara* (d) *Suparna kumāra* (e) *Agni kumara* (f) *Vāta kumara* (g) *Stanita kumara* (h) *Udadhi kumara* (i) *Dvīpa kumara* and (j) *Dik kumara*

The *Vyāntaras* comprise eight classes (a) *Kinnara*

(b) Kimpuruṣa, (c) Mahoraga (d) Gandharva (e) Yakṣa (f) Rākṣasa (g) Bhuta and (h) Piśāca. Some of them serve even men.

The Jyotiṣkas are divided into five classes (i) suns (ii) moons (iii) planets (iv) constellations and (v) stars.

The Vaimānikas are divided into two classes (i) Kalpopapanna and (ii) Kūlpatita. The former have twelve sub classes¹ whereas the latter two viz Graha, yakavasin² and Anuttaravasin³.

1 These are based upon the particular heaven (*starga*) out of twelve they reside in. These twelve heavens are named as under —

(i) Saudharma (ii) Īśāna (iii) Sanatkumāra (iv) Mahendra (v) Brahmaloḥa (vi) Lāntaka (vii) Mahāśukra (viii) Sahasrāra (ix) Ānata (x) Prānata (xi) Āraṇa and (xii) Acyuta.

In Brahmaloḥa there are gods known as Lokāntikās whose duty it is to request a Tīrthanāra to establish a tīrtha by renouncing the world.

2 There are nine grahaevakās. Their names are (i) Sudarśana (ii) Supratibaddha (iii) Manorama (iv) Sarvaśuddha (v) Vīśva (vi) Sumanas (vii) Saumanasa (viii) Pṛthivī and (ix) Āditya. Vide *Lokaprakāśa* (vol II p 363b). They are also known as the lowest, the middle and the uppermost of the lower, middle and upper divisions.

The *garbhaja* are again three fold according as their uterine birth is umbilical (i e having a yolk sack flesh envelope, like a human child), unumbilical (i e without any sack or shell, like a cub of a lion or a kitten) and incubatory (i e from a shell, like an egg)

(2) *Sañjñā*—All the living beings can be classified under two groups (i) *sañjñin* and (ii) *asañjñin*. The former have a developed brain whereby they can distinguish the beneficial activities from the unbeneficial ones, whereas the latter have a brain, no doubt, but it is less powerful as compared with that of the former. Both the *sañjñin* and *asañjñin* have four instincts (*sañjñas*) pertaining to food, fear, sex and possession (*parigraha*). The *ekendriyas* *dvandriyas*, *trindriyas* and *caturindriyas* are all *asañjñin*. But, amongst the *pañcendriyas* there are some who are *asañjñin* and some *sañjñin*, too. All the celestial and infernal beings are *sañjñin* and even those human beings and *tiryacs* that are *garbhaja* are *sañjñin* whereas the rest which include *sammurchima* human beings and *sammurchima* *tiryacs* are *asañjñin*.

(3) *Prāna*—A living being that we come across in this world, is obviously a combination of two distinct substances • animate or living and inanimate or lifeless (dead). We do see purely inanimate objects e g a table a chair, a dead body etc., but we do not and cannot see purely animate objects. The difference

between any living being and any life less object is that the former has consciousness whereas the latter is wanting in it. But, if we were to confine our attention to living beings we see we find them dying, too. The state prior to death¹ shows the presence of several vitalities (*pranas*). For instance, in a dead person we see that his sense organs do not function : e to say he has none of the five vitalities associated with the five sense organs. Further, he is unable to act, speak and think. Thus he is bereft of three other vitalities—vitalities pertaining to body, speech and mind. But a living person when asleep, unconscious or in a trance, appears to be wanting in these eight vitalities. So, in order to know whether he is living or dead, we examine his respiration. If it is there we infer that he lives, if not, we conclude that he has breathed his last². This shows that respiration (inhalation and exhalation) is another vitality of a mundane living being. A popular saying such as 'his days are numbered' suggests that life period—span of life is also a vitality of a mundane living being. Thus we see that in all there are ten vitalities³ in the case of

1 Death ordinarily means the separation of the soul from the physical (outer) body. It is not of course annihilation of anything soul or matter. According to Jainism death means the destruction of *pranas*.

2 Spenser speaks of death as 'nought but parting of the breath'. See his *Faerie Queene* (Book VII, canto 7, stanza 46).

3 They are five sense-organs three powers (those of body, speech and mind), respiration and life period.

a human being They can be grouped under four heads (a) the vitality of the senses, (b) the power of body, speech and mind, (c) respiration and (d) life period

All the ten *pranas* exist in the case of *pañcendriyas* that are *sañjīn* whereas all except the power of mind in the case of those that are *asañjīn*. The four sensed beings have no thinking power, and same is the case with the three sensed two-sensed and one sensed beings Further, the power of communicating which assumes the form of articulate speech in the case of human beings is a common property of all the mundane living beings except the one sensed which have however, only the power of respiration, life period sense of touch and the bodily strength in common with the rest

From this one can see that the one sensed beings have four *prapas*¹ in all the two sensed two more (one sense more and the vocal strength) the three sensed still one more viz the sense of smell, the four sensed one more viz the sense of sight and the five sensed at least one more viz the sense of hearing (and in some cases the mental, too) This shows the gradation of the development of mundane living beings

(4) *Body*—According to Jainism there are five

1 They are sense of touch physical power respiration period

kinds of bodies (i) *audarika*, (ii) *vaikriya*, (iii) *ahā' raka*, (iv) *taiyasa* and (v) *karmana*

Of these the first is the gross physical body peculiar to animals and men

The second is the transformation body It exists by nature in the case of celestial and hellish beings and the wind bodied, whereas it can be acquired by some human beings by practising austerity.

The third is the translocation body It is created by certain ascetics¹ who wish to get a solution about some dogmatical question from a *Tīrthankara* like *Śimandharasvāmin* living in another part of the world They send it there while their physical body remains here Nothing can obstruct the passage of this *āhā' raka* body so far as it goes from one part of the *trasa naḍi*² to another

The fourth is a fiery body It assists in digesting the swallowed food It is helpful to ascetics in case they wish to burn any living beings or things, when enraged

The fifth is the receptacle of *karmans* It comprises *lāṃṃika targaṇā* See D K J P (p 25)

1 According to the *Digambāras* a man like figure emanates from the head of the saint concerned

2 This is a portion of *loka* outside which there are to be found only *ekendriyas* and no *labdhītrāsas* It may be roughly translated as 'a mobile channel'

Of these five bodies each successive one is finer than the preceding one

Each of the first three bodies has *asankhyeya* times the number of *pradeśas* which are in the one preceding it whereas each of the last two has *ananta* times the *pradeśas* compared with the body preceding it

The *śarīra* and *karmāṇa* bodies are associated with every mundane living being from the beginning less time. They are ever changing, for, they attract and assimilate new *karmāṇas* and discard the old ones. So, in a way each has a beginning and an end as well. Further, both of them have a free passage not only inside *trasa nāḍī* but even beyond it. In short each can go upto any and every part of *loka*.

A mundane soul can have at best four bodies at a time but never all the five, for *śarīra* and *ahāraka* bodies cannot co exist, though the powers to generate them can.

(5) *Paryāpti*.—A mundane soul requires a body in order that it can function. So as soon as a mundane soul on death reaches its new abode of incarnation, it begins to assimilate matter and then transform it in a suitable way. The first thing it does is to collect various *īrgaṇas*¹ useful for developing body, sense organ vocal organ mental organ and respiratory organ. After collecting them it retains

1 For explanation see D K J P (pp 24 25)

those which can serve the purpose and discards the rest. This act is known as 'āhāra-paryāpti' (1).

When a portion of the acquired matter assimilated by the soul is further developed as to form a body, the completion of this development is called 'śarīra-paryāpti' (2).

When a part of it is formed into sense-organ, the completion of this development is called 'indriya-paryāpti' (3).

Similarly the completion of the capacity for respiration, and those for forming *bhāṣā-vargaṇa* into speech and *mano-vargaṇā*, into mind are respectively known as 'prāṇāpāna-paryāpti', 'bhāṣā-paryāpti' and 'manah-paryāpti' (4-6).

A newly born mundane being is incomplete but has the capacity to become complete in assimilation, body, sense-organ, respiration, speech and mind. This six-fold capacity is not developed by each and every mundane being; for, some die before they have done so. Further the one-sensed beings can have at best the first four *paryāptis*; the two-sensed, the three-sensed, the four-sensed and the *asañjñin* five-sensed five; and the *sañjñin* five-sensed all the six. Each of these kinds of living beings cannot die before the first three capacities are developed. Further, each of them tries to develop simultaneously all the capacities it is entitled to.

(good) and *asubha* (bad). The former is three fold *tejas*¹ (fiery red) *padma* (pink) and *sukla* (white). The latter is also so *kṛṣṇa* (black), *nīla* (blue) and *kāpota* (grey). Thus it will be seen that there are six *leśyās* in all, viz (i) *kṛṣṇa*, (ii) *nīla* (iii) *kāpota*, (iv) *tejas*, (v) *padma* and (vi) *śukla*², and they can be distinguished according to the tints-colours they give to the mundane soul. Of them the first is the worst, and it is characterized by the possession of the greatest sinfulness. Each following one is better than the preceding one, and the last is the best. I may illustrate these remarks by means of the following two parables given in the *Jaina* literature.

Six hungry men saw a Jambū tree, full of ripe fruits. They wished to eat these fruits. One of them proposed to hew down the tree from its very root. The second suggested to chop off the big boughs of the tree. The third recommended to cut off only the branches and the fourth only the bunches. The fifth advised to pluck the fruits while the sixth said that they should only gather the fruits fallen on the ground and eat them. Here the first has a black *leśya*, the second blue, the third grey, the fourth fiery, the fifth pink and the sixth white.

1 Instead of *tejas* *plta* (yellow) is mentioned in the English translation (p. 57) of TS.

2 For the description of colour taste etc., of these *leśyās* and the influence each exerts on the corresponding individual see II J (pp. 102-104).

The development of the first *pariyāpti* requires the least time. The time taken by each of the remaining *pariyāptis* is greater than the one taken by the preceding one. Thus the development of the sixth *pariyāpti* takes the maximum time, whereas that of the first minimum.

(6) *Leśyā*—The word *leśyā* is differently derived by different writers. For instance Devendra śūri in his com on *Kamma-vivāga* (v. 92) says: "*liṣyate-s'liṣyate karmaṇā sahā' tmā' naye'ti leśyā*" i.e. to say one that makes the soul embrace *karman* is called '*leśyā*'. Dr. Charpentier traces it from *leśa* and Dr. Jacobi from *klēśa*.

As regards the nature of *leśyā* there are three theories.

(a) Some believe that it is a *niṣṣyanda* (product) of *Laṣāyas* (passions).

(b) Some take it to be a *parināma* (result) of *yoga* (activity).

(c) Some think that it is a *parināma* of the eight kinds of *karman*.

In O J (p. 46) *leśyā* is defined as under:—

"*Leśyā* (tint) is said to be that by means of which the soul is tinted with merit and demerit."

In the English trans (p. 57) of TS *leśyā* is translated as thought point.

Leśyās are broadly divided into two classes: *śubhā*

(good) and *aśubha* (bad). The former is three-fold : *tejas*¹ (fiery-red), *padma* (pink) and *śulla* (white). The latter is also so : *kr̥ṣṇa* (black), *nīla* (blue) and *kāpota* (grey). Thus it will be seen that there are six *leśyās* in all, viz. (i) *kr̥ṣṇa*, (ii) *nīla*, (iii) *kāpota*, (iv) *tejas*, (v) *padma* and (vi) *śukla*², and they can be distinguished according to the tints-colours they give to the mundane soul. Of them the first is the worst, and it is characterized by the possession of the greatest sinfulness. Each following one is better than the preceding one, and the last is the best. I may illustrate these remarks by means of the following two parables given in the *Jaina* literature :

Six hungry men saw a Jambū tree, full of ripe fruits. They wished to eat these fruits. One of them proposed to hew down the tree from its very root. The second suggested to chop off the big boughs of the tree. The third recommended to cut off only the branches and the fourth only the bunches. The fifth advised to pluck the fruits while the sixth said that they should only gather the fruits fallen on the ground and eat them. Here the first has a black *leśyā*, the second blue, the third grey, the fourth fiery, the fifth pink and the sixth white.

1. Instead of *tejas*, *pīta* (yellow) is mentioned in the English translation (p. 57) of TS.

2. For the description of colour, taste etc., of these *leśyās* and the influence each exerts on the corresponding individual see H J (pp 102-104).

The second parable refers to six robbers who wanted to plunder a village. The first robber wishes to kill all living beings, quadrupeds and bipeds, the second only the human beings, the third only males; the fourth only the armed ones, and the fifth only those who oppose them and fight. The sixth however advised them to take away only the treasures but not to murder anybody. This parable is to be explained in the same way as the first.

. Broadly speaking, the earth-bodied, the water-bodied, the *vanasptikāya*, Bhavanapati gods and goddesses and Vyantara gods and goddesses have the first four *leśyās* beginning with the black one. The fire-bodied, the wind-bodied, the *vikalendriyas*, *sammūrcchīma-tiryak-pañcendriyas* and *sammūrcchīma* human beings and infernal beings have three viz. black, blue and grey. The *garbhaja-tiryak-pañcendriyas* and the *garbhaja* human beings can have all the six. Gods of Saudharma and Īśāna and all the Vaimānika goddesses have *tejoleśyā*. Gods of Sanatkumāra, Mahendra and Brahmaloḥa have *padma-leśyā* and the rest of gods only *śukla-leśyā*.

In the case of *garbhaja* human beings all the six *leśyās* exist. These can be differentiated according to their types. For instance, the hostile, pitiless, cruel, barbarous, impious man, who has a bad tongue and who takes pleasure in torturing other beings, has

a black *lesya*, the fraudulent, corruptible, inconstant, hypocritical,¹ voluptuous man has a blue *lesya*, the thoughtless one who in all his actions does not weigh the evil and the wrathful, has a grey one, the prudent man who stops the influx of new *karman*, who is liberal and honorable and who has a friendly mind towards religions, has a fiery *leśya*, the compassionate, bountiful, steady and intelligent one has a pink *leśya*, and the pious man who performs good deeds and who is passionless and impartial, has a white *lesya*¹ In O J (p 47) it is observed

‘ the six *leśyās* are the colours of the aura of the human body in occult Jainism The theosophical view of the colours of the aura may be compared the aura of the saint is ethereal bluish, like the shimmering blue of pure white ice, that of the angry man is red that of the wicked and sinful man black, and so on ”

(7) *Samhanana*—This is variously translated as osseous structure, skeleton and constitution. Its strength depends upon the type of joints and bones¹ In all there are six varieties of it (i) *vajraṣabha naraca*², (ii) *ṛṣabha naraca* also known as *ardha vajra-*

1 See D K J P (p 48) where a substance of six verses occurring in Devendra Suri's com (p 114) on his own work *Chāṣṭi* (p 114) is given

2 This is explained as “amphiarthrodial articulation, when the bones are slightly moveable and united by an intervening substance” in the English translation (p 163) of T S

ṣabha and *vajra naraca*¹, (iii) *naraca*¹, (iv) *ardha naraca*, (v) *kilika*² and (vi) *sevārta*³ also called *cheda prṣṭha*. The first is the strongest and the last weakest, for, herein the ends of the bones only touch one another.

'Vajra' means a bone of the shape of a tack⁴, 'ṣabha', a bone of the shape of a bandage, and 'narāca' a *markaṣa-bandha* at both the ends. In the best type of *saṃha-nana*, the two bones are hooked into one another at both the ends; i.e. to say there is a *markaṣa-bandha* on each side, and a tack is hammered through the joining, and the whole is surrounded by a bandage. It is strong like adamant.

The *ṣabha naraca saṃhanana* is not so firm as the first, for, it is lacking in a tack. If we name it as 'vajra naraca', it is to be considered as wanting in a bandage.

In the *naraca saṃhanana* the two bones are hooked into one another at both the ends, and thus there is a

1 'Ordinary amphiarthrodial articulation and bones' *Ibid*, p 165

2 This is styled as "kilika" and explained as "synarthrodial articulation in which bones are unmoveable and directly joined" *Ibid*, p 165

3 This is named as *asampraptāsrpāṣikā* and explained as diarthrodial articulation in which bones may be more or less moveable when the articular surfaces are covered with smooth cartilage and surrounded by a fibrous capsule *Ibid*, p 165

4 In *The Karma Philosophy* (p 41) *vajra* is translated as a sort of bolt or pin, and *ṣabha* as an envelope of tissue

markaṣa bandha This *samhanana* is lacking in both a tack and a bandage

In the *ardha naraca samhanana* the two bones are hooked into one another at one end only and at the other end the bone is simply straight and a tack is hammered through it There is no bandage

In the *lilika samhanana* both the bones are straight, and a tack is hammered through them But there is neither any hook nor any bandage

In the *sevarta samhanana* the bones simply touch each other or are in sockets They are in constant need of being besmeared with oil etc Here there is an absence of a tack a *markaṣa bandha* and a bandage The *samhanana* of most of us is like this

Only the first three *samhananas* are considered good Therein the first is excellent and it is essential for the highest type of *dharma* which precedes salvation

(8) *Samsthana*—This may be roughly translated as the figure or shape of the body of a mundane living being This is of six kinds (i) *samacaturasra* (ii) *nyagrodha parimaṇḍala* (iii) *sadī* (iv) *kubja* (v) *ramana* and (vi) *hunda* The first is perfectly symmetrical Suppose a person is seated with his legs crossed and hands placed on the navel i e in a *paryanka* posture If we further imagine that his two knees are joined by a straight line and that three straight lines are drawn one from his right shoulder to his

left knee and one from his left shoulder to his right knee and one from the forehead to the hands we get four straight lines. If all of them are equal the figure is called 'samacaturasra' and it is perfectly symmetrical and proportional all round if not it is one of the remaining five *samsthana*s

The second *samsthana* is like a banyan tree short in the lower extremities and large in the upper body. Herein the upper part of the body is symmetrical and not the lower one.

The third is reverse of the second for here the body below the navel is symmetrical.

The fourth figure is that of a hunch back. Herein hands feet the head and the neck are symmetrical, but the breast and the belly are unsymmetrical.

The fifth is dwarf like. Here the breast and the belly are symmetrical but hands feet etc are not so.

The sixth is quite disproportionate. It makes the entire body perfectly unsymmetrical.

Death—Death means an end of the encasement in which a mundane soul got itself incarnated. This end is of two types. It may mean a death blow to death for ever or it may be a preparatory ground for a subsequent death to result when a new birth follows. The former leads to *mokṣa* the final emancipation whereas the latter is a temporary release.

from a prison-house in the form of a body¹ This latter one takes place only after the soul concerned has found out another encasement for it *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* (IV, 4, 3-5) expresses this idea as follows in the case of a human being —

‘As a caterpillar leaves the end of one blade of grass only after it has secured its hold on another, so does this self (atma) leave the human body only after it has found out another tenement in another kind of existence ’

Further, in this latter type of death, the soul as it were migrates along with its *karmika* property accumulated upto the last moment—a heritage of the past as well as its present life It was during this present life that it determined its new landing place and the period how long it will stay on there²

While the mundane soul is on its passage for re-incarnation, there is only *karma yoga* i e to say *karmika* activity

Further, its movement is in a straight line i e

1 The mundane soul, if not liberated is incarnated in a new body with the *lesyā* it had at the time of its death

2 A parallel idea occurs in *Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad* (III, 2-13, IV, 4-2-6) There it is said

‘The soul, at death, moves out and is accompanied by the person’s accumulations of all actions (*karmasaya*) during his life-time, and this *karmāsaya* determines the form which the soul has to take in the next birth ’ Vide *Hindu Social Institutions* (p 6)

parallel to any of the four directions or up or down'. This soul takes only one *samaya*. Thus a mundane soul gets incarnated in a new body in one *samaya* in the least and four *samayas* at best, for, the maximum number of turnings for its passage is three, however crooked this passage may be. If the passage is quite straight and has no turning it takes only one *samaya* as is the case with a *paramayu* going from one end of the *lola* to the other in a straight upward direction.

Before we end this chapter we may note the following fundamental characteristics of the soul which incidentally serve to distinguish the *Jaina* view from those of other systems of philosophy.

The soul is recognised, as against the *Cārvāka* view which recognises no proof but sense perception.

The *Nyāya* system recognises the absolute difference between a quality and the possessor of a quality; but, as Jainism maintains that the soul has the quality *upayoga*² which is made up of *jñāna* and *darsana*, that theory of *Nyāya* is exploded.

The soul usually pervades the body only, though its knowledge is unlimited. Hereby is drawn a distinction between *Jainism* and those other systems of

1 The direction of the liberated soul is vertically straight quite direct and with no turning whatsoever.

2 *Upayoga* is the resultant of consciousness. It may be said to be a sort of inclination arising from consciousness—the inclination toward *darsana* or *jñāna*.

philosophy such as the Nyaya the Mimamsa and the Sankhya which look upon the soul as ubiquitous i. e. co extensive with the universe

The soul enjoys fruits of *karman* This view distinguishes Jainism from Buddhism

The soul is different in different bodies The belief of the *Advaitavadins* that there is only one soul pervading the universe is thus denied

The soul undergoes modifications This serves to distinguish Jainism from the Nyaya and the Sankhya systems of philosophy

The soul wears a material garb that is to say *karman* is matter This Jain view distinguishes it (i) from that of the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas* who consider *karman* (*dharma* and *adharma*) as an attribute of the soul (ii) from that of the *Bauddhas* who call *karman* *rasana* and (iii) from that of the *Brahmatadins* who advocate the theory of *avidyā*

The soul has a tendency of going upwards This distinguishes it from all non Jain systems of philosophy

The soul does not require the help of any thing else in knowing itself for if it does not know its own existence no one else can impart that knowledge to it since instruction from without can never take the place of the feeling of consciousness of one's own presence which is implied in self knowledge

If the soul is not considered as the agent, i.e. the doer of actions and enjoyer of the fruits of these actions, we would fall into the error of exempting the soul from all responsibilities for its actions and thus at one stroke uproot all ethical distinctions and put a full stop to discriminate actions

Bhavas—Some of these differences can be gathered from the theory of *bhavas* treated in *Jaina* philosophy. There it is said that the soul is neither absolutely permanent (*kuṣastha nitya*)¹ nor absolutely imppermanent (*ekanta kṣanika*)² but it is *parināmi nitya*³ i.e. to

13 There are three different views about *nityatva* —

(i) According to the *Vaiśeṣikas* nothing which is not absolutely changeless (*kuṣastha nitya*) is *nitya* and the *nitya* substances according to them are *ākāśa*, *paramāṇu* etc

(ii) According to the *Vedāntins* there are two types of *nityatva* (a) relative and (b) absolute. The former is designated by them as *anvayitva*, *antvitatva* or *sthiratva*. It is such as belongs to *kāraṇa* in all its changes (e.g. clay in a jar, destruction of a jar etc). Further they base it on the ground of *pratyakṣajñā* just like the *Jainas*. The latter type of *nityatva* is such as belongs to *Brahman* or *ātman* and to it alone. In so far as the *Vedāntins* trace *sthiratva* or *antvitatva* in the midst of change, they are at one with the *Jainas*. But in so far as this relative *nityatva* is of small importance in the *Vedānta* system, and absolute *nityatva* alone counts, the *Vedāntins* are at one with the *Vaiśeṣikas* who hold the view that *apracayāt nityam*⁴ *raikarūpaṃ nityam*⁵ i.e. who look upon *nitya* as absolutely changeless.

(iii) According to the *Jainas* the only *nityatva* which is

say it is permanent so far as its essence goes and is impermanent so far as its modifications like knowledge, happiness, misery etc are concerned. All these modifications do not exist in one and the same condition of the soul. Thus modifications are associated with different conditions which are known as *bhavas*¹. In the case of a living being there can be at best five *bhavas* viz, *aupasamika*, *kṣayika*, *kṣayopasamika* or *mūḍha*, *audayika* and *parinamika*.

(a) *Aupasamika bhava* rises from the subsidence (*upaśama*) of *mohanīya karmāṇāṃ*². Here there is no realization (*udaya*) whatsoever of this *karmāṇāṃ* which is in potentia (*satta*). This *bhava* is a kind of purity of the soul. It can be compared with that of water of which the dirt has settled down but not destroyed. It is of two kinds viz, *aupasamika samyaktva* and *aupasamika caritra*.

(b) *Kṣayika bhava* rises from the destruction of *ghatī karmāṇāṃ*³. It is the highest type of purity of the soul. It can be compared with water of which

possible is the relative *nityatva* as absolute *nityatva* is a pure fiction. They manage to reconcile origination and destruction with this relative *nityatva*. Vid. the late Dr A B Dhruva's Notes (pp 43-44) on *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*.

1 The word *bhava* is translated as 'thought-activity' in the English trans. (p 49) of T S (II 1).

2 For its explanation see Ch. VIII.

3 For explanation see Ch. VIII.

all sorts of dirtiness are completely annihilated It is nine fold omniscience *kevala darsana* infinite power ideal conduct ideal faith ideal charity infinite gain undefiled enjoyment and undefiled re enjoyment

(c) *Kṣayopasamika bhava* rises from the partial destruction subsidence and operation of *ghati karmans* It is also a kind of purity of the soul It is of eighteen kinds some of which are associated with the *kṣayopasama* of passions

(d) *Audayika bhava* rises from the operation or fruition of *karmans* It is an impurity of the soul and can be compared with the dirtiness of clean water mixed with dirt It has 21 varieties viz 4 *gatis* (grades of existence) 4 passions 3 sexes wrong belief ignorance vowlessness unliberatedness and 6 *leśyas*

(e) *Parīṇamīla bhava* is a natural condition of the soul It is not the result of the operation subsidence destruction or *kṣayopasama* of *karmans* It is manifold consciousness or soulness capacity to attain salvation incapacity to attain salvation existence distinctness non omnipresence etc Of these the first three belong to the soul whereas the rest exist even in the case of some of the inanimate objects

The liberated beings have only two *bhavas* viz *kṣayīla* and *pārīṇamīka* whereas the mundane ones have three to five



CHAPTER VIII

Epistemology

Or

The Theory of Knowledge

According to Jainism *upayoga* (attentiveness) is one of the fundamental characteristics of the soul. It is also designated as *cetana* or *cattanya*—meaning ‘consciousness’ or awareness for attentiveness is a kind of it. This *upayoga* which is after all the direction or tendency of consciousness to apprehend or comprehend an object¹, is two fold differentiated (*sīlāra*) or undifferentiated (*anālāra*). In the former case it supplies us with details about the object in view and is known as *jñāna* whereas in the latter case it mentions only bare outlines of the object concerned and is known as *darśana*. Thus *jñāna* is differentiated knowledge and *darśana* undifferentiated. Further *jñāna* like a luminary illumines itself as well as its object.

Jñāna is two fold according as it is direct (*pratyakṣa*) or indirect (*parokṣa*). The direct *jñāna* is depen-

1 This is not the function property or sensation of matter or the material brain.

2 Vide the English translation (p. 59) of T. S.

dent on the soul only and so there is no scope for sense organs or the mind to act or assist it in its realization. Thus it is immediate and super sensuous and differs from intuition¹. The indirect *jñāna* is attained by the soul by means of the sense organs or the mind or both and it is inferior to the direct *jñāna*. The direct *jñāna* is either complete or incomplete. If former, it is named as *sakala* and if latter as *vikala*. *Sakala jñāna* (omniscience) is also known as *kevala* as it is 'absolute'. It enables a person to comprehend all objects and phenomena of the past present and future and that too in all respects². The incomplete direct *jñāna* has two varieties viz *avadhi* and *manah paryaya*. *Avadhi jñāna*³ reveals all the *mūṛta* (corporeal) objects—the objects having *rūpa*, but not the pure souls *dharmastikaya* etc., which are incorporeal and hence such as have no *rūpa* whereas *manahparyāya*

1 Intuition is explained as (i) immediate apprehension by the mind without reasoning (ii) immediate apprehension by sense and (iii) immediate insight. Thus it is at best immediate but not direct.

2 Lord Buddha refers to omnisience in the most glowing terms as that separate and supreme vision of all sufficing noble (Aryan) knowledge passing human ken. Vide *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (vol II p 70).

3 Some translate this as 'clairvoyance' but it is not correct for this is a faculty of seeing mentally what is happening or exists out of sight and it thus takes the help of mind which is not required in *avadhi jñāna*.

jñāna, only *pariyāyas* of the mind of the *sañjñins*. The latter enables its master to read the thoughts of others but, on this account it cannot be said to correspond with 'mental telepathy' which is an indirect knowledge.

The indirect *jñāna* is *vikalā* only. It is two-fold *ābhini-bodhikā* and *śruta*. The former is not as mature as the latter and hence these two can be respectively roughly compared with milk and a dish prepared from milk. *Ābhini-bodhikā jñāna* which is also known as *matī jñāna* deals with the existing substances whereas *śruta jñāna* with all things now existing and also with those which are dead and gone, and with the things to appear in future¹. Thus *ābhini-bodhikā jñāna* has a limited range for the past and the future are not within its province. *Śruta jñāna* is based upon hearing or reading a scripture² or the like. It implies knowledge acquired by the interpretation of signs, symbols, words etc.

Thus in all, we have five kinds of knowledge *ābhini-bodhikā*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manah pariyāya* and *kevala*. These five kinds of knowledge may remind a *Bauddha* scholar of *sutamaya pañña*, *cintamaya pañña*, *vilokana*, *cetopariyāyana* and *sabhaññuta*³.

1 An eclipse occurring to-day may be known by *matī jñāna*, but one in the time of Alexander or one to happen (say in the next month) can not be known by *śruta jñāna*.

2 For the characteristics of a true scripture see STh (p. 46)

3 See M L T (p. 80)

Before we deal with the varieties and sub varieties of the five kinds of knowledge except *kevala jñana* which has no varieties we may note that even the lowest type of living beings like the *sūkṣma nigoda* has *matī jñāna* and *śrūta jñāna*. *Avadhī jñāna* exists in the case of only some human beings and *tiryacs* but it is always possessed by all the celestial and infernal beings either in the natural or perverted form. *Manah paryāya jñāna* is solely a property of some saintly characters. *Kevala jñana* which is perfectly perfect is a price less attainment of the soul in its thoroughly pure and undefiled condition. In this all embracing knowledge all the objects of knowledge of the past present and future scintillate like stars in the infinite firmament.

There are differences of opinion as to whether an omniscient being has all the five kinds of knowledge or has only *kevala* especially when *abhinibodhika jñāna* and *śrūta jñāna* are indirect and they along with *avadhī jñāna* and *manah paryāya jñāna* belong to the *lāṣa jopasamika bhava* and not the *kṣayīla* one. The latter view is preferable. See Ch XIII.

It may be mentioned *en passant* that Jainism respects that knowledge which is based upon the right type of faith and it attaches greatest importance to omniscience—the knowledge which is completely purged of the infatuating elements of anger, pride etc.

Ābhinibolhika jñāna is mainly of two sorts viz, *sruta nisrita* and *asruta nisrita*. The former has four varieties known as *avagraha*, *śha*, *avāya* and *dharaṇa*, and each of these is six fold inasmuch as it is associated with five senses and the mind. The latter (*asruta nisrita*) has four varieties. They are known as *autpatiki*, *vainyiki*, *larmiki*, and *pariṇamiki* with *mati* added to each of these words. Thus *ābhinibolhika jñāna* has 28 varieties in all. So say some of the Ācāryas, but it is not a sound view according to Jinabhadra Gani (vide his *Visesa*° v 300-306). He counts 28 varieties in a different way for which the reader is referred to p 107.

Before we deal with these varieties we may note that an *avagraha* is of two types (i) *vyākhyānavagraha* and (ii) *arthavagraha*. The former is a stage beyond the mere *darśana* (perception) as it is after all *jñāna* though very very little in measure. This in course of time gains in strength as the contact between an object to be comprehended and the sense organ acting as an instrument of knowledge becomes stronger and stronger. When it reaches a stage when we know that the object to be comprehended is something it is known as *arthavagraha*. This *arthavagraha* is six fold as it is associated with all the five senses and the mind but *vyākhyānavagraha* is only four fold since the sense of sight and mind have no scope therein.

The reflection to determine what this something comprehended by *arthavagraha* is is called *īha*. It is the attitude of enquiry leading to the ascertainment of truth about the object of *avagraha*. For instance suppose while going on the way something touches our feet. It creates doubt in our mind as to whether it was the touch of a serpent or a rope. But a subsequent thought that in spite of our almost trampling upon it, it neither made any sound nor any attempt to bite us suggests that it ought not to be a serpent. Thus *īha* is different from doubt.

When the final decision in this matter is arrived at that it was the touch of a rope and not that of a serpent it is known as *avāya*. It is the ascertainment of truth in respect of the subject of enquiry.

The retention of the *avāya* is called *dharanā*. So far as *īha*, *avāya* and *dharanā* are concerned the contact with any sense-organ is not quite necessary during these stages of knowledge for the mental activity is rather predominant here.

It may be noted that when the object of *avāya* is being examined with regard to some other characteristic of it this *avāya* may be metaphorically spoken of as *avagraha*. In order that this *avagraha* may be distinguished from the initial one it is called *vyāpti-harika* (conventional) as opposed to the initial one which is then styled as *naivāyika* (transcendental).

This *vyākharika āyagraha* iha *āyaya* and *dharana* give rise to 23 varieties of *abhinibodhika jñāna*. Further, each of these varieties has twelve sub varieties according as it is associated with (i) one object or (ii) many, (iii) an object of one type or (iv) one of many types (v) it is quick or (vi) slow (vii) *nīśrita* or (viii) *anīśrita*, (ix) certain or (x) uncertain and (xi) *dhrūva* or (xii) *adhruva*.

The *Digambaras* mention *nīśrita* (exposed) and *anīśrita* (unexposed) instead of *nīśrita* and *anīśrita* and *ukta* (described) and *unukta* (undescribed) instead of certain and uncertain. Further, it seems that the words *dhrūva* and *adhruva* are interpreted differently by different schools. One takes *dhrūva* to mean lasting—permanent whereas the other as one which ought to occur.

Whatever it may be according to the *Śvetambaras* the first four sub varieties out of twelve are associated with an object whereas the remaining eight depend upon the kinds of *lāṣāyopasama* one may have.

Abhinibodhika jñāna is of 288 kinds or 336 according to the stand point we take. *Āyagraha* etc., upto *dharana* are each six fold as stated on p 105. If we think of each of these varieties with respect to twelve sub varieties we get the first result ($4 \times 6 \times 12 = 288$). If we add to these the twelve sub varieties of each of the four types of *vyākharanāyagraha*—the four types

associated with all the senses that of sight excepted and mind too, we get the second result $(288+4 \times 12 = 336)$ Here it should be noted that since according to *Viseṣa*° (v 305) *avagraha*, *īha avāya* and *dharana* exist even in the case of the four varieties of *asrutanisrita abhinibodhika jñana*, this *jñana* gets included in *śrutanisrita abhinibodhika jñana*

We shall now deal with the four varieties of *asrutanisrita abhinibodhika jñana*

The first variety viz, *autpatiki mati* has as its object one which was never seen, heard or dreamt before and which thus presents itself for the first time Further, this kind of *mati* gives a correct idea about this object in an unfailing manner In a way this *mati* shows the presence of mind

(2) *Vainayiki mati* is fruitful and enables an individual to understand works dealing with *dharma*, *artha* and *kama* It is acquired by paying due reverence to a teacher

(3) *Karmiki mati* is what is found in the black smiths, goldsmiths, carpenters and other

jñāna. It is of two kinds: *anga-praviṣṭa* (contained in the *aṅgas*¹) and (2) *aṅga-bāhya* (outside the *aṅgas*), also called *anaṅga-praviṣṭa*. The former has twelve divisions whereas the latter, many. The twelve divisions are known as the twelve *aṅgas* all of which are practically written in the *Addhamāgahī*² language—the language of the masses and not a sole property of the cultured classes³. Their names are: (1) *Āyāra*, (2) *Sūyagaḍa*, (3) *Thāna*, (4) *Samavāya*, (5) *Viāhapannatti*, (6) *Nāyādhammakāhā*⁴, (7) *Uvāsagadasā*⁵, (8) *Antagaḍadasā*⁶, (9) *Aṇuttarovavāyadasā*⁷, (10) *Panhāvāgarana*⁸, (11) *Vivāgasūya* and (12) *Diṭṭhivāya*.

Aṅga-bāhya-śruta has two divisions (i) *āvaśyaka* and (ii) *āvaśyaka-vyatirikta*. Of these the former has six sub-divisions viz. (a) *sāmayika*, (b) *caturviniśatistava*, (c) *randanaka*, (d) *pratīkramana*, (e) *kāyotsarga* and (f) *pratyākhyāna*, whereas the latter, two viz. (a) *lālīka* and (b) *utkālīka*⁹. Thirty-one works

1. These are the 12 scriptures prepared by each of the *Ġapadharas* of a *Tīrthankara*.

2. In *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* (II, p. 261) this language is referred to as "one of the most important, the best preserved and the most copious of all the Prakrit dialects".

3. In H J (pp 15 16) it is said that the Jainas "are very proud of this fact", and "we who have our scriptures and our book of Common Prayer in our mother tongue can understand their pride".

4 8. Each is really in plural.

9 For a tabular representation see H C L J (p. 23).

associated with all the senses that of sight excepted and mind too we get the second result ($288 + 4 \times 12 = 336$) Here it should be noted that since according to *Vīṣeṣa*^o (v 305) *avagraha* *īha* *avaya* and *dhārana* exist even in the case of the four varieties of *śrūta* *nirṣṛta* *abhinirodhika* *jñāna* this *jñāna* gets included in *śrūtānirṣṛta* *abhinirodhika* *jñāna*

We shall now deal with the four varieties of *śrūta* *nirṣṛta* *abhinirodhika* *jñāna*

The first variety viz *autpātiki mati* has as its object one which was never seen heard or dreamt before and which thus presents itself for the first time Further this kind of *mati* gives a correct idea about this object in an unfailing manner In a way this *mati* shows the presence of mind

(2) *Vamayiki mati* is fruitful and enables an individual to understand works dealing with *dharma* *artha* and *kāma* It is acquired by paying due reverence to a teacher

(3) *Karmiki mati* is what is found in the case of black smiths goldsmiths carpenters and others regarding their own craft and trade

(4) *Pariṇāmiki mati* is helpful in drawing an inference when only *pratyñā* (assertion) and *hetu* (reason) are mentioned Moreover its development is associated with the maturity in age.

Śrūta jñāna is always preceded by *abhinirodhika*

gnana It is of two kinds *anga praviṣṭa* (contained in the *angas*¹) and (2) *anga bahya* (outside the *angas*) also called *ananga praviṣṭa*. The former has twelve divisions whereas the latter, many. The twelve divisions are known as the twelve *angas* all of which are practically written in the *Addhamagahī*² language—the language of the masses and not a sole property of the cultured classes³. Their names are (1) *Ayara* (2) *Suyagaḍa*, (3) *Thana*, (4) *Samaraya* (5) *Viahapannatti* (6) *Nayadhammakaha*⁴, (7) *Uvasagaḍasa*⁵ (8) *Antagadadasa*⁶, (9) *Anuttarovavaiyadasa*⁷, (10) *Paṇharagarāṇa*⁸, (11) *Vivagasūya* and (12) *Diḥḥuaya*.

Anga bahya sruta has two divisions (i) *alasyaka* and (ii) *avasyaka vyatirīkta*. Of these the former has six sub divisions viz (a) *samayika* (b) *caturim satistara* (c) *vandanaka*, (d) *pratīkramana* (e) *layot sarga* and (f) *pratyakhyana*, whereas the latter, two viz (a) *halika* and (b) *utkalika*⁹. Thirty-one works

1 These are the 12 scriptures prepared by each of the *Ganadharas* of a *Tīrthankara*.

2 In *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* (II p 261) this language is referred to as one of the most important the best preserved and the most copious of all the Prakrit dialects.

3 In H J (pp 15 16) it is said that the Jainas are very proud of this fact, and we who have our scriptures and our book of Common Prayer in our mother tongue can understand their pride.

4 8 Each is really in plural.

9 For a tabular representation see H C L J (p 23).

beginning with *Uttarayjhayana* are mentioned as *kalika sruta* and twenty nine headed by *Dasavayaliya* as *utkalika sruta* in Nandi (s 44)¹ By *kalika-sruta* are meant those scriptures which can be read—studied in the first and the last quarters of the day and the night as well. Similarly *utkalika sruta* stands for such scriptures as can be read at any other time excluding three *kalavelas*² This is the Śīcāmbara definition Akalanka a Digambara author, defines them in his *Tattvartharajavartika* (p 54) as under

The scripture for which the time to study is fixed is *kalika* while one for which there is no specific time or period to study is *utalika*³

Atadhyajana—This is of two types (i) *bhava pratyaya*⁴ and (ii) *guna pratyaya* It is true that for the attainment of either of these types of knowledge

1 For differences of opinion regarding the numbers of these works see *ibid* pp 25 26

2 The period of 24 minutes before sun rise and that after sun rise constitute *kalavelā* Same is the case pertaining to noon sun set and mid night Thus there are four *kalavelas* The last is however practically out of question here

3 See H C L J (p 24)

4 The *Tīrthaṅkaras* have *atadhyajana* from their very embryonic condition but as this is not so in virtue of the birth (as a human being) and as this does not last till his life-time as in the case of celestial beings it cannot be given the designation *bhavapratyaya*

there ought to be a *kṣayapopasama* of *avadhiyāna varana karman*¹. But this *kṣayopasama* is as it were the birth-right of the celestial and infernal beings (as is the power of flying in the case of birds) whereas, for other living beings mere birth does not help them in getting it, but some sort of spiritual qualification is essential for its realization. Hence, in the first case it is called *bhava pratyaya* and in the second, *guna pratyaya*. The latter has six varieties viz (i) *anugamika* (accompanying), (ii) *ananugamika* (unaccompanying), (iii) *vardhamana* (increasing) (iv) *hiyamana* (decreasing) (v) *avasthita* (unflickering) and (vi) *avasthita* (flickering)

Though these six varieties get explained by the words in brackets, they may be expounded for clear understanding as under :—

- (i) It accompanies the individual even when he or she leaves the place where he or she attained *avadhi-jñāna* and goes elsewhere
- (ii) This ceases when the individual leaves its birth place
- (iii) The province goes on increasing
- (iv) The province goes on decreasing
- (v) This lasts either upto the attainment of omniscience or death or even in the subsequent birth

(vi) At times it increases, at times it decreases, or at times it altogether vanishes

Manah paryaya jñāna—According to the *Jaina* view when one thinks about any object or phenomenon, one's mind assumes a corresponding form. These forms differ according to the objects etc., thought of. They are known as *paryāyas* of the mind. One having *manahparyāya jñāna* directly knows these *paryāyas* and then by means of inference, one comes to know that which is thought about. For, on knowing a particular *paryaya*, one infers by experience that such a *paryāya* exists only when a particular object or phenomenon is thought of.

This is the view as propounded in *Viseṣā** (v 814) and *Nandīkūṇṇi* (p 16b). There is another view, too, for, from the *Ālasyayanijjuttī* (v 76) and the *Bhāṣya* (p 106) on TS (I, 29) it appears that the very object thought by another individual is known by one by means of the *manahparyāya jñāna*.

Of these two views only the second is noted in the *Digambara* works such as *Sarvārthasiddhi* on TS (I, 23), *Gommaṣasara* (jivakāṇḍa, v 437) etc., whereas, in the *Śvetāmbara* works both the views are recorded, though from the sixth century A D or so only the first view is mostly accepted by the *Śvetāmbara* writers, as the second view is not quite sound.

Manah paryaya jñāna is of two kinds (i) *ṛju-*

mati and (ii) *vipula mati*. The latter is more subtle than the former, and it supplies more details. Further *vipula mati* lasts till the attainment of omniscience while the other vanishes in some cases after a short interval after its birth.

False Knowledge—

Abhinibodhika jñāna, *sruta jñāna* and *avadhi jñāna* may be false or perverted but such is not the case with two other kinds of knowledge. To be explicit it may be noted that Jainism looks upon the knowledge of one endowed with right faith (*samyaktva*) as *jñāna* and considers the knowledge of one wanting in right faith and hence having *mithyatva*, as *ajñāna*. For, a person having *samyaktva* will utilize his or her knowledge as a means to attain salvation whereas one having *mithyatva* will utilize it for a worldly gain. It is on this basis that we have three kinds of *ajñāna*. Such being the case even some of the hellish beings who are endowed with *samyaktva* have *avadhi jñāna* and not *vibhanga jñāna* its perverted form. The same thing holds good in the case of celestial beings. It is not that each and every celestial being has *avadhi jñāna*, for those who are lacking in *samyaktva* have *vibhanga jñāna* and not *avadhi jñāna*. The *ajñāna* associated with *avadhi jñāna* is not named in Jainism as *avadhi ajñāna* but it is designated as *vibhanga jñāna*.

*Four darsanas—*The word *darsana* here means

'undifferentiated knowledge. It is of four kinds — (i) *caḥsur darsana*, (ii) *acāḥsur darsana*, (iii) *aiadhi darsana* and (iv) *kevala darsana*. The first is attained through the sense of sight, it is ocular. The second is non ocular for, herein any sense of organ except that of sight and mind are the channels utilized for its realization. The *darsanas* which are acquired by means of *aiadhi labdhi*¹ and *kevala labdhi* respectively are known as *avādhi darsana* and *kevala darsana*.

It may be observed that just as there is *ajñāna* as opposed to *jñāna* there is no *adarsana* as opposed to *darsana*. For it is not possible to point out the differences between these two as in the case of *jñāna* and *ajñāna* wherein the distinguishing factor is the presence or absence of right faith. We have not the opposites of *manah paryaya jñāna* and *kevala jñāna* as these two are always based upon right faith as is the case with *kevala darsana*. The remaining three *darsanas* are however possible even in the absence of the right faith.

If it is admitted (and really² it should be) that omniscience cannot be accompanied by any other kind of knowledge one can have from one to four kinds of

1 There are several *labdhis* or miraculous powers. For their varying details etc. see the translation of TŚPC (vol I pp 75-76).

2 See *Jñānabīnduprakaraṇa* (p 1) and Ch XIII.

knowledge at a time. If it is one, it can be nothing else but omniscience, if two, they are *mati* and *śruta* which are enjoyed by all except the omniscient, if three, they are either *mati*, *śruta* and *avadhi* or *mati*, *śruta* and *manah-paryāya*, and, if four, they are all except omniscience.



CHAPTER IX

Pramāṇas

The first *Jaina* writer on systematic logic whose work is available to us, is Siddhasena Divakara. It was he who laid the foundation of *Jaina* logic by composing in Samskrta a treatise called *Nyāyavatara*. He is also the author of *Sammāi-payarāṇa*, a *Paṭiya* work where he has discussed the principles of logic very elaborately.

Pramāṇa etymologically signifies 'an instrument of measurement' from *mā* to measure and *pra*, forth. Thus it means a measured standard authority. It is a means of acquiring accurate or valid knowledge—knowledge which is free from any sort of blemishes such as doubt¹, error etc., and which ascertains objects as they exist in nature².

The *Carvakas* believe in one *pramāṇa* viz., *Pratyakṣa* (perception), the *Bauddhas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas* in two viz. *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* (inference) the

1 It is the state of uncertainty about the correctness of two or more possible views of a fact.

2 *Pramāṇa* lays bare the whole truth which is the synthesis of extremes and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths. *Pra* in *pramāṇa* suggests completeness of view. See Notes (p. 276) to S M.

Sankhyas in these two along with *Sabda* (verbal authority) the *Naiyāyikas* in these three along with *Upamana* (comparison) the *Prabhakaras* in these four along with *Arthapatti*¹ (presumption) and the *Bhāṭṭas* in all these along with *Anupalabdhi* (non perception), while the *Jainas* in *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa*.

Pratyakṣa pramāṇa is generally interpreted as sense perception by all schools of thought except Jainism. This interpretation is however considered secondary—subordinate by the *Jaina* logicians. They call it *sāmyavaharika* (conventional) *pratyakṣa*. It is for the sake of convenience of the ordinary people that this *sāmyavaharika pratyakṣa* is admitted as one of the divisions of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* otherwise really speaking this is *parokṣa* i. e. indirect and mediate for a sensory object is realized by an ordinary living being through the medium of sense organs and the mind. This *jñāna* is included in *mati jñāna* and *śruti jñāna*—the two kinds of knowledge that we have in our daily life.

Paramārthika (transcendental) *pratyakṣa* is the clear knowledge acquired by the soul directly and immediately and not through any other kind of knowledge or medium of senses and the mind. It is pure knowledge arising from the illumination of the soul,

1 It is one of the five processes of inference of the *Mīmāṃsā* *sākas*. It is an inference by which any apparent inconsistency is explained away.

and it is a means of securing absolution. It is again twofold perfect (*saḥala*) and imperfect (*vikāla*). The former means omniscience. It is unlimited by time and space. It transcends all relativity of discursive thought involving the idea of succession and series. It is infinite, supreme, unobstructed and perfect. It preceles the attainment of salvation. The latter (*vikāla*) is again two fold *anādhī-jñāna* and *manah paryaya jñāna*.

Parokṣa pramāṇa is five-fold (i) *smṛti*, (ii) *pratyabhijñāna*, (iii) *tarka*, (iv) *anumāna* and (v) *āgama*.

Smṛti is the remembrance of an object previously seen, heard or experienced. It arises through the awakening of the past impressions.

Pratyabhijñāna is the recognition of an object by noticing its similarities and differences. It is the result of remembrance and perception. In the instance 'this is that very person' 'this' connotes present perception, 'that' refers to a recalled memory, and from their combination there arises the idea of the identification of the person. This knowledge includes such knowledge as arises from a comparison between an object seen and some other object remembered. "This is like that." The *boṣ gaeas* (*gavaya*) is like the cow, etc., are its instances. This corresponds to 'upamāna pramāṇa' recognised by other schools.

Tarka also known as *nha* is the knowledge of a

universal concomitance (i e invariable relationship) of any two objects e g wherever there is smoke there is fire This knowledge is the basis of inference It is the same as *vyapti jñāna* mentioned in the Nyāya philosophy

Anumāna (inference) is of two kinds (i) *svārthanumāna* and (ii) *parārthanumāna* *Svārthanumāna* is the valid knowledge arising in one's own mind from* repeated observation of facts It is useful for removing one's own doubts A person by repeated observations in a kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that wherever there is smoke there is fire Afterwards he is not certain as to whether the mountain that he sees is fiery or not But noticing it to be smoky he recalls to his mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke and concludes that there must be fire on this mountain This is an example of *svārthanumāna*

*
Parārthanumāna is useful when a conviction is to be produced in the mind of another It is based upon *svārthanumāna* as one cannot convince another without first convincing oneself In this *parārthanumāna* it is necessary that the premises must be stated with exact formality and precision otherwise there is a possibility of the speaker being misunderstood by the hearer Thus it is clear that in this kind of inference each proposition must be stated in a prescribed form

In other words a syllogism is essential for *parārthanumana* whereas such is not the case with *śārthanumana*

Generally a syllogism consists of five members (*aiyavas*) viz (i) assertion (*pratiyñā*) (ii) reason (*hetu*), (iii) example (*udaharāṇa*), (iv) application (*upanaya*) and (v) conclusion (*nigamana*) This is illustrated as follows —

(1) The mountain (*dharmīn*) is fiery (*sādhyā*)
—(*Pratiyñā*)

(2) because it is smoky—(*Hetu*),

(3) wherever there is smoke there is fire e g in a kitchen—(*Udaharāṇa*),

(4) so is this mountain full of smoke (*Upanaya*)

(5) therefore this mountain is full of fire—*Nigamana*

A syllogism of five members is called *madhyama* or mediocre If it consists of less than five members it is called *jaghanya* or the worst A syllogism consisting of ten members is considered *uttama* or the best For its illustration the reader is referred to p 7 f, of *History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic* by the late Dr Satish Chandra Vidyābhusana

As *parārthanumana* is a kind of knowledge acquired by means of the members of a syllogism so by attributing effect to cause even the words which express the reason and which are set forth to produce

conviction in the mind of others may be called *anumāna* i.e., the *hetu* which is the most important factor of producing *anumāna* may be looked upon by metaphor as *anumāna*

Āgama is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons (*apta*) It is recognised in different systems of philosophy, such as Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā etc It also means knowledge of scriptures It is the most important form of *śruti gñāna* It is admitted as *pramāna* because it is the most reliable form of testimony, being the word of an omniscient being who is completely devoid of all sorts of attachment and aversion¹, and who has no motive—no reason for deceiving or misleading any one Such being the case *āgama* is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, etc

We may end this topic by noting two points as under —

(1) The *Bauddhas* of the Yōgācāra school believe that knowledge reveals—illuminates itself alone and nothing else, as there is according to them no other object

1 Aversion manifests itself in a variety of forms such as hate disaffection, coolness, enmity, animosity, umbrage, abomination pique, bitterness, acrimony, malice repugnance, detestation, antipathy, execration malevolence malignity, spite rancour churlishness cruelty, bigotry, intolerance, vindictiveness superciliousness contempt etc See *Jama Culture* (p 69)

besides it¹ The *Naiyayikas* and the *Mimāṃsakas* hold that knowledge illumines the external objects alone and does not illumine itself The *Jainas* like the *Vedantins* differ from all these schools of thought, for, they maintain that knowledge like a lamp, illumines itself as well as other objects

(ii) The Indian systems of philosophy differ from one another in their belief about the number of *prapyakaran indriyas*². The *Bauddhas* recognise all organs of sense except those of sight and sound as *prapyakaran* whereas the *Naiyayikas*, the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the *Mimāṃsakas* and the *Sāṅkhyas* admit all the *indriyas* as *prāpyakaran* The *Jainas* differ from all these inasmuch as they consider all the *indriyas* except the sense of sight as *prapyakaran*



1 This is why this school is also known as *Jnanādvaita*¹

2. These mean the sense-organs which realize an object after coming in contact with it

nayas under seven heads viz (i) Naigama, (ii) Saṅgraha, (iii) Vyavahara, (iv) Rjusūtra, (v) Śabda, (vi) Samabhirudha and (vii) Evambhūta. The first three are called *dravyarthika nayas* inasmuch as they deal with the substantive aspect while the latter are called *pariyayarthika nayas* as they deal with the aspect of modifications¹, that is to say, the subject matter of the former is the substratum of an object—the eternal or the abiding element of a thing whereas that of the latter is modifications—the changing character of that thing². Instead of *dravyarthika* and *pariyayarthika*

in Śabda. While so doing its author Umāsvatī in his *Bhāṣya* (p 117) has given a different name, viz, Sāmprata the suitable to what is here described as Śabda, the verbal

1 According to Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamāśramana, even Rjusūtra is a *dravyarthika naya*. Vide *Jainatarkabhāṣā* (p 21)

2 While explaining *dravyarthika naya* and *pariyayarthika naya* Akalanka in the com (p 65) on his own work *Tattvārtharajavārtika* has given three meanings of the word *artha* viz (i) truth or reality, (ii) effect and (iii) object or purpose. Thus these two *nayas* respectively mean (vide Notes p 81 on S M) —

I. (a) the view that *dravya* is the only reality, *guṇa* and *karman* comprised under the common head of *pariyāya* being mere status of *dravya* and (b) the view that *pariyāya* i.e. *guṇa* such as *rūpa* etc and *karman* such as *utkṣepaṇa* etc. is the only reality, *dravya* being nothing apart from *pariyāya*

II (a) the view that *dravya* i.e. *kāraṇa* is *kārya* (effect) and (b) the view that *pariyāya* is the effect

the words *dravyāstika* and *paryāyastika* are also used as can be seen from *Sammai payarana*¹ (I, 3 & 6) They respectively mean a view point of the reality of the substance and a view point of the reality of modifications (changing modes)

The seven *nayas* can also be grouped as *artha nayas* and *śabda nayas*. The former include the first four *nayas* whereas the latter, the remaining three². In this connection in S Th (p 92) we have

The former are, strictly speaking the true stand points of philosophy, since the latter are employed specially by linguists, grammarians etymologists, and the like. But since human speech is couched in words and since the selection of words depends on the rules of grammar and is determined by their derivation and the like the last three stand points have also to

III (a) the view that *dravya* is the object of our thought, language etc and (b) the view that *paryaya* is so

1 Herein Siddhasena Dīyākara takes the number of *nayas* to be six and he accordingly begins their enumeration by mentioning Sangraha and not Naigama. In this *Sammai payarana* (I, 4 5) he says

(i) Sangraha and Vyavahara are the sub-divisions of *dravyāstika naya*

(ii) Rjusutra is the very foundation of *paryāyāstika naya*

(iii) Śabda etc, are of course subtle varieties of Rjusutra

2 The point of view of a speaker may have either reference to thought (*artha*) or word (*śabda*) in which the thought is expressed. Since these are the only ways in which the mind can approach reality, we may take it that a division of *nayas* which is founded upon them is exhaustive

be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the language of men as well of the spiritual text

Over and above these classifications of the *nayas* there are some more. One of them is to divide all the *nayas* into two groups known as *naiscayika* (transcendental) and *vyavaharika* (conventional). The former is the realistic point of view which attempts an accurate description of the realities which are practically neglected in our every day parlance. The latter is the ordinary common sense view point. For example according to the *vyavaharika naya* we can say a pot of milk but according to the *naiscayika naya* we ought to say a pot of a particular substance containing milk.

The *nayas* have been also classified as *arpita nayas* and *anarpita nayas* (vide *Visesa** v 3588). The former take into account particulars (*viseṣa*¹) whereas the latter universals (*samanya*¹). Thus according to

1 2 In S Th (p 42) *samānya* and *vīśeṣa* are translated as the general and the particular. Further there we have

When the special feature of a thing which distinguishes it from other things of the same description happens to be the object of attention it is the particular otherwise that is to say when emphasis is to be laid on the properties common to the whole class it is the general that is the object of knowledge. Whoever has realised the impossibility of the general and the particular existing apart from each other will readily perceive that like the two sides of a coin they are the two concomi-

the former, one liberated soul differs from another, when the *saṁaya* and the like are taken into account, but, according to the latter all the liberated souls are alike as they have the same fundamental characteristics

The *nayas* are also grouped as *jñāna nayas* and *kriyā-nayas*. The former emphasize the importance of knowledge whereas the latter that of conduct. *Rjusūtra* and three other *nayas* are *kriyā-nayas* as they attach importance to *kriyā* of the type of *caritra*. *Naigama*, *Sangraha* and *Vyavahāra* look upon *caritra*, knowledge and faith as the causes of liberation singly but not conjointly Vide *Jainatarkabhāṣa* (p 23)

tant, complementary and inseparable aspects which all concrete things wear in nature "

Sāmānya and *viśeṣa* are recognised as separate categories by the *Vaiśeṣikas* to account for *anurtti* and *vyārtti* but the *Jainas* do not hold this view as they believe that both *anurtti* and *vyārtti* can be explained as arising from the nature of the objects themselves. In other words objects co-ordinate themselves and distinguish themselves *sui forte*, they do not require such mediators as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* to enable them to accomplish the task in question. Further, they believe that *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are *dharma*s of objects in which they are supposed to inhere but they are neither absolutely the same nor absolutely distinct from these objects. See "Notes" (p 26) on S M

Anurtti means a common concept and a common name, and *vyārtti* also called *vyatirkti* means exclusion—distinction from other individuals of a different class —*Ibid* , p 27.

(1) *Naigama*, the non-distinguishable—*Naigama* takes into account both the *sāmānya*¹ and *viśeṣa*² the generic and specific properties of an object. Suppose we have a number of *ghaṭas* (jars). If we look at

1 In Jainism *sāmānya* is spoken of as of two kinds: *Tiryak* and *Urdhvatā*. The common general characteristic which belongs to all the individuals of a class is called *tiryak sāmānya*, e.g. the state of being a cow (*gaur*) in cows and the fundamental substance (like gold) which is present in the modification (such as a bracelet etc. of gold) is called *urdhvatā sāmānya*.

To be explicit the same fundamental attribute that is found in all the objects denoted by a genus is called *tiryak sāmānya*. *Ghaṭatva* which is present in all the *ghaṭas* *gaur* that is found in all the cows *surviveṭva* that is to be had in all the objects of gold etc. are instances of *tiryak sāmānya*. On the other hand *urdhvatā sāmānya* is a substance. It remains the same in all the modifications it undergoes. For instance we can have various kinds of ornaments of gold. In all these kinds—modifications, gold is present. Hence gold is an instance of *urdhvatā sāmānya*. We may consider one more case, say of a *ghaṭa* prepared from clay. It is true that various articles such as *kumbha*, *kalāśa* etc., can be prepared from this very clay. Thus clay is another example of *urdhvatā sāmānya*.

2 *Viśeṣa* is of two kinds: (i) *guna* and (ii) *paryaya*. *Guna* is co-existent with what it reveals. In other words it is *saśabhaṃ*. For example consciousness is the *guna* of *ātman*. It co-exists with it. It can be never separated from it. *Paryāya* is a modification. It is *krāma bhavaṃ*. Pleasure pain etc. are its instances. Thus it is clear that the particular mark which stays all the time with the substance is *guna*, while its temporary state is *paryaya*.

them from the stand-point of *sāmānya*, we know one property namely *ghṛtatra* (jariness) which belongs to all the *ghatas*. But, if we examine them from the stand point of *viśeṣa*, we can distinguish one *ghāṭa* from another, i.e. to say we come to know their differences in colour, weight etc.

This *naya* is called 'non-distinguished'; for, it does not observe any distinction between the generic and the specific properties of an object as the two succeeding *nayas* do. It considers that the generic properties are always accompanied by the specific ones and *vice-versa*. For example, when we speak of a jar, we realize certain properties of that jar which distinguish it from other substances; i.e. to say, the specific properties belonging to it and the generic properties that it has in common with other substances.

This *naya* has three sub-divisions. (i) Bhūta-Naigama, (ii) Vartamāna-Naigama and (iii) Bhaviṣyan-Naigama. To speak of a past event as present is 'Bhūta-Naigama'. For instance, on the morning of Dipāvalī, one may say that Lord Mahāvīra attained salvation to-day. Here it is a fact that Lord Mahāvīra has not attained salvation on the day when this remark is made. But it is that such an event took place on a corresponding day in the past. Thus, figurative attribution of the past to the present comes under this *naya*.

To speak of the futuro event as the present is Vartamana Naigama. Herein instead of noticing in the concrete present some elements which were once associated with the past we may detect in it some thing which is yet to be. As for example at the sight of a president elect one may say that he is a president. Thus one identifies the futuro with the present for really speaking at the moment under consideration the individual referred to is not a president he will be rather so in futuro. Similarly we may say about every soul that will attain salvation in due course of time that it is *siddha*.

To speak of the futuro as the past is Bhaviṣṭvan Naigama. Take for instance the case of rice being cooked. Before it is completely cooked one may say that it has been cooked.

Naigama is also defined as one that relates to the purpose or end of a course of activities. To illustrate this definition let us consider the case of a woman that is carrying water fire wood and other necessary materials for cooking. If we ask her what she is doing she may reply that she is cooking. This reply relates to the purpose or end of a series of activities. She is not actually cooking at the time she is replying.

Naigama which is an abbreviation of Naikagama according to Vadin Deva Suri is a statement where one of the following varieties occurs at a time

- (i) Of two *dharma*s one is subordinate to the other
 (ii) Of two *dharmin*s one is subordinated to the other
 (iii iv) Out of one *dharma* and one *dharmin* the former is subordinated to the latter and *vice versa*.

In the soul there is (*sat*) consciousness (*caitanya*) Here of two *dharma*s viz *caitanya* and *sat*, the former is a subject and therefore principal *Sat* is a predicate and hence it is subordinated to *caitanya*

A substance (*dravya*) having modifications (*pariyāyas*) is a reality (*tastu*) Here *dravya* and *tastu* are the two *dharmin*s of which the former is the subject and the latter the predicate So the former is principal and the latter subordinate If we have however the sentence viz, 'reality is a substance having modifications' the reverse will be the case though there, too, one *dharmin* is subordinated to the other

A living being attached to sensual objects (*viśaya-saktajñāh*) is happy for a moment (*kṣaṇam ekam sukha*) Here the *dharmin* viz, *viśayasaktajñāh* is subject whereas the remaining portion which is *dharma* is the predicate So the latter is subordinated to the former

(2) *Saṅgraha* the collective—*Saṅgraha naya* considers the general nature of objects after dividing them into groups or classes It is of two kinds (i)

Para Sangraha and (ii) Aparā Sangraha corresponding to the two groups of *samānya* viz *para samānya* (highest universal) and *apara samānya* (lower universal) of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Every existing object partakes of the nature of reality. Hence from the stand point of reality of existence we may speak of all things as one. This is Para Sangraha. But the different classes of objects animate and inanimate included in this ultimate reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is Aparā Sangraha.

The following is an illustration of this *naya*. We may say that there is one soul in all bodies. We do not hereby mean that the number of souls is one, but as we know that the souls in different bodies have the same fundamental characteristics, we can make the above remark. This *naya* contributes to economy of thought as it enables us to deal with a number of things as one. In S.T. (p. 91) it is said that the absolute of monism and the Platonic notion of Archetypal ideas are due to the over emphasising of this *naya*.

(3) *Vyavahāra the practical*—*Vyavahāra naya* means the statement made about an object from the conventional or popular stand point. It rests on sense perception of concrete present. It deals with the specific attributes of an object. According to this *naya* a bee though having five sorts of colour is

“

spoken of as having only one colour, the black one. Further one can say that a mountain burns, though strictly speaking, one ought to say that some substance or substances on the mountain, burn. But, in this *naya* convention is allowed to play a leading part. Men in their daily avocations, of life are guided by this *naya*.

(4) *Rjusūtra, the straight forward*—*Rjusutra naya* takes into account only the modifications of an object and not the substratum of that object. Hence, according to this *naya*, no object is eternal, for, every object is bound to undergo modifications, and these modifications are liable to change. This *naya* looks at an object as it is in the present mathematical moment. It does not bend towards the past or the future and is thus straight as its name implies. It is the extreme opposite of the *Sangraha naya* inasmuch as it denies all continuity and identity. It is narrower than the *Vyāvaharika* present for, according to the *Vyāvahāra naya*, there is a tolerable duration for the present, and the conventional things are real so far. According to *Rjusutra*, reality is concentrated to mathematical present. *Rjusūtra* and the following three *nayas* take into account only *bhāva-nikṣepa*¹ out of the four.

(5) *S'abda, the verbal*—*Sabda naya* does not take into account the differences in etymology of synonyms,

1. See pp 133-139

but it maintains that all synonyms mean one and the same thing. As for instance according to this *naya ghaṭa kumbha* and *kalasā* are all expressive of one and the same object namely a jar. According to some writers this *naya* observes distinctions of gender number case tense etc. in synonymous words like *dara bharya* and *kalatra* all of which mean wife.

(6) *Samabhirūḍha the subtle*—*Samabhirūḍha naya* observes distinctions between synonyms on etymological grounds. According to this *naya ghaṭa kumbha* and *kalasā* though synonymous and of the same gender differ in meaning as there is a difference in their etymology¹. As this *naya* differentiates terms according to their roots it may be said to be a special application of *Śabda naya*. It is hence narrower and more exaggerated than the above *naya*. Further *Śabda naya* is the stand point of a grammarian whereas *Samabhirūḍha naya* that of an etymologist. Moreover the former considers the denotative aspect and the latter the connotative aspect of words².

(7) *Evambhūta the such like*—*Evambhūta naya* takes into account the special functions or activities

1 For another example consider the synonyms *Indra Śakra* and *Purandara* all applicable to the ruler of the heavenly world. *Indra* means the possessor of divine powers, *Śakra* signifies the strong individual and *Purandara* the destroyer of the cities (of the enemy).

2 See Notes (p. 282) to SM.

of things and describes them by such words as are justified by their actual activities. In other words this *naya* recognizes the propriety of applying a word to an object only while it is justified by the then character of the object. It is thus a further specialization of the above *naya*. It maintains that the same thing in a different attitude—activity must be designated by a different word. According to this *naya* though Indra, Sakra and Purandara refer to one and the same person viz. the ruler of the celestial world this individual referred to can be called Indra only at that time when he actually possesses many divine powers can be designated Sakra, if he is really powerful at that moment and Purandara when he is engaged in the act of destroying the cities (of the enemy). We may consider one more example to illustrate this *naya*. The word *go* means a cow. According to its etymology any one that is in the act of going can be called *go*. So this *naya* will object to this term being applied even to the cow that is at rest or lying down. The word *go* can be applied to that cow only who is actually in motion.

Scope—From this exposition it must have been realized that out of these seven *nayas* every preceding *naya* is wider than every succeeding *naya*. To be explicit Saṅgraha deals with only Being (*bhāva*) whereas Naigama with non Being (*abhāva*) and Being. So Naigama is wider than Saṅgraha.

Vyavahara deals with particular forms or entities of Being while Sangraha with general Being. Sangraha is therefore wider than Vyavahara.

Rjusutra deals with the present only whereas Vyavahāra with the past present and future. Vyavahara is thus wider than Rjusutra.

Śabda deals with *arthas* which it regards as differing according to differences of time (tense) etc. whereas Rjusutra makes no such distinction. Hence the latter is wider than the former which insists upon the punctiliousness of language so much so that it would not permit the use of *apas* for a drop of water or even *viramati* (although grammatically sound) instead of *viramate* when the *kriyā* (act) is *atmane* (for oneself).

Samabhirūḍha carries the punctiliousness of language still further as it recognises differences of things corresponding to those of synonyms. So Śabda is wider than Samabhirudha.

Evambhuta takes note of the present condition only. Hence Samabhirudha is wider than it.

It may be noted *en passant* that in the last three *nayas* exaggerated importance is attached to the form of expression in the ascending order.

Just as a portion of a sea is neither sea nor non-sea so *naya* is neither *pramāṇa* nor a *pramāṇa*.

Nayas and the non-Jaina schools—According to Jainism several non-Jaina schools of thought have

glimpses of part truths and are so far right. But as they insist upon these part truths as whole truths by denying the other sides of truth they become erroneous and so in their case *naya* ceases to remain *sunaya* and becomes *durnaya* i. e. *nayābhāsa*.¹ To be explicit the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika schools lay undue emphasis on Naiṣama the Sāṅkhya² and Vedānta ones on Saṅgraha¹ the Cārvāka school on Vyavahara the Bauddha school on Rjusūtra and the school of grammarians on Śabda. Abhayadeva Suri the commentator of *Sammāyaparana* (I 5) has somehow shown the relation of the four² schools of Buddhism with the last four *nayas*. Upādhyāya Yasovijaya in his *Nayopadeśa* (v 119) says that Rjusutra and the following three *nayas* have been resorted to by the *Sautrantikas* *Vaiśeṣikas* *Yogacaras* and *Mādhyamikas* respectively.

Niksepas

There are four *nikṣepas* or connotations of every word. These connotations or the *nikṣepas* as they are called are *naman* *sthāpan* *dṛavya* and *bhava*.

Naman is the name of an object. This name may or may not be significant i. e. the object may bear a

1 The doctrines suggested by the words Brahmadvaita Śabdādvaita Dravyādvaita and the like are looked upon as so many illustrations of this Saṅgraha *naya*.

2 They are (a) Yogacara (b) Mādhyamika (c) Sūtrāntika and (d) Vaiśeṣika.

name even though the etymological meaning may be absent in it e g naming a person as Fox

Sthapana is an installation or a material representation of an object. A photograph, a picture a keepsake, an image a model a statue, pieces employed in the game of chess¹ and the like are its instances.

Dravya is the substance underlying an object. It refers to its inherent potentiality which it is not manifesting at the present moment but which it either did in the past or which it is going to do in future e g to call a president elect president, a retired or a dead president president and one who has resigned as a president, president.

Bhava means the actual nature of an object. It refers to its present function—the actual condition.

In order to understand these four *nīkṣepas* consider the case of *ghata*. To give the name *ghaṭa* to an animate or inanimate object is called *nāma ghaṭa*. Its illustration is called *sthapana ghaṭa*. The clay of which a *ghaṭa* is made or to which it is reduced on being broken is called *dravya ghaṭa*. The *ghaṭa* that

1 The pieces are 32 in all. Of them every player has 16: two castles or rooks, two knights, two bishops, one queen, one king and eight pawns. A castle is a piece with a battlemented top. A knight has usually a horse's head. A bishop is a mitre-shaped piece. A pawn is a piece of smallest size and value.

is useful for fetching water etc,—the *ghaṭa* whereby all the functions of a *ghata* can be performed, is called *bhava ghaṭa*. These are four possible meanings of the word *ghata* according to *nikṣepa*.

We may take another example. Suppose there is a person who calls himself *Vaidya*. Then this name is 'nāma vaidya'. If there is his picture or photo or the like it is called 'sthāpana vaidya'. If this person is going to be a *vaidya* (a physician) in future or if he was so in the past, he is 'dravya vaidya'. If he is actually a physician at the present moment, he is 'bhava vaidya'. These are the four possible meanings of the word *vaidya* according to *nikṣepa*.

Sometimes the word *dravya* occurring in *dravya-nikṣepa*¹ denotes non predominance—bogusness e g. *Angāramardaka Ācārya* is spoken of as 'dravyācārya'.

1 In the Eng. trans. (pp. 8-15) of T S there is an exposition of *nikṣepas*. There the word *nikṣepa* is rendered as 'aspect' and *dravya nikṣepa* as 'privative aspect'. Further, varieties and sub-varieties of *dravya nikṣepa* are noted there along with those of *bhāva nikṣepa*. For a parallel treatment according to the *Śvetāmbaras* see my *Ārhat-darśana-dīpikā* (pp. 151-154).

It may be noted that the *Śvetāmbaras* differ from the *Digambaras* in some respects in their exposition of *nikṣepas* as can be seen by comparing its treatment in *Vīśeṣa*² with that in *Laghīyastrayī* and its com. *Nyāyakumudacandra* by *Prabhācandra*. Vide the 'paricaya' (p. 7) of *Jaina tarka bhāṣā*.

since he was void of the qualities of an *acarya*. Further the word *dravya* at times suggests non attention. For instance the *kriya* (act) like the worship of the *Tirthankaras* performed with devotion but with the mind engaged elsewhere and not in a way enjoined in the scriptures is said to be *dravya kriya*.

Utility—*Niksepa* is the first necessary preliminary for metaphysical inquiry and understanding for no progress is possible in abstract thought in the absence of a verbal mark to represent objects and things and their attributes. It analyses the meanings of a word or the purpose of the speaker so that there is left no scope for ambiguity for it throws light on every possible meaning of that word and then it determines as to what particular meaning—connotation is intended by the speaker at that particular moment or what meaning is proper in that particular context. Thus this *niksepa* is very useful in clearing misunderstandings if any and it has been consequently used by the *Jaina* commentators of olden days while explaining the sacred lore. The Indian rhetoricians have no

and others examine the meaning of a word from the stand points of *vyakti*, *ākṛti* and *jāti*. Thus these respectively signify *dravya*, *sthapana* and *bhāva*, the first three *nikṣepas*. The grammarians consider *naman* as a substance so even the non Jainas admit *niḥ śepas*¹

Classification—The first three *nikṣepas* have somehow the element of oneness or sameness in them whereas the last that of difference. So the first three come within the legitimate sphere of the *dravyastika naya*, and the fourth is the subject of the *paryayā stika naya*. To give an example when people come across a person Vaidya by name, they can identify him by saying that here is Vaidya. Similarly, on coming across his photo or the like, even when he is dead, people can say the same thing. Thus they identify the past individual with his present photo. Similarly, if this individual was a physician or he is going to be so he can be addressed as Vaidya when seen. Here the past or the future is identified with the present. In all these three cases, the idea of complete oneness—identity is predominant. But, in the case of a person who is actually a physician at the moment in question he gets distinguished from

1 This is what Upādhyaya Yaśovijaya says in his com (p 24a) on T S (I 5). So the view expressed in the last lines of *Sanmati-tarka* (p 4 in) by Pandit Sukhlal and Pandit Bechardas is erroneous.

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others who are not a physician and thus here difference—non identity plays the chief role

In the end while concluding this topic I may mention that Akalanka's *Laghyastrayā* (v 73 76) and its com *Njayakumudacandra* (pp 798 808) furnish us with a *Digambara* view about *nīkṣepas*



CHAPTER XI

Saptabhāṅgī

In Jainism the propositions of *pramāṇa* and *naya* are considered as being subject to *sapta bhāṅgī*. *Sapta bhāṅgī* is the name given to that faultless seven fold statement which is limited by the word *syat* and which is made either in detail or concisely, affirmatively or negatively, with reference to one single object while considering any one of its attributes (*dharma*s) at a time

By the word 'faultless' occurring in the above mentioned definition of *sapta bhāṅgī* it is to be understood that the statement must not be inconsistent with the *pramāṇas*, *Pratyakṣa* and others. Thus the word faultless serves to avoid the possibility of including sentences such as *स्यादस्त्येव वह्नि शीतलः* (fire is somehow certainly cold), *स्यादस्त्येव म माता वन्ध्या* (my mother is somehow barren) etc., in *sapta bhāṅgī*.

If the words 'one single object' were not mentioned in the above definition, even the sentences like *स्यादस्ति घटः स्यान्नास्ति पट* (somehow there is a jar and somehow there is not a piece of cloth) will have to be considered as constituting *sapta bhāṅgī*.

There can be infinite modes of expression instead

of seven as it is possible to make affirmative or negative predication about every attribute of an object out of infinite. This difficulty is solved by inserting the words 'one of its attributes at a time' in the above definition.

The word *syat* is an indeclinable and it suggests that every object can be studied from more than one stand point. In other words it means 'somehow or from some particular stand point'. It is a mistake to translate this word by 'may be or perhaps' so it deserves to be avoided. The reason of using this word *syat* in the mode of expression is to make it clear that there are other possible aspects of studying an object besides the one in question. These other aspects are not denied but it is that they are given a secondary place whereas the predication under consideration is given predominance over other possible ones.

Predication is the statement of our conclusions with reference to an object. It is either affirmative or negative for, we generally want to convey the existence or non existence of an attribute of an object. There is a great likelihood for confusion to arise when we intend to sum up the affirmative as well as the negative conclusions in one and the same judgment. To avoid this we stand in need of a method of logical

predication. Such a method is supplied by *sapta bhangī* as it covers all sorts of simple as well as complex judgments by mean of the seven types of predication each of which begins with the word *syat*.

Thus *sapta bhangī* is a unique system of predication resorted to by the *Jainas* to carry on their metaphysical discussions. It is the basis of the synthetic comprehensiveness of knowledge. It is a method which surpasses all other methods of cognition in matters of apprehension of the spiritual realities by virtue of its universal and synthetic character of vision. This method is perfectly in accordance with the principles of logic.

Sapta bhangī as its very name suggests means the seven modes of expression—the seven kinds of predication i.e. heptagonal forms of philosophical enquiry. Just as in every mode of expression there is found the word *syat* similarly *eva* is also given a place therein to suggest that the statement that is made from a particular stand point is as definite as anything else. In short there is no ambiguity about it and thus there is not the least room for indefiniteness. It may be here remarked that it is a general rule to use the word *eva* so at times one can depart from this rule in case one is conscious about the definiteness of the statement under discussion.

The following is an example of *sapta bhangī* with

reference to one of the attributes (viz existence) of an object like a jar

(1) स्यादस्त्येव घटः । o somehow the jar does exist

This is a statement of affirmation made singly

(2) स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः । o surely somehow the jar does

not exist This is a statement of negation made singly

(3) स्यादस्त्येव घटः स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः । o it is certain

that from a certain view point the jar exists as well as from another stand point it does not exist This is a statement of affirmation and negation made conjointly but one after another

(4)¹ स्यादवक्तव्य एव घटः । o surely, from a parti-

cular stand point the jar is indescribable When existence and non existence are to be predicated of the jar conjointly and simultaneously the jar is said to be indescribable

(5) स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्य एव घटः । o it is a fact

that from a particular consideration the jar exists, and somehow it is also indescribable (affirmation *plus* indescribability)

(6) स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्य एव घटः । o surely, some-

how the jar does not exist and is also indescribable (negation *plus* indescribability) -

1 Some writers interchange the third and the fourth modes of expression What is given here is in accordance with *Pyramidānanayatattvaloka* (IV, 17 18)

(7) स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवकृतव्य एव घटः : e
surely, somehow the jar exists, somehow it does not
exist and from a certain stand point, it is indescribable
as well, (affirmation *plus* negation *plus* indescribability)¹

It is thus seen that the predicates, viz, existent
non existent and indescribable variously² combined
make up the seven modes. This number seven is due
to the fact that the questions regarding each *dharma*
are seven, and the questions are seven because the
curiosities (*gyñāsas*) from which they spring are
seven, and the *gyñāsas* are seven because doubts which
give rise to them are seven, and the doubts are seven
because the *dharmas* in regard to which doubts may
exist are seven viz, (a) relative existence, (b) relative
non existence, (c) indescribability, (d f) all these three
taken in pairs and (g) all the three taken conjointly

In the first mode of expression, the attribute viz,
existence is given preference to other attributes like
non existence. All the same it must be borne in

1 These seven modes are twice referred to in the Śānti par
van of M Bh, once as v 6 of Ch 238 and once as v 21
of Ch 232. The pertinent verses are practically the same, the
first being

“एतदेवं च नैवं च न चोभे नानुभे तथा ।

कर्मस्य विषय त्रयुः सत्त्वस्याः समदर्शिनः ॥६॥”

2 Once each of them is taken up singly, then in pairs and
then all together. So we have 3+3+1 modes, same as 2³—1

mind that other attributes are not denied. A similar remark holds good in the case of the remaining modes of expression. In the second mode, non existence is looked upon as prominent similarly, in the third existence and non existence considered at different intervals and not simultaneously in the fourth indescribability in the fifth existence along with indescribability in the sixth, non existence accompanied by indescribability and in the seventh existence along with non existence and indescribability.

The first mode of expression suggests that a jar exists if considered from the stand-point of its own *dravya kṣetra, lāla* and *bhāva* i.e. from the aspects of its own substance place or locality, time and nature or property. To explain take the case of a jar made of clay, lying in Surat existing in the season of spring and having a black colour. Here clay, Surat, spring and black are respectively substance, place, time and nature of the jar under consideration. When the jar is referred to these four aspects it does exist but when referred to some other substance as copper, some other place as Bombay etc. it surely does not exist otherwise it would lose its own individuality—its own self. Thus it is clear that it is logical to say that from the stand point of one's own substance etc., an object exists while from the point of view of another's

substance etc it does not exist¹ In short every object possesses two attributes existence and non existence even at one and the same time

In the fourth mode an attribute like indescribability is mentioned to indicate that it is impossible to have a word in any language which can simultaneously and with equal prominence express the coexistence of mutually contradictory attributes like existence and non existence

It may be argued that the word *puṣpadanta* means both the sun and the moon But it does not mean that it presents to the mind both these ideas simultaneously—Same is the case with *sat* which stands for both the *satr* and *sina* terminations (vide *Aṣṭa dhyāyī* III n 27) Thus there is no single word nor a Dvandva compound nor a Karmadharaya compound nor a sentence which can express the idea of simultaneous

1 From this exposition it must have been realized that Jainism admits modal or relative existence or non existence and not absolute existence or non-existence in the case of an object Further this existence and this non-existence are no doubt recognised alongside of each other, though from different view points in different capacities This may remind one of a good *hetu* which is always absent from the *vipakṣa* (a negative instance) quite as much as it is invariably present in the *sapakṣa* (a similar instance) In other words there is non existence of the *hetu* alongside the existence of the same and *vice versa*

combination of attributes like existence and non-existence

It may be here borne in mind that the word 'indescribability' does not express the co existence of the two attributes, but it is used to express another attribute, viz, indescribability arising from the impossibility of simultaneously stating the two contradictory attributes¹, and that, too, relative indescribability and not absolute which would mean only *anabhidheyatva* which is absurd

Let us take another example and consider the predications regarding the permanency of the soul

1 The soul undergoes different modifications but it is neither entirely created anew nor wholly destroyed Thus, from the stand point of its substance it is permanent

1 The late Dr R G Bhandarkar in this connection has observed —

"You can confirm existence of a thing from one point of view (*syād asti*), deny it from another (*syād nāsti*) and affirm both existence and non existence with reference to it at different times (*syād asti nāsti*) If you should think of affirming both existence and non-existence at the same time from some point of view, you must say that that thing cannot be spoken of (*syād nākatatvāt*) It is not meant by these modes as that there is no certainty or that we have to deal with probabilities only as some scholars have thought All that is implied is that every assertion which is true is true only under certain conditions of space, time, etc "

2 Likewise, though it is intrinsically intact, it does undergo various modifications. So from this view point it is impermanent—ever changing.

3 If we want to state these two attributes consecutively and not simultaneously, we can say that the soul is permanent and non permanent as well.

4. If we want to express both these attributes of the soul (permanence and non permanence) at one and the same time, words fail. Hence, from this view point it is indescribable.

5 If we look at the soul from the stand point of its substance and at the same time we wish to express its permanence and impermanence simultaneously we must say that the soul is permanent and indescribable.

6 If we examine it from the stand point of its modifications and wish to express its two attributes above noted simultaneously, we must say that the soul is impermanent and indescribable.

7 If we look at the soul from these stand points consecutively and then simultaneously and try to make a statement it can be the soul is permanent non permanent and indescribable.

Likewise we can apply the principle of *sapta bhāṅgi* to *dharma*s (other than existence, non existence permanence and non permanence) such as *samānya* and *vīśeṣa*. Of these two the first may be taken as affirmative and the latter as negative. Thus, on this

understanding we can have the first three *bhaṅgas* as *Syat samanyam Syad viśeṣaḥ* and *Syad samanyam syad viśeṣaḥ*. If we however place *samanya* and *viśeṣa* on the same footing we can make any one of them principal or subordinate and present the principal as the affirmative and the subordinate as the negative.

This *saptabhaṅgī* in respect of each of the *bhaṅgas* is either of the nature of *sakalādeśa* (i. e. synthetic) or of the nature of *vikalādeśa* (i. e. analytic). In other words every mode of expression of any and every *sapta bhaṅgī* is of the nature of two *adeśas* viz *sakalādeśa* and *vikalādeśa*¹. That *sapta bhaṅgī* of which every mode is of the nature of *sakalādeśa* is called *pramāṇa sapta bhaṅgī* while that of which every mode is of the nature of *vikalādeśa* is termed *nāya sapta bhaṅgī*.

Sakalādeśa otherwise called *pramāṇa vākya* (proposition of the whole truth) is a statement made with reference to an object of *pramāṇa* expressing simultaneously (*yaugapadyena*) all the attributes of the object as non distinct² really or figuratively from one another.

1 This is the opinion of Vadin Deva Suri. See his PNTL (IV 43). Some however say that the first the second and the fourth modes of expression are known as *vikalādeśa* and the rest (four) as *sakalādeśa*. Some say that each of the modes is *vikalādeśa* but when all the modes are taken conjointly they form *sakalādeśa*. Vide *Saptabhaṅgī-lāraṅginī*.

2 Cf. Hegel's idea that being and non being are identical.

from the stand points of *kāla* etc.¹ The reverse is the nature of *vikaladeśa* otherwise called *naya vakya*. The main points of difference between *sakaladeśa* and *vikaladeśa* are

- (I) The former depends upon *pramāṇa* i.e. the view of truth or full orb'd reality whereas the latter on *naya* i.e. a single point of view which takes note of merely the broken lights or fragments of reality
- (II) In the former the entire reality is comprehended synthetically i.e. with *all* its *dharma*s taken *simultaneously* whereas in the latter the reality is treated analytically i.e. with its *dharma*s taken *one by one*²

1 This definition of *sakaladeśa* deals with five issues worth noting

(i) If we bring *pramāṇa*s to bear upon the reality—a substance we shall find that it has an infinite number of *dharma*s

(ii) There are certain bonds of union amongst these *dharma*s such as *kāla* etc. (in all eight in number)

(iii) These bonds render an act of synthesis possible where by the infinite *dharma*s get united together

(iv) The synthesis may be due either to emphasis laid upon the identity of the common elements—*kāla* etc., or to a supposed identity of these elements in the case of all the *dharma*s

(v) All the *dharma*s should be viewed together simultaneously.

2 When one desires to emphasise the synthetic unity

(III) In the former stress is laid upon the *unity* of the object whereas in the latter on (a) the *difference* or (b) the difference is superimposed upon the unity so that the unity is lost in the difference or (c) the unity is superimposed upon the difference so that the difference is lost in the unity

(IV) Recognition of unity is possible when emphasis is laid upon *dravyarthika naya* as opposed to *pariyayarthika naya*. That is why in *sakalādeśa dravyarthika naya* is given the first place and *pariyayarthika naya* is considered subordinate while the reverse is the case in *vikalādeśa*.

When we look upon the attributes of an object as non distinct from the consideration of *kala* etc it is possible that by knowing one attribute we may simultaneously know the rest. This explains *yaugapadyena* noted above.

By *kala* etc are meant the eight elements as under

- (i) *Kala* (time) (ii) *atma rūpa* (one's own nature)
 (iii) *sambandha* (relation) (iv) *samsarga* (contact)

*dharma*s (and not the difference of *dharma*s) one word may originally express the whole object with all its *dharma*s simultaneously. If however it is not this unity to which attention is to be called but the difference in *dharma*s in point of *kala* etc no single word can be found to express the separate *dharma*s and therefore *succession* in the use of words will be inevitable.

(v) *upakara* (influence), (vi) *guni desa* (locality of the substance, the possessor of an attribute) (vii) *artha* (substratum) and (viii) *śabda* (word)

We shall now consider how the attributes of an object can be looked upon as non distinct from the above mentioned stand points

(1) When we say that somehow a jar certainly exists (as in the first mode) it is certain that at the time (*kāla*) when the attribute 'existence' is there in the jar, there also exist its other attributes. Thus, at one and the same moment, there coexist all the attributes in the same substance, viz, the jar. Hence, from the stand point of *kāla* i.e. owing to the sameness of time the attributes may be considered as one—non distinct from one another.

(2) The nature of existence is 'to be one of the *dharma*s of the jar. This is also the nature of every other attribute of the jar. In other words that which is the nature of existence viz 'to be one of the *dharma*s of the object' is also the nature of every other *dharma* of the object so, from this stand point, viz, *atma rupa* also the above remark holds good.

(3) Existence has somehow a relation of identity with the jar. Other attributes also have the same relation with the jar. So from this third stand-point viz *sambhāṇḍha* the attributes may be considered as non-distinct

(4) A similar remark can be made with reference to *samsarga*

The difference between *sambhandha* and *samsarga* is that in the former non distinction is of primary importance and distinction, of secondary importance whereas in the latter it is just the opposite. In short the former has a leaning towards identity and the latter towards distinction.

(5) The influence which existence exercises upon an object viz to tinge it with itself is also the influence which other attributes exercise upon that object. Hence, from the standpoint of *upakara*—the sameness of the influence all the attributes may be considered as non distinct.

(6) It is not that the attribute 'existence' is to be found in one portion of the object (say a jar) and remaining attributes in some other portion of it. On the contrary, all the attributes are found in one and the same portion of the jar. Thus it follows that it is not that different portions are allotted to different attributes: i.e. to say all the attributes have the same locality of the substance. So, from the consideration of *guni desā* all the attributes may be looked upon as non distinct.

(7) Just as the jar is the substratum of the attribute 'existence', so it is for its other attributes, too, that is to say, that which is the substratum of exis

tence is also the substratum of all other attributes. So, from this stand point i.e. that of *artha* all the attributes may be looked upon as non distinct.

(8) The word (say a jar) which denotes an object with existence as its attribute is the same as the word which denotes this object with other attributes also. Hence from the stand point of *śabda*—the sameness of *śabda* the attributes may be considered as non distinct.

| We shall now consider how the attributes of an object can be looked upon as distinct from the stand points of *kāla* etc.

Abhedavrtti or recognition of unity arises when *draṣṭyarthika naya* is considered as principal and *pariyayarthika naya* as subordinate i.e. when emphasis is laid upon the former and not upon the latter. But, when *draṣṭyarthika naya* is subordinated to the *pariyayarthika naya* i.e. when the *pariyāyas* are considered rather than the *draṣṭya*, the principle of unity retires in the back ground and since the *pariyāyas* are many, the recognition of unity is impossible. This may be shown from eight view points as under —

(1) Several attributes such as existence etc. do not belong to the same object *at the same time*. If they do they would create a breach in the unity. There would be as many different strata as there were *pariyāyas*, and also as many moments characterizing them. To be explicit, as the attributes are many, they

cannot belong to the same object *at the same time*. If they did, they would create a breach in the unity of the object and also the time. Thus, there would be as many objects as there are *paryāyas* characterising them, and these again would belong to different moments of time. Hence the unity of time on which the synthesis was based in the *dravyārthika naya* (previous case) is not available in this *paryayarthika naya* (present case), and, consequently it is not possible to have *abhedaṛtti* here. That is to say it is not possible to consider the attributes as non distinct from the stand point of *kala*.

(2) The nature of one attribute is different from that of another. So says the *paryayarthika naya*. If all the attributes had the same nature, that would militate against their plurality. Thus, as the attributes differ in their nature, how is it possible to consider them as non-distinct from the stand point of *atma rupa*?

(3) *Sambandhas* are many corresponding to the many *sambandhins*. For, a plurality of the latter must involve a plurality of the former. Thus, when there is a difference in the *sambandhas* of different attributes, it is impossible to believe that from the stand point of *sambandha*, the attributes may be considered as non distinct.

(4) *Samsarga* differs with each *samsargin*. So,

even from the stand point of *samsarga*, we cannot consider attributes as non distinct

(5) The *upakara* that one attribute exercises is distinct from that exercised by another. Consequently there cannot be oneness between the various *upakaras* exercised by different attributes. Hence from the stand point of *upakara* the attributes are different.

(6) For every attribute there is a distinct *guni desa* i. e. to say the *guni desas* vary with the attributes. Hence from the stand point of *guni-desa* also the attributes must be looked upon as distinct.

(7) The substratum of one attribute is different from that of another, if it were the same this would *ipso facto* make for the unity of the attributes which is contrary to our hypothesis of a plurality of attributes. So we must look upon the attributes as different from the stand point of *artha*.

(8) A word differs with each object. If all the attributes could be expressed by a single word only one word will be sufficient to denote everything and other words shall have to be considered as useless. This is absurd there are as many words as there are attributes, and so the unity of 'word' is wanting. Consequently from the stand point of *śabda* the attributes must be looked upon as different.



For the last decade or so I find that some scholars use the word *syādīda* in the sense of *saptabhaṅgī*¹. Some have drawn a line of demarcation between *anekānta-lā* and its synonym *syādīda*. But I do not think that they are justified in doing so for (i) no Jain author of olden days so far as I know, has done so and (ii) on the contrary we find several Jain authors looking upon them as synonyms. I may however add that according to the *Samabhināha naya* it is possible to make a distinction but that applies to synonyms of one and all the words.

Definitions—*Syādīda* is defined by Samanta bhadra in his *Īpāmuniṃśī*, by Malliṣena Suri in his *Syādīdamañjarī* (p. 13) and by Gunarātna Sūri in his com. on *Śāḍdarsanasamuccaya* (v. 1). Vaidin Deva Suri has described it in his *Syādīdaratnākara* (p. 2)².

1 It seems that Dr. A. B. Dhruva was the first to do so. Vaid. Īpā oḍīma (p. 745).

2 Here it is said *Syādīda* enables us to distinguish between what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted. It resorts to *saptabhaṅgī* and *naya* and it gives up absolute one-sidedness as it is characterised by 'somehow'.

3 He says that *śīda* is an indeclinable and it means somehow. Hence *syādīda* means *anekānta-lā*. It looks upon a substance as one having contradictory attributes (*dharmas*) such as permanency and non-permanency.

4 The description runs as under—

Syādīda is a lion having a pair of shining eyes viz. a *prajñā*

thought and welds them together into a consistent and harmonious whole' It is the many sided all comprehensive and encompassing truth It teaches us to respect every other religion as containing some

1 One of the questions about which some of the systems of Indian philosophy pronounce different—contradictory opinions is whether an effect (*karjā*) is the same as its material cause (*kāraṇa*) or it pre-exists in that cause and is only made manifest by the operation which the cause undergoes In the former case it is the *sākhya* doctrine of the *Sākhya* and in the latter case i.e. when it is believed that the effect is something new and did not exist before it is the *asādhya* doctrine held by the *Īśācikas*

To be explicit *sākhya* means a doctrine which says that the cause and the effect are but one entity in two different states i.e. the effect is not created but is only produced i.e. drawn out of the cause It looks upon the *karjā* as existing in a potential state in the *kāraṇa* and hence is always existing and real Similarly *asādhya* means a doctrine which says that the cause and the effect are two distinct entities held together by a relation called *samavāya* thus a jar was non-existent (*asat*) before its manufacture and will be non-existent after its destruction and it enjoys existence (*sat*) only during the interval

According to the school of Vedānta led by Śaṅkarācārya the effect is neither the same as nor distinct from the cause moreover it cannot be both the same as and distinct from the cause i.e. two judgments being contradictory hence it is concluded the effect is such as cannot be described adequately either as that which is the same as or distinct from the cause—it is *anirvacanīya*, it is neither *sat* nor *asat* either before or after its birth it is *mithyā* This doctrine may be hence called

thought over with reference to its own *dātavya kṣetra* *hīla* and *bhāva* and it does not exist when referred to another's substance etc¹ Likewise it is not true to say that a substance is only eternal or non eternal. For if we examine it from the stand point of the substratum underlying it it is eternal but if we take into account its form etc it is non eternal for its form etc are liable to be changed.

Further *anekāntavāda* informs us that the distinction between *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is true only in a relative way for what is *viśeṣa* from one point is *sāmānya* from another and *vice versa*.

In earthen jar is distinct from another jar made of clay in case we take into account their special

1 The latter part is in fact the very point which the critic of *anekāntavāda* often misses and which the *anekāntavādin* makes out in defence of his position. Of course it is not denied that in the *anekāntavāda* non-existence belongs to the thing itself and not to the other thing and that is what distinguishes a *śārta* *rīda* from *śīlāntavāda*. But it should be particularly noted that just as existence is nowhere said to belong to the thing from the stand point of another's substance etc so non existence is nowhere said to belong to the thing from the stand point of its own substance etc otherwise one thing would be every other thing i.e. anything would be anything and there would be nothing like a thing's own nature. Thus this Jaina view stands distinguished from nihilism of the *Buddhists* and the Jaina may well claim that it is the only form in which the *Buddhist* nihilism could justify itself to common sense. Vide Notes (p. 216) to B M.

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1 The latter part is in fact the very point which the critic of *anekāntavāda* objects to and which the *anekāntavādī* makes out in defence of his position. Of course it is not denied that in the *anekāntavāda* non-existence belongs to the thing itself and not to the other thing and that is what distinguishes *anekāntavāda* from *ekāntavāda*. But it should be particularly noted that just as existence is nowhere said to belong to the thing from the stand point of another's substance etc. so non existence is nowhere said to belong to the thing from the stand point of its own substance etc. otherwise one thing would be every other thing i.e. anything would be anything and there would be nothing like a thing's own nature. Thus this Jain view stands distinguished from nihilism of the *Buddhas* and the Jain may well claim that it is the only form in which the Buddhist nihilism could justify itself to common sense. Vide Notes (p. 216) to S.M.

features such as location etc. But they are non-distinct, if we focus our attention on their common property viz., jñāna. Likewise *śruta-niśruta ābhini-bodhika jñāna* is distinct from *aśruta-niśruta ābhini-bodhika jñāna*, when we view them regarding their indebtedness to *śruta*. They are however non-distinct, if we were to examine them from the standpoint of their common properties viz. *anagāha*, *thā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. See *Viśeṣa*⁹ (v 303 and 169). For, in this v 169 it is said that if the knowledge of one who had acquired *śruta-jñāna*, is independent of it at the moment under consideration this knowledge is called *śruta-niśruta mati-jñāna*. The remaining kind is called *aśruta-niśruta mati-jñāna*. It is four-fold viz., *anupātikā buddhi* etc., and it exists in the case of one who has not even superficially studied any scripture previously. See Maṇḍagiri Śāri's com. (p 144a) on *Nandī*.

To illustrate this doctrine—the doctrine consciously or unconsciously adopted by every religion, I take up the question whether the *Jainas* are Polytheists or Monotheists. According to Jainism, every pure soul is God, and the number of such souls is infinite. Hence, from this stand-point, a *Jaina* who worships God may be called 'Polytheist' or worshipper of Gods without number. However, the attributes of all these Gods are identical, and a *Jaina* may in the light of

this consideration be called Monotheist or worshipper of one God. This is an instance where the paradoxical theory that the one includes many and the many are one and the same is shown to be consistent by *anekāntavāda*.

We may also illustrate this *anekāntavāda* the fundamental doctrine of *Jaina* logic by considering that five elements—*kāla śrābhāva niyati karmān* and *udiyama* are necessary for the achievement of an object.

Kāla or time—*Kāla* plays an important part in the accomplishment of an object. For it is not possible that as soon as we sow the seed of a mango we can get mangoes to eat nor is it possible that no sooner do we take our seat in a railway carriage than we reach our destination. We have to make allowance for time. Even *karmān* begins to operate after at least some time has elapsed. Usually it rains during the rainy season—in its proper season and we experience heat in summer and cold in winter. A lotus expands at sunrise and gets contracted at sunset. Thus it is clear that every event takes place in its proper season. Nay even in the attainment of salvation time has a hand for one has to wait till one's *karmāns* get annihilated.

Śrābhāva or nature—*Śrābhāva* too must be taken into account while considering the achievement of an

object. It is not that even in due course of time we can expect to get rice in case we have sown the seeds of wheat. Equally true is the remark in the case of women who have come of age for it cannot be expected that each of them can give birth to a son. It is again nature that explains why some of the souls (*abhavyas*) shall not attain salvation however long they may wait for it. Further is it not owing to nature that we find fire hot and ice cold ?

Karman—We cannot ignore *karman* which is also one of the causes that govern the achievement of an object. We fail to explain some anomalies in this world if we do not admit *karman*. Royalty poverty pleasure pain etc. are the results of *karman*. Even after working in the same way it happens that the fruits which the two persons though born as twins derive differ. What is this due to if not to *karman* ?

Niyati or *destiny*—At times one has to believe in destiny. It so happens that in spite of making every sort of attempt one fails to achieve the desired object. Or it may be that all of a sudden the events take the opposite turn as was the case with Rama who had to begin the life of a wanderer on the very morning when he was to be crowned king. To illustrate this destiny an example of a doe that became free though she was surrounded on all the sides with difficulties is given. In front of her was a hunter

Since it is so who can deny the influence of exertion in the achievement of an object ?

It is *anekāntavāda* that teaches us to assign a proper place to each of the above mentioned five elements, to consider them as related to one another and not to discard any of them. It may be that sometimes *lala* may be the main cause while the rest may be playing a subordinate part sometimes *śabha* may be of primary importance and the rest of secondary importance and so on.

Limit of time may be altered. For example in one country it may take a year for a certain tree to grow while it may grow within half a year in some other country. From this it should not be concluded that we can wholly dispense with *lala*. There is another reason for admitting *lala*. It teaches us to keep patience and wait for the fruit. This makes us persevering in our work. In denying time one will be highly disappointed in not gaining the fruit at once of the work done.

At times even the nature can be altered. By the company of the good even the wicked improve.

Niyati is the name given to such *harmanas* which are sure to produce their effects. But even their effect may be in some degree nullified by practising austerities of a very severe type. It should not be believed at once that it is the work of *niyati*, when a person has failed to achieve the desired object at the first attempt. On the contrary he should go on repeatedly making an attempt and even then if he does not get success he may leave it off by believing that it is so destined.

I may quote in this connection the following lines from *An Idealist View of Life* (p 279) the work by S Rādhakrishnan published in 1929 A D —

Life is like a game of bridge. The cards in the game are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to past karma but we are free to make any call as we think fit and lead any suit. Only we are limited by the rules of the game. We are more free when we start the game than later on when the game has developed and our choices become restricted. But till the very end there is always a choice. A good player will see possibilities which a bad one does not. The more skilled a player the more alternatives does he perceive. A good hand may be cut to pieces by unskilful play and the bad play need not be attributed to the frowns of fortune. Even though we may not like the way in which the cards are shuffled we like the game and we want to play.¹

¹ This very idea is expressed in short by the same author in his work *The Hindu View of Life* (p 73) published in 1922 A D

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Limit of time may be altered. For example, in one country, it may take a year for a certain tree to grow while it may grow within half a year in some other country. From this it should not be concluded that we can wholly dispense with *lāla*. There is another reason for admitting *lāla*. It teaches us to keep patience and wait for the fruit. This makes us persevere in our work. In denying time, one will be highly disappointed in not gaining the fruit at once of the work done.

At times even the nature can be altered. By the company of the good, even the wicked improve.

Admission of *karmān* makes us endure our difficulties with great fortitude for, we take consolation from believing that these difficulties are brought about by ourselves. It reminds us of the principle viz., "as you sow, so shall you reap."

Niyati is the name given to such *Jaṁmans* which are sure to produce their effects. But, even their effect may be in some degree nullified by practising austerities of a very 'severe' type. It should not be believed at once that it is the work of *niyati*, when a person has failed to achieve the desired object at the first attempt. On the contrary, he should go on repeatedly making an attempt, and, even then if he does not get success he may leave it off by believing that it is so destined.

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must be borne in mind that these events—the origination and destruction do not take place successively. It is that the destruction is simultaneous—synchronises with the origination. By preparing a *kaṣāka* out of a *lundala* there is noticed a change viz that gold that formerly existed in the *lundala* now exists in the *kaṣāka*. So it cannot be said that the *kaṣāka* is quite a new product—quite distinct from the *lundala* when it contains the same gold that was formerly found in the *lundala*. The same consideration serves us to understand that the *lundala* has not been completely destroyed for its gold still exists.

Let us take another example viz *gorasa* to illustrate that every object is characterized by three attributes. Curd is only a modification of milk. In both the modifications viz that of milk as well as that of curd *gorasa* is present. Thus if curd is prepared from milk *gorasa* has origination in the form of curd destruction in the form of milk and permanence as it throughout exists as the main substance.

The *Jaina* philosophers state that it is not only the *Jaina* system of philosophy that admits *anekāntavāda* but even other systems have admitted it willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or otherwise. In short, no system can do without it. They explain this statement as under —

Take the case of the *Sūkhya*s. Do they not

— To consider *anekāntavāda* as *samśaya-vāda* (the doctrine of doubts) is certainly erroneous. It is true that even contradictory statements are made about an object while subjecting it to *anekāntavāda*. It represents the synthesis of the two extremes. It is the doctrine of *identity in change*, of *unity in difference* of *one in many* etc.¹ For instance, it may be said that an object exists as well as it does not exist. But this is not a sufficient ground to consider that the statement is doubtful. On the contrary, it is that the statements are made from different stand points and that they are perfectly accurate. For, when we say that an object exists as referred to its own *dharma* etc., we do not in the least doubt the statement. A similar remark holds good in the case of the other statements.

Thus *anekāntavāda* never leaves us in doubt. It makes conclusive statements. It is only that the statements vary according to the stand points and that is but natural.

— Every object possesses attributes viz., origination, destruction and permanence. For instance, when we prepare a *laṣaṇa* (a bracelet) by breaking a *luṇḍala* (an ear ornament) there is origination of the state of the *laṣaṇa* and destruction of the state of the *luṇḍala*; all the *śrma* gold is throughout present. It

1 See Notes (pp 274-275) on S M

must be borne in mind that these events—the origination and destruction do not take place successively. It is that the destruction is simultaneous—synchronises with the origination. By preparing a *kaṭaka* out of a *lundalī* there is noticed a change viz. that gold that formerly existed in the *lundalā* now exists in the *kaṭaka*. So it cannot be said that the *kaṭaka* is quite a new product—quite distinct from the *lundalā* when it contains the same gold that was formerly found in the *lundalā*. The same consideration serves us to understand that the *lundalā* has not been completely destroyed for its gold still exists.

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The *Jaina* philosophers state that it is not only the *Jaina* system of philosophy that admits *āṇkāntī* but even other systems have admitted it willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or otherwise. In short no system can do without it. They explain this statement as under —

Take the case of the *Sūkhya*s. Do they not

admit three different attributes—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in one and the same object *prakṛti*? Can it not be hence said that they resort to *anekāntarāda*? The case of the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas* shares a similar fate. For, they look upon *prthivī* as both eternal and non eternal from different aspects. According to them *prthivī* that is in the form of *paramānu* is eternal, whereas the other varieties of *prthivī* are non eternal. Thus they, too pronounce different, nay contradictory opinions about *prthivī* from different stand points. Is this not *anekāntarāda*? The *Viśiṣṭas* accept the authority of *anekāntarāda* inasmuch as they consider that the knowledge of the three different types—*pramātṛ*, *prameyā* and *pramāṇa*, is one. Bhatta and Miśra, too accept *anekāntarāda* for, they look upon an object as both a genus and a species from different stand points. The *Brahmaṇḍins* regard *ātman* as *baddha* and *abaddha* from the conventional and transcendental stand points respectively. Thus they also recognise *anekāntarāda*. The *Bauddhas* consider knowledge of different forms as homogeneous. This is also *anekāntarāda*. The *Vēdas* have been looked at, by staunch *Vēdāntins* in the light of *anekāntarāda*. For, do they not say that the *Vēdas* are eternal from the *ārtha* point of view and non eternal from the *ruparūpa* point of view? Even the *Cārvākas* who believe that *caitanya* arises from the combination of

four elements, earth etc cannot consider this *caitanya* as distinct from the four elements for that will go against their doctrine as they shall have to admit that the number of elements is five and not four. Nor is it possible for them to say that *caitanya* is manifested by each element singly. Thus they too are obliged to resort to *anekantavāda*.

Allegations—Some of the ancient and modern non-Jaina scholars have criticized *anekantavāda*. For instance Śaṅkarācārya while commenting upon *Brahma-sūtra* (II, 2, 33) has done so and Prof Belvalkar in his notes to this and in his article 'Undecuments of Jainism' ¹ But this is not the place to examine them. Suffice it to say that Śaṅkarācārya's views have been noted and refuted in—E. J. (Chs. IX, X) and in Prof Chakravarti's intro (LXXXVI-LXXXVIII & LXXX-LXXXII) to *Pañcatthikaya*.

Inter relations—*Naya* gives us definite knowledge about one of the *dharma*s out of infinite inherent in a substance, whereas *pramāṇa* about all the *dharma*s by throwing light on *any one* of them. In *naya*, the

1 In S Th (p 116 ff) are reproduced the pertinent lines from this article and the allegation made therein is refuted by pointing out that there is a marked conflict between the object and our description of it. On p 126 it is stated that 'the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of *svādvāda* has no foundation of fact anywhere. As a matter of fact the system of *svādvāda* is more exact and determinate than all systems based on one-sided absolutisms.'

*dharma*s are each looked upon as distinct from one another but, in *pramāṇa* they are considered as non distinct. Thus one and the same sentence such as *syād asti ca ghaṭak* is both the first mode of expression of *naya saptabhaṅgi* (i.e. *vikalāleśa*) and that of *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgi* (*sakalāleśa*) as well. Here the *dharma* specifically referred to is 'existence'. If this *dharma* is considered as entirely unassociated with the other *dharma*s of the *jai* the sentence above referred to becomes a part and parcel of *naya saptabhaṅgi* if not that of *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgi*.

In *naya saptabhaṅgi* *naya* is the main thing whereas in *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgi* *pramāṇa*. The former is a *naya lakṣaṇa* and the latter a *pramāṇa lakṣaṇa*. Knowledge derived by means of *anekāntarāśa* when expressed in words is a *naya lakṣaṇa* and a *pramāṇa lakṣaṇa* as well according as the view we take about the distinctness or non distinctness of the *dharma*s of a substance.

Anekāntarāśa is a *naya* if it throws light on only one *dharma* by resorting to *naya* but it is a *pramāṇa* if it deals with all the *dharma*s coming within the province of *pramāṇa*.

Saptabhaṅgi differs from *anekāntarāśa* for in the former there must be seven modes of expression whereas such is not the case with the latter.



CHAPTER XIII

The Doctrine of Karman

Man is not a being of only one ingredient, and same is the case with every other mundane living being. For, each of them is a combination of a soul and a foreign matter. This combination is not merely a mixture which can be resolved by a simple or complex mechanical process. It is rather a very very subtle combination of which the two ingredients can be separated from one another only with difficulty, and that, too, by the very living being itself. No outside agency can bring about this separation. Even death or murder cannot separate them. There is however a scientific process of getting rid of the foreign matter, even before its natural time of expiry, and also of stopping its amalgamation (*bandha*) with the embodied soul. *

When a mundane living being does or carries on any activity physical, mental or vocal, no matter even if this is very subtle, it attracts and amalgamates foreign matter with the soul. This matter is then known as *karmān*, and the amalgamation as bondage of *karmān*. This bondage of *karmāns* is explained by means of two illustrations in H J (pp. 161-162). They can be expressed as under:—

(i) When the soul is attacked by the passions like anger etc., it takes up particles of the foreign matter fit for the bondage of *karmans* just as a heated ball takes up water particles in which it is immersed. This is the bondage of *karmans*.

(ii) If oil is spilled on a cloth dust will easily adhere. The cloth represents our soul, the oil represents our passions, etc., by which *larman* is acquired and the dust represents the foreign matter.

The harm *larman* can do to the^{*} mundane living being depends upon the intensity of attachment and aversion it possesses. If there is a total absence of these two, the foreign matter, though amalgamated, does not succeed in obscuring or impeding its inherent qualities¹, but, in other cases it does so.

This shows that the foreign matter *larman* acts in two different ways, and this gives rise to its two desig

1 Every living being has infinite qualities. Of them the following eight deserve special mention —

(i) *Kevala jñāna* (omniscience) (ii) *kevala-darśana* (absolute undifferentiated knowledge) (iii) *avyabadha* (mastery over pleasure and grief) (iv) *samyaktva* (the right type of faith) and *cāritra* (the ideal character) (v) *akṣaya sthiti* (eternal duration) (vi) *amūrta* (immateriality i.e. devoidness of colour, taste, odour and touch), (vii) *aragahana* (interpenetrability) and (viii) *ananta śīrya* (infinite—unrestricted energy).

These qualities are more or less latent in the case of the mundane living beings.

nations viz *vyāpāthika karman* and *samparāyika karman*. The former is so called as it gets amalgamated owing to activities like going coming etc. It leaves the mundane soul soon after it has got amalgamated with it in one *saṁaya* for it is like a wooden ball struck against a dry wall—the ball which cannot remain stuck to it. This *vyāpāthika karman* lasts for one *saṁaya* i. e. to say it is realized after one *saṁaya* and it takes one *saṁaya* to wear out. The *samparāyika karman* owes its name to the fact that it causes *samparāya* i. e. humiliation—degradation of the mundane soul which is full of passions. It can be compared with dust which falls on and sticks to a wet leather. Its effect depends upon its nature (*prakṛti*) duration (*sthiti*) intensity (*rasa* or *anubhava*) and mass (quantity of *pradesas*). From the stand point of nature the *samparāyika karmans* are grouped under the following eight heads —

(i) *Jñānāvarāṇa* k (ii) *Darsanavarāṇa* k (iii) *Mohaniya* k (iv) *Vedāniya* k (v) *Ayusya* k (vi) *Nāma* k (vii) *Gotra* k and (viii) *Antaraja* k k standing for *karman*

Instead of *jñānāvarāṇa* and *darsanavarāṇa* the words *jñānāvarāṇiya* and *darsanāvarāṇiya* are also used. The word *jñānāvarāṇa* is made up of *jñāna* and *āvarāṇa*. The former means knowledge and the latter 'a veil or veiling'. So *jñānāvarāṇa* means veiling of

knowledge Similarly *darsanavarana* means veiling of undifferentiated knowledge Hence the words *gnanavarana k* and *darsanavarana k* stand for *karman* obscuring and curtailing knowledge and *karman* obscuring undifferentiated knowledge respectively The former is responsible for the differences in the degree of manifestation of knowledge among different orders of living beings

Mohanīya k causes infatuation

Vedanīya k makes the mundane soul experience pleasure or pain

Ayusya-l determines the quantum of life one is to live in a particular condition of existence (*gati*)

Nīma k determines various factors which make up individuality i.e. to say, it causes the individual diversities of the mundane living being¹

Gotra k fixes the lineage—the family surroundings

The word *antarāya* occurring in *antaraya k* means hindrance Thus this *karman* restricts and interferes with the manifestation of various potentialities of the soul

(I) Knowledge has five varieties and so has *jñānavarana karman* according as it obstructs one or the other variety of knowledge They are —

(i) *Matijñānavarana* It obscures *mati jñāna*

(ii) *Śrutajñānavarana* It obscures *śruta jñāna*

(iii) *Avadhiyñānavarana* It obscures *avadhi jñāna*

(iv) *Manahparyāyājñānāvarana* It obscures *manah paryaya jnana*

(v) *Kevalajñānāvarana* It obscures *kevala jñana* (omniscience) altogether

Nyayacarya Yasodvijaya Gani in his *Jñana bindu prakarana* (p 1) says that this *karman* performs another function too viz that of generating imperfect knowledge and since an omniscient being is completely void of this *karman* omniscience is *not* accompanied by other four kinds of knowledge See p 114

(II) *Darśanāvarana* is of nine kinds —

(i) *Cakṣurdarśanāvarana* It obscures the physical sight which is perception by means of the sense of sight Blindness one eyedness short sightedness etc are due to this *karman*

(ii) *Acakṣurdarśanāvarana* It obscures perception conditional upon other four senses and the mind the organ of thinking

(iii) *Avadhīdarśanāvarana* It obscures *avadhi darśana*

(iv) *Kevaladarśanāvarana* It obscures *kevala darśana*

(v) *Nidra* It produces a light pleasant slumber¹ from which the sleeper can be aroused with ease—say by clicking of finger nails

1 This acts as an obstacle in offering a prayer or in carrying on meditation or the 1 ke

(vi) *Nidrānidhā* It produces a deep or heavy slumber from which the sleeper can be awakened by shaking him or her violently

(vii) *Pracala* It causes sound sleep which overtakes a person sitting or standing upright

(viii) *Pracalapracala* It produces an exceedingly intensive sleep that overtakes a person while walking

(ix) *Styanarddhi* or *styanagrddhi* It is the worst type of slumber. It imbues its victims with terrific vigour so that they possess at least half of the strength of a Vasudeva. With this strength they can commit in their sleep even crimes like murder etc. This may remind one of somnambulism.

From this exposition it must have been realized that the last five types of *darśanaiarāṇa* produce physico psychological conditions in which the sense organs are not active and which therefore exclude all possibility of perception.

(III) *Vedanīya karman* is of two types (i) *sāta¹-vedanīya* and (ii) *asāta vedanīya*. The former causes the feeling of pleasure as is experienced when honey applied to a sword is being licked from it and the latter pain.

(IV) *Mohanīya karman* is two fold (i) *darśana mohanīya* and (ii) *caritra mohanīya*. The former so infatuates us that we cannot distinguish between right

1 This is a Samskṛta word meaning 'happiness'

and wrong belief, and it has three sub-varieties. The latter makes us unable to act rightly, and it has twenty-five sub-varieties

The three sub-varieties of *darśana mohanīya* are (a) *mithyātva*, (b) *samyag-mithyātva* (i. e. *miśra*), and (c) *samyaktva*.

Mithyātva-karma causes complete unbelief or heterodoxy. When it operates, the mundane soul does not believe in the truth propounded by a *Tirthankara*, but it rather believes false prophets as saints and false doctrines as true

Samyag-mithyātva-karma generates a mixed belief. When it operates, the mundane soul wavers to and fro between truth and falsehood. It is indifferent to the religion expounded by a *Tirthankara* and has neither predilection for nor hatred against it.

Samyaktva-mohanīya-karma produces correct belief. It is originally *mithyātva*, though now free from poison¹ and so it may occasionally cloud the correct belief. Just as milk covered by perfectly clear water becomes thoroughly pure after the water is poured off, similarly the true belief in its completeness is attained,

1. Of a collection of *mithyātva pudgalas* some are completely purified, some half way and some not at all as is the case with a species of grain known as 'madana kodrava'. The purified group is *samyaktva mohanīya*, the mixed one *miśra* and the last unpurified one is *mithyātva*. For details see chapter XXI

only when the *paramanus* of *samyaktva mohaniya* have disappeared

Caritra-mohaniya can be classified under two groups (a) *lasāya mohaniya* and (b) *ino lasāya mohaniya*. The former has 16 sub groups and the latter 9 thus they make up the 25 sub varieties above referred to

The 16 *lasāya mohaniyas* are four varieties of each of the following four *kaṣayas* (passions) —

(a) Anger¹ causing rash and injurious action

(b) Pride² causing us to ignore the sanctity of life in inferior beings or to overlook good qualities in an otherwise inferior being

(c) Deceitfulness where the thought does not correspond with the speech or the action

(d) Greed arising from the identification of our selves with that which is not ourselves

Each of these is of four kinds according to the intensity of their manifestation. These four kinds are named as (i) *anantanubandhin* (ii) *apratyākhyānāvarana* (iii) *pratyākhyānavarana* and (iv) *sañjvalana*

1 This anger may be at times justifiable. In that case it is called *praśasta* (praiseworthy) otherwise it is *apraśasta* (censurable)

2 This is eight fold pride of caste, of gain of wealth of family, of strength, of beauty of penance and of learning

The first lasts throughout the life. It completely hinders right belief and right conduct.

The second lasts for one year. It prevents one from taking up any type of vow. So it checks both *sarva virati* (complete self discipline) and *deśa virati* (partial self discipline) as well.

The third lasts for four months. It checks *sarva virati* only, for it does not check the existence of true belief and *deśa virati*.

The fourth lasts for a fortnight. It does not come in the way of taking *dikṣa*—renouncing the world but it tarnishes it and thus it interferes with the attainment of the highest type of right conduct known as *yathākhyata cāritra*.

This shows that the length of time a passion is indulged in, affects its nature for passions grow worse through long keeping. Cf. 'Let not the sun go down upon your wrath. For, the anger which is kept over night has grown deadly by the morning.'

The various types of passions along with the degrees of their intensity are illustrated in the Jaina works as under —

The four types of anger can be compared with a line drawn on a stone in earth in dust and in water. The first can be removed with great effort and the rest with lesser and lesser effort. Likewise the first type of anger can be subdued with greatest difficulty whereas the rest more easily.

The four types of pride can be compared with a pillar of stone a bone a piece of wood and liana of a *Dilbergia ougetensis* each of which is more inflexible than the succeeding

The four types of deceitfulness can be compared with a bamboo root a ram's horn a cow's urine and a piece of wood each of which is more crooked than the succeeding. The crookedness of each of these is removed more easily than that of the preceding. For instance the zigzag line of a cow's urine disappears through the influence of wind and weather.

The four types of greed can be compared with a scarlet colour a great quantity of dirt a small quantity of dirt and a spot of turmeric each of which soils a garment. The difficulty of removing the soiling in each case is greater than that in the succeeding one¹

1 Slightly different illustrations are given in II J (p 124). Further there on pp 124-125 it is said in connection with avarice

If avarice be cherished even to the least degree it will stain the soul yellow like turmeric but this discoloration can easily be washed off. If greed be given way to for a fortnight the heart will be soiled like earthen cooking pots which can only be cleansed with great labour. If one cherishes it for four months its stain grows as difficult to efface as the marks left by the oil of a cart wheel and in the last degree it can never be washed away in this life whatever efforts one may make but is as inefaceable as the crimson dye.

Cl Come now and let us reason together saith the Lord

The nine kinds of *no kaṣayas* are (i) laughing—joking (ii) improper and confirmed prejudicial liking (iii) improper and confirmed prejudicial disliking (iv) fear (v) sorrow or grief (vi) disgust and (vii-vi) sex passions as found in males females and neuters¹ All these nine kinds accompany as well as excite *kaṣayas* and hence they are called *no kaṣayas*

though your sins be as scarlet they shall be as white as snow though be red like crimson they shall be as wool —*Isaiah* : 18

1 These three sex passions are respectively known as *purusa veda stri veda* and *napuṃsaka veda* Under the influence of the *purusa veda* is generated in a male the desire for union with a female in the way the desire for eating something sour is awakened by phlegm This *veda* is like a straw fire which blazes with the burning of the grass but which gets soon extinguished Similarly a male has at first an exceedingly strong desire but it disappears as soon as his lust is satisfied

Through *stri-veda* the desire for union with a male is excited in a female as through the bile the desire for eating something sweet is generated It is like the burning of dung As the dung ball only glimmers so long as it is covered but on its being violently shaken it grows into a continuously greater fire so also the desire in the female is at first very weak so long as she is untouched but grows into immensity through the enjoyment of the intercourse

All these beings who have no sexual organs are subject to *napuṃsaka-veda* The sexual desire in their case is exceedingly strong for it is directed towards men and women as well It corresponds to the desire for *majjika* (curdled milk with sugar and spices) created by bile and phlegm It may be also compared with the burning of a town which lasts long

cases where death does not take place in spite of the individual having resorted to the well known ways of committing suicide or his or her passing through a stage which usually culminates in death. What is the explanation of these anomalies? The answer is the *Jaina* view noted above.

It is in the present birth that the *ayusya karman* which is to produce its effect in the next birth is amalgamated. If this amalgamation is loose at the time of its bondage and not sufficiently tight it leaves a chance for the modification—decrease in the life period. If, however, this amalgamation is thoroughly tight—adamantine the period of life fixed at this stage can not be lessened whatever the circumstances may be at the time this *karman* has commenced to operate. It is difficult for cattle to get in a group of trees that have grown very near each other but reverse is the case if they are few and far between. Same is the case with the life period. If it is sufficiently tight, there is no scope for a deadly weapon, poison etc to diminish its full extent, but, if it is loose, it will not last as long as it was expected to be in the usual circumstances. It should be noted that though the full span of life is not lived at times the portion of the *ayusya karman* which is thus likely to be left unfructified, is finished off in an *antarmuhūrta* before one succumbs to death. Thus there is no room to charge

(V) *Āyusya karman* is of four types according as it is associated with celestial beings human beings, infernal beings and sub human beings (the rest) This *karman* determines 'a certain quantum of life but not a particularly definite number of years etc of life For, as, in the case of a sponge the quantity of water that it absorbs is determined but not the time it takes to leave it, so also the quantum of life is determined by this *karman*, but not the time occupied in its consumption

Such being the case we have two types of *ayusya* (life period) viz *apavartaniya* and *anapavartaniya* The former type is one where life gets cut short by external causes such as excessive pain poison, fire etc, and the latter is such where the external causes if any, produce no effect whatsoever, and thus the full span of life is lived An *apavartaniya ayusya* is thus *sopakrama* only whereas an *anapavartaniya ayusya* is both *sopakrama* and *nirupakrama*, *upakrama* standing for the attainment of any of the external causes above referred to This view of the *Jainas* leads us to believe that there is an untimely death and that it is not, as well

We shall deal with this *Jaina* view in *extenso* so that it may be easily grasped. When there is any epidemic or a war breaks out, we find a number of people dying a premature death Similarly we come across

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this *Jaina* view with *kyta naśa akṛtagama* or the like

The quick disposal of the *ayusya karman* is *apariartanā* popularly known as untimely death (*alala mṛtyu*) whereas its absence is *anapariartanā* or death at the right moment (*kala mṛtyu*)

Uḥakrama as already noted means the attainment of a cause or causes that lead to untimely death. In all there are such seven causes mentioned in *Āṭassaya niṣṣutti* (v. 723-725 and 726). They are (1) mentality (*adhajaiasāya*) (2) *nimitta* such as taking deadly poison getting stuck by a sword or so (3) food (4) pain (5) *parāghata* (fall in a well etc.) (6) touch & bite of a scorpion a poisonous serpent etc. and (7) respiration¹. Any of these causes does produce its evil effect in the case of one whose *ayusya* is *apariartaniya* whereas even all combined together prove a complete failure in producing their effect on one whose *ayusya* is *anapariartaniya*.

Gods and denizens of hells and some human beings whose life period consists of *asatmlheja* years and some *tiryacs* of similar longevity have an *anapariartaniya ayusya* which is *nirupakrama* only whereas persons who are no more to be reborn (*carama dehin*) and excellent personages such as the *Tirthankaras* the *Cakravartins* the *Vasudevas* and others have no doubt

¹ For further details see *Āṭala-darsa va-dīpikā* (pp. 475-478)

an *anapavartanija ayusya* but some of them have *sopakrama* and others *nirupakrama ayusya* as the case may be

(VI) *Nama karman* has 93 varieties. Some of these are associated with 5 sense organs 5 kinds of body 6 *samhananas* 6 *samsthanas* 5 colours 2 odours 5 tastes 8 touches and 4 states of existence (*gatis*). Of these varieties I shall select a few and explain them. The *nama karman* which causes birth as a being with one sense organ is called *ekendriya gati nama karman*. Similarly one that gives the gross physical body is called *audarika sarira nama karman*. Like wise the *karman* which gives an excellent joining of bones is called *vajrarsabhanaraca samhānana* and the *karman* which causes the entire body to be perfectly symmetrical *sama caturasra samsthina nama karman*. *Tirthankara nama karman* is also one of the varieties of *nāma karman*. It secures the position of a prophet of Jainism. Another *nama karman* worth noting is *ucehisa nama karman*. It bestows the capability of respiration.

(VII) *Gotra karman* is two fold according as it bestows high family surroundings or the low ones. In the former case it is known as *ucca gotra karman* and in the latter as *nicca gotra karman*.

(VIII) *Antaraya karman* is of five types

(a) *Danantaraya* which obstructs charity. When it operates, a person who knows the merit of giving

something in charity and who has something to give is not capable to give it even when there is some person worthy of the gift

(b) *Lubhantarāya* which obstructs profit of any kind. When it operates a person is not in a position to receive any profit even when he or she is a fit person and has exerted in the right direction for gaining it. Further, it is due to this very *karma* that one fails to receive a present though a friendly giver and a suitable present are there and the demand for the latter has been effective.

(c) *Blogantarāya*. It hinders the enjoyment of a thing which can be enjoyed once such as food, drink etc.

(d) *Upabhogantarāya*. It hinders enjoyment of a thing which can be enjoyed more than once e.g. dwelling, clothing, bed etc.

(e) *Viryāntarāya* which obstructs power. When it operates even a strong full grown person becomes incapable of exerting his or her power.

Thus in all there are $5+9+2+28+4+93+2+5=148$ *karma prakṛtis*. All of these are known as *uttara prakṛtis* whereas the eight kinds of *karma jñānantarāya* etc. as *mūla prakṛtis*.

All the *karmans* can be classified into 8 heads

(a) *ghāti karmans* and (b) *aghāti karmans* consist of all the 5 kinds of *j*,

9 types of *darsanatarana* all the 28 types of *mohaniya* and all the 5 types of *antaraya* i.e. they include 47 *uttari prakrtis* belonging to four *mūla prakrtis*. The rest are *aghati karmans*. They comprise the remaining 101 *uttara prakrtis* belonging to other four *mūla prakrtis*. Out of the *uttari prakrtis* the following are looked upon as *punya* whereas the rest as *pāp* in TS (VIII 26) —

(1) *Sata vedaniya* (2) *śmajaiva mohaniya* (3) *hasya* (4) *ratī* (5) male sex (6) good span of life, (7) good *nama karmans* and (8) *ucā gotra*

In other works 2 to 5 are not noted. They mention the varieties of 6 and 7 and on the whole mention 42 *uttara prakrtis* as *punya prakrtis* and 82 as *papa prakrtis*. For instance the span of life of a hellish being is *papa prakrti* whereas those of other three kinds of living beings are three *punya prakrtis*.

The following terms deserve to be mentioned in connection with the doctrine of *karmān* —

Satta abadhā kālā udāya udīranī apavartana udīartana and sanī rama

Sattā means existence in *potentia* of *karmans* from the moment of their assimilation—amalgamation with the embodied soul to the moment of their realization.

Abadhā kālā is an interval during which a *karmān* is existing but is not producing any effect—is non-operative.

Udāya is realization or manifestation of the effect

of a *karman* after its *abadhukala* is over.¹ It is two fold (i) *vipakodaya* and (ii) *pradesodaya*. Experiencing the *pradesas* of *karmans* in which the intensity (*rasa*) is present is *vipakodaya* whereas experiencing the *pradesas* of *karmans* from which the intensity is gone is *pradesodaya*. In *lṣayopasama* of *karmans* there is no *vipakodaya* but there is *pradesodaya* whereas in the *upāsama* of the *mohaniya karman*, there is neither *vipakodaya* nor *pradesodaya*.

Udīrana is the premature realization of the effect of a *karman*.

The time during which a *karman* operates and the intensity with which it manifests is fixed—definite. But the effect of *karman* can be increased or decreased. The increased realization is called 'apavartana' and the decreased one 'udvartana'. The most important *apavartana* is that of *āyusya karman*.

Sanhrama roughly means transformation of one *karman* into another. It takes place in the case of the *uttara prakṛtis* of a *mula prakṛti* and not in the case of any two different *mula prakṛtis*. Further, as regards the *uttara prakṛtis* it does not take place in the case of (a) the four types of *āyusya* (b) *darsana mohaniya* and *caritra mohaniya* and (c) the different kinds of *darsana mohaniya*.

1 The terms *sūta*, *baudha* and *udaya* may remind one of *sañcita*, *kriyamāna* and *prarabdha karman* of the *Vedāntins*.

Before proceeding further, we may note the following points:—

(1) No *karman* begins to operate immediately after it is amalgamated.

(2) Sometimes a *karman* can be made to operate before its realization has become due

(3) The effect of a *karman* can vary

(4) Transmigration is the undivorcable spouse of *karman*.

(5) The *karman* of the *Jaina* philosophy neither means a deed—work nor some invisible mystical force like *ādṛṣṭa*, but it is a complexus of very very subtle matter, which is supersensuous and which pervades the entire *loka*.

(6) The *paramānus* of *kārmana-vargaṇā* are attracted by the mundane soul when its *pradeśas* vibrate, and they get united—assimilated—amalgamated with this soul in a way which far surpasses the union between milk and water and between fire and an iron ball.

Evaluation—The doctrine of *karman* is the only means which satisfactorily explains various anomalies of this world. For instance, it furnishes us with a rational answer as to why several mundane living beings have limited knowledge and energy, accept false doctrines, believe pseudo-prophets, neglect the laws of morality, experience pain and have a short span of

life Thus it is based upon reason and its truth is self evident It provides a great incitement to do good by invigorating power over the moral nature and furnishes a considerable stimulus to activity and responsibility It advocates perfect justice for it distinctly declares that there is no spot either on this earth or in the sky, under the sea or in the cleft of mountains whither going an evil doer can escape from the sufferings which result from his or her evil deeds There is no room for the intervention of God and for the theory of forgiveness since the natural law of *karman* is unerring and self acting and is the finest illustration of the theory of cause and effect It teaches that 'man is the architect of his own fortune and gives a pleasing satisfaction to those who are enjoying a happy life reminding them that they reap the fruits of the good seeds they had sown It inspires a man with the principle of 'plain living and high thinking It deals a fatal blow to the indolent and

rious deeds It gives comfort and consolation to those that are in dark despair by giving hopes that they will have a bright future for the good deeds they have done and they are doing, though they suffer now for some evil deeds they must have committed in one or more previous existences It does not endorse such a belief that this earthly life is a punishment for sins committed by our "first parents" and the pessimistic view that 'this world is a vale of tears' With full confidence and correctness, it teaches us that all the dark phenomena of life are the outcome of *kaśāyas*—ignorance, delusion, malice and indolence of each individual, and that all is bright and noble is the result of good behaviour and right knowledge. Thus, in short, it gives full scope for the moral development



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APPENDIX

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